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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN INDONESIA 
By 
BONDI ARIFIN 
DECEMBER 2017 
Committee Chair: Dr. Thomas A. Mroz 
Major Department: Economics 
 
Improvement in health, education, and reducing child labor are a widely accepted public 
policy in the developed as well as developing countries. This dissertation consists three essays that 
examines the impact of health and education policy in Indonesia. The first essay examines the 
impact of the existence of limited resource hospitals on medical care utilization and household 
health expenditures. Limited physical access to facility health care is a primary concern that 
contributes to high health risks and inadequate medical care in developing countries, primarily in 
poor areas. The Indonesian government built limited-resource hospitals in poor areas. Difference-
in-differences and matching-difference-in-differences methodologies were used in exploiting 
timing implementations of mobile hospital establishments. To do so, I scrape and utilize variables 
about hospital location and travel distance from many different sources. I find the existence of 
public hospitals more likely increases outpatient and inpatient in public hospitals, as well as 
household health expenditures. Also, I find only areas in which new hospitals are located closer 
than existing hospitals or more transportation alternatives benefit from the intervention. These 
results suggest that not only broadly expanding facility health centers but also improving 
infrastructures in poor areas are critical for improving access to health care. 
 
 
The second essay investigates how dependent coverage changes for civil servants' children 
impacts medical care utilization for Indonesia universal health insurance (BPJS) scheme in 2014. 
I use a difference-in-differences and triple difference-in-differences methodologies with the third 
children as a treatment group, and both the first two children and the fourth and afterward children 
as a control group, by exploiting timing implementation of policy changes in civil servant 
dependent coverage insurance policy. I employ representative data from Indonesia Family Life 
Survey (IFLS). I find coverage expansion more likely increases outpatient medical care utilization 
in public hospitals for eligible children. Also, I separate the impacts of eligibility status and 
reduction of copayment. Our results are robust to many specifications. These findings suggest that 
broadly expanding public insurance dependent coverage is beneficial for insurance holders. 
The last essay the impacts of compulsory education and free tuition programs in Indonesia 
on child labor and health outcomes for children. I use difference-in-differences and matching 
difference-in-differences approaches with 13- to 15-year-old junior high school students as a 
treatment group and 16- to 18-year-old senior high schoolers as a control group by exploiting 
timing implementations of compulsory education and free tuition programs. I employ large 
representative data from Indonesian Household Surveys (SUSENAS). I find compulsory education 
and free tuition programs significantly reduce the probability of child labor and illness symptoms. 
The results support the notion that free tuition eases household budget constraints to keep children 
in school and prohibit them from working, thus leading to children becoming healthier. Our results 
are robust to many specifications. These findings suggest that broadly expanding compulsory 
education supported by free tuition programs to higher levels of education would benefit society 
in general. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Improving education, reducing child labor, and increasing health outcomes are widely 
accepted public policy goals in developed as well as developing countries. However, there always 
been a debate about which government intervention best for its citizen welfare and how do similar 
interventions in developed countries create a different impact when they are applied in developing 
countries. This dissertation purpose seeks to examine the impact of government interventions 
about health and education in a developing country. In particular, the first two chapters investigate 
the construction of health facilities and health insurance expansion on medical care utilization; the 
last chapter focuses on how an education policy affects child labor and health outcomes. 
Limited physical access to health care is a major factor contributing to the poor health of 
populations in developing countries. Furthermore, inequality of development between city and 
rural areas creates an additional burden for people who live in the countryside. Tough topography 
or remote regions hamper individuals' access to medical care, and these factors also contribute to 
lack of health centers. In the first chapter, I examine the impact of limited resource hospitals, 
namely mobile hospitals, for underdeveloped municipalities on medical care utilization and 
household health expenditures. Access to the hospital would lower the effective price (regarding 
time and traveling cost) of medical care utilization and reduce delays in getting medical care. On 
the other hand, severe topography and lack transportation would hamper individual access to 
newly-built hospitals.  
I applied difference-in-differences (DID) and matching-DID methods with areas that 
constructed mobile hospitals as a treatment group and municipalities that did not have any 
hospitals as a control group. Also, variables such as hospital location and travel distance were 
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collected from many different sources, including Google Developers. I find that the establishment 
of mobile hospitals more likely increases outpatient to more than 1.2 percentage points, 
corresponding to more than a 40 percent increase from the pre-intervention period. Furthermore, 
it more likely increases inpatient by 0.2 percentage points, corresponding to more than a 33 percent 
increase from the pre-intervention period. Interestingly, our results suggest enormous impact for 
areas that are located in main islands, but I find no evidence for outer islands. Also, only regions 
with new hospitals located closer than existing hospitals benefit from the intervention. The 
findings support the notion that healthcare facilities are an essential factor that contributes to access 
to medical care utilization. Moreover, there may be another policy required in addition to public 
hospital construction in outer islands, such as infrastructure construction to connect those islands. 
In the second chapter, I examines the causal effect of government-provided insurance for 
children on their medical care utilization by exploiting changes in public insurance coverage for 
children in Indonesia. Access to health insurance for covered children will lower the effective price 
of medical care utilization in all public health facilities and member private health facilities, and 
reduce delays in getting medical care that may translate into better health outcomes. I use 
difference-in-differences (DID) and triple DID approaches with newly eligible children (third 
child) because of the policy change as a treatment group and both eligible children already in place 
(first and second children) or ineligible children (fourth and above) within a household as a control 
group. I find that eligible children are more likely to have outpatient care in hospitals by 4 
percentage points, corresponding to a 210 percent increase from the pre-intervention period. There 
is a more substantial impact when I count both eligibility and co-payment reduction effects. That 
is, universal health coverage not only adds the third children to the scheme but also includes co-
payment reduction from their initial program. 
3 
 
The last chapter estimates the causal effect of compulsory education together with free 
school programs on child labor and health outcomes by exploiting changes in compulsory 
government education and free tuition programs in Indonesia. The Indonesian government has 
mandated primary nine-year school since 2003, from previous (1993) mandates of only up to six 
years of education. However, in developing countries, mandates per se may not be optimal to bring 
children into school and keep them away from working. Additional interventions are required for 
developing countries because of the nature of developing countries' limited financing ability or 
limited education facilities to put their children into school.  
I apply difference-in-differences (DID) and matching DID approaches with 13- to 15-year-
old junior high school students as a treatment group and 16- to 18-year-old senior high school 
students as a control group. I employ representative large-scale multi-purpose socioeconomic 
survey data of Indonesian families and individuals (SUSENAS) for the years 1997-1999 and 2003-
2014. I find compulsory education and free tuition programs likely lead to reductions in child labor 
and fewer experiences with diarrhea and migraines. The impact is larger for children from low-
income families and children from rural areas. It suggests the program eases household budget 
constraints. Our results suggest the benefit of government expenditures in education on child labor 
and health outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC HOSPITAL AVAILABILITY IN 
UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS ON MEDICAL CARE UTILIZATION AND 
HOUSEHOLD HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Limited physical access to health care is a major factor contributing to the poor health of 
populations in developing countries (Perry & Gesler, 2000). Furthermore, inequality of 
development between city and rural areas creates an additional burden for people who live in the 
countryside. Tough topography or remote regions hamper individuals' access to medical care, and 
these factors also contribute to a lack of health centers. The Indonesian government has introduced 
limited resource hospitals, named mobile hospitals, for underdeveloped municipalities, outer 
islands, and shared state border cities.  
A mobile hospital is a hospital with a non-permanent structure (such as combined 
containers) and limited land area (around 2,500 m2). However, it provides all medical care required 
including outpatient, inpatient, midwifery, and emergency.  It was a substantial policy intervention 
because there were neither public nor private hospitals in areas that are far from any other place 
and lack transportation. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the causal effect of government-
provided hospitals on medical care utilization and household health expenditures by exploiting 
mobile hospital development over time in Indonesia.  
This government policy creates a differential impact on families living in one area and 
families residing in other regions over time. Access to the hospital would lower the effective price 
(regarding time and traveling cost) of medical care utilization and reduce delays in getting medical 
care. On the other hand, severe topography and lack transportation would hamper individual access 
to newly-built hospitals. So, the impact depends on the hospital location, whether it is reachable 
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by the society in an area and relative distance compared to an existing hospital in neighboring 
cities.  Also, it may either increase or decrease household health expenditures. Improving access 
to health care facilities can enhance medical care utilization, thus increasing household health 
expenditures. On the other hand, closer health facilities may reduce transportation cost, thus 
decreasing family health expenses. Substitution or complement effects between health centers may 
either increase or decrease household health expenditures Therefore, the impact on health 
expenditures depends on whether the reduction in transportation cost outweighs the increase in 
medical care cost due to higher medical care utilization, also substitution/complement effect 
between health center. Furthermore, improvement in access to health care utilization may translate 
into better health outcomes.  
Despite the importance of access to health facilities, there are scant studies in developing 
countries. Well-designed transportation systems in urban areas may cause inconclusive evidence 
in developed countries because additional health facilities may not substantially decrease travel 
time (Carpenter, Morrow, Del Gaudio, & Ritzler, 1981; McGuirk & Porell, 1984; Mooney, 
Zwanziger, Phibbs, & Schmitt, 2000). Even though medical care utilization significantly correlates 
with distance in developing countries (Ayeni, Rushton, & McNulty, 1987; Stock, 1983; Tanser, 
Gijsbertsen, & Herbst, 2006), those areas are mostly covered by land. Indonesia has unique 
geographic characteristics that differ from countries in previous studies. For example, Indonesia 
consists of thousands of separate islands, even within the same municipalities. It creates an 
additional burden to access primary health centers since no ground transportation is available to 
travel to other islands. 
This study contributes a valuable resource for policymakers in assessing the impact of 
public expenditures for rural development in developing countries. To my knowledge, this is the 
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first study the impact of public hospital availability in Indonesia. Our solution to the problem of 
lack of health facilities in developing countries is to exploit a quasi-experimental intervention of 
government spending on public hospitals. I applied difference-in-differences (DID) and matching-
DID methods with areas that constructed mobile hospitals as a treatment group and municipalities 
that did not have any hospitals as a control group. Also, variables such as hospital location and 
travel distance were collected from many different sources, including Google Developers. This 
information enables us to understand who benefits and who does not benefit from the intervention 
within the same municipality by comparing travel distance to new hospitals and existing hospitals.  
I compared the evolution of medical care utilization at the individual level between the 
treatment and control units by policy interventions. I used large representative data from 
Indonesian Household Surveys (SUSENAS) that covers underdeveloped or remote areas. 
Indonesian government built more than 80 percent of the overall mobile hospitals in Indonesia 
between 2008 and 2012. I estimated the impact of mobile hospital establishment in 2008 since it 
was the first large wave in building mobile hospitals.  
I find that the establishment of mobile hospitals more likely increases outpatient use by 
more than 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to more than a 40 percent increase from the pre-
intervention period. Furthermore, it more likely increases inpatient by 0.2 percentage points, 
corresponding to more than a 33 percent increase from the pre-intervention period. Interestingly, 
our results suggest enormous impact for areas that are located in main islands, but I find no 
evidence for outer islands. Also, only regions with new hospitals located closer than existing 
hospitals benefit from the intervention. Our results are robust to many specifications. The findings 
support the notion that healthcare facilities are an essential factor that contributes to access to 
7 
 
medical care utilization. Moreover, there may be another policy required in addition to public 
hospital construction in outer islands, such as infrastructure construction to connect those islands. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the impact 
of health facilities. Sections 3 and 4 describe the history of the mobile hospital in Indonesia and 
data sources. Section 5 discusses identification strategies. In section 6 I apply those methods to 
mobile hospital availability, robustness and placebo tests. Section 7 concludes. 
 
1.2. Review of the relevant previous literature 
1.2.1. The impact of physical distance of health facilities 
Research on the physical distance of human activities and economic outcomes mostly 
comes from environmental and resource studies, namely distance-decay approaches. It shows how 
population characteristics or the demand for a particular good may differ when physical distance 
increases. For instance, biodiversity studies use distance-decay approaches to explain how the 
similarity between two communities varies with the geographic distance that separates them. 
Transportation demand studies evaluate the performance of the transportation network and travel 
patterns and their effects on medical care facilities (Bashshur, Shannon, & Metzner, 1971; 
Martínez & Viegas, 2013; Morlon et al., 2008).  
A basic distance-decay model assumes interaction intensity of population with health 
facilities as a function of physical distance: 
𝐼𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑗)                                                                     (1) 
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𝑑𝑗 = [(𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖)
2
+ (𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖)
2 ]1/2                                              (2) 
where Ij is some measure of interaction intensity, f(.) is monotonically decreasing function of 
distance, and dj is some measure of distance measured as direct lines from the coordinate (xj,yj)  
location j of each residence to the coordinate (xi,yi) location of medical facility i (Bashshur et al., 
1971; Taylor, 1971). Equation (2) of the basic distance-decay model assumes distance as a straight 
line measured from point A to point B. However, a distance from one point to another point may 
not be a straight line. For example, the travel distance from house A to hospital B follows roads or 
rivers instead of straight-line distance. Moreover, people who live in mountainous areas may have 
to use spiral-shaped streets to reach a hospital that is located down the mountain. It creates a 
significant difference between straight-line distance and travel distance.   
Varieties of this model develop some specifications and control factors that affect both 
distance and outcomes. Two most-often-used specification developments are an exponential 
model and a gravity model. Exponential models treat f(.) as the exponential of distance, and gravity 
models normalize range with all intervening hospital ranges around a neighborhood (De Vries, 
Nijkamp, & Rietveld, 2004; McGuirk & Porell, 1984; Morlon et al., 2008; Roghmann & 
Zastowny, 1979; Stock, 1983).    
Many factors confounded the impact of physical distance of the hospital. People are more 
likely to travel to a different level of services, such as a general or a specializing health facility, 
and larger hospitals are perceived to be higher quality. Socio-demographic characteristics such as 
income, gender, age, and culture may create a differential impact of distance on utilization. For 
instance, adults are more likely to travel farther than children. There also may be cultural 
restrictions in society related to distance. Season and type of illnesses have different utilization 
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patterns. For example, rainy seasons are more likely to generate more flu diseases, and some 
populations may be inclined to go to a traditional healer for fractured bones. Other important 
factors affecting both distance and health facility choices include the existence of intervening 
hospitals and physicians in the neighborhood; more hospitals give more opportunities for medical 
care utilization (McGuirk & Porell, 1984; Stock, 1983).  
 
1.2.2. The impact on medical care utilization 
Improving access to medical care utilization will lower the effective price of health care, 
thus increasing its use (Dafny & Gruber, 2005). However, empirical evidence shows inconclusive 
evidence about whether physical access affects health facility utilization choices and medical care 
utilization.  There are two principal directions of empirical research studies that examine the 
impact of hospital physical distance on medical care utilization, rural and urban areas.   
Empirical studies examining the effects of physical access to a hospital for medical care 
utilization in cities have found inconclusive evidence, whereas one study in a Allegheny county, 
Pennsylvania  found that significant distance and time factors strongly influence hospital choices 
that vary by service and hospital (McGuirk & Porell, 1984). On the other hand, other studies 
showed no significant differences in hospital or clinic choice pattern services based on the distance 
from Rochester, New York and the greater Cleveland area (Bashshur et al., 1971; Carpenter et al., 
1981).  These instances of mixed evidence may be related to well-developed transportation 
systems in urban areas. Increasing physical distance in a metropolitan area may only slightly 
increase travel time due to reliable transportation systems.   
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Empirical evidence in the countryside has mostly come from developing countries. 
Empirical studies in Kano State, Nigeria, and Kwa-Zulu Natal, South Africa, found that utilization 
per capita declined with distance or travel time (Tanser et al., 2006). Another study in rural areas 
in Nigeria revealed that new facilities have increased the use of maternal and child health centers. 
However, current location of health facilities could be improved which population could have been 
more accessible to the centers (Ayeni, Rushton, & McNulty, 1987; Stock, 1983).   
I introduce substitution or complementary effect between health facilities. The idea is that 
reducing the effective price of one provider may reduce utilization of another provider. This 
substitution effect could create a different impact on health outcomes if there are differences in 
quality across providers. For example, closer distance to the public hospital might mean that an 
individual visits a primary-care physician instead of traditional healer, since doctors are more 
likely to refer the person to a hospital if they need further advanced treatment. A closer distance 
to the public hospital may substitute similar medical care utilization on the private hospital, and 
vice versa since they provide similar services. The existence of a health facility could have a 
complementary impact if nearby facilities have similar objectives and supporting activities. For 
example, public hospitals in Indonesia use a referral from public health care before someone could 
visit a hospital, except for some urgent medical care such as an emergency.  
Furthermore, increasing the accessibility of medical care may increase ex-ante moral 
hazards by people not taking preventive uses such as immunizations and routine check-up. Also, 
reducing the effective price of medical care would discourage self-protection because of decreased 
financial losses associated with illness (Barbaresco et al., 2015; Ehrlich & Becker, 1972). 
Therefore, hospital availability may increase or decrease the utilization of medical care from 
different medical care utilization channels.  
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1.3. History of mobile hospitals in Indonesia 
The Indonesian government-provided limited medical facility hospital started in 2005 
when a new government regime prioritized developing poor areas and remote islands by issuing 
Presidential Decree No. 78 about outer islands management. The Ministry of Health spelled out 
this mandate that requires cooperation between central and local governments to build hospitals, 
issuing regulations about field and mobile hospitals in underdeveloped municipalities and/or on 
remote islands. They started to build one field hospital in 2004 and 2005, then established two in 
2006. Ten mobile hospitals were constructed in 2008 and nine in 2012. Modern mobile hospitals 
have better medical facilities than those built years ago. While the field hospital may be built by 
using tents in the temporary location, the mobile hospital can be constructed using bricks or mixed 
containers. 
The mobile hospital is a hospital in a non-permanent building with limited land area. For 
example, a mobile hospital can be made using mixed containers covering less than 2,500 m2. 
Although it was created with limited resources, it gives all required medical care services, 
including outpatient, inpatient, midwifery, and emergency. The central government constructed 
the hospital and covered all operating costs in the first year, reducing its support gradually over 
time as local authorities started financing this hospital from that point on. 
To support a mobile hospital operation, cooperation between central and local governments 
was necessary to provide at least three general practitioners and two specialists in the hospital. 
Using another regulation, the Ministry of Health mandated each newly graduated doctor to 
dedicate their time for a particular period, one or two years, in remote places. They also gave 
additional monetary incentives for physicians who worked at those places, both for mandated 
physicians and doctors voluntarily working at those remote sites. 
12 
 
The Ministry of Health together with the local government developed eligibility criteria 
from the Ministry of Underdeveloped Areas for building mobile hospitals based on geography, 
accessibility, social, economic, culture, health, and budget priorities. One obvious eligible criterion 
was that a municipality must not have a single hospital. They defined remote areas as a zone 
located in inland areas, mountainous regions, small outer islands, and/or a shared international 
border region. Furthermore, they identified underdeveloped areas as those with less developed 
sectors nationally in their social, economic, culture, and health conditions. Therefore, we would 
expect these targeted areas would more likely have high-risk people and less transportation 
compared to non-targeted areas.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Mobile Hospital Map 
 
Figure 1.1 provides the mobile hospital map across Indonesia. The green shaded areas with 
green “H” signs are municipalities where mobile hospitals were built in 2008. The blue shaded 
with blue “H” signs are municipalities where mobile hospitals were constructed in 2012. The grey 
patterns without any “H” signs are municipalities which have no hospital as of 2014. The figure 
suggests that hospitals have been built both in the west and east regions, but they were not made 
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on Java Island. Hospitals were built not only inside the main five big islands but also in the outer 
and isolated regions. However, mobile hospitals only reached the east region in 2012. The west 
region is more developed than the east region in infrastructure and economy on average. For 
example, the Indonesian capital city, Jakarta, is located on the island of Java (in the western part 
of Indonesia). So, different level of economic and infrastructure development between those two 
regions may be one possible reason why mobile hospitals were only built in the east region in 
2012. 
Different geographical characteristics between the main islands and outer islands are other 
relevant facts to consider. People who live on the main islands could have more choices of 
transportation mode compared to people who live on the outer islands. For example, while people 
on the main islands could either use ground transportation, water transportation or just walk to 
nearest hospitals, people on the outer islands must use either ferry or private boat to reach hospitals 
in the neighboring islands, even within the same municipality. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. A Municipality on a Main Island (Papua Island) 
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Figures 1.2 and 1.3 provide example areas in main islands and outer islands. The blue 
shaded area in Figure 1.2 is a municipality on a main island, Mamberamo Raya. Water 
transportation is the primary transportation mode in this area. People in this area could use either 
water transportation or ground transportation for limited distance, or simply walk to the nearby 
hospital.  
 
 
Figure 1.3. A Municipality on an Outer Island (Alor) 
Figure 1.3 shows two islands within the same district, Alor. People on one island must use 
either a ferry or private boat to reach their nearest hospital on a neighboring island because a sea 
isolates those islands. In addition, people who live on outer islands could have much longer travel 
time to reach nearby islands because of using a ferry or other water transportation. For example, 
travel from Sulawesi Island (main island) to Talaud Islands (outer islands) might take ten hours 
using a ferry. Additionally, water transportation may not be available all of the time. A ferry 
transportation may be available only once or twice a week and a private boat only once or twice a 
day, depending on travel locations. Therefore, people who live on outer islands have more burden 
to reach both nearby existing hospitals and newly-constructed mobile hospitals.   
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1.4. Data 
I employed eight waves’ repeated cross-section data sets from the Indonesia National 
Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS), periods 2004-2007 and 2009-2011. I excluded 2008 because 
of the mobile hospital regulation effective as of October 2008. Thus, an individual may or may not 
be treated depending on when they were interviewed during that year. SUSENAS removed sub-
district identifiers since 2012. Sub-district identifiers are required to merge with travel distance 
data on our primary analysis. Therefore, I included 2012-2014 for robustness purposes without 
utilize travel distance. 
SUSENAS is a series of restricted large-scale multi-purpose socioeconomic surveys 
initiated in 1963-1964 and fielded every year or two since then. Since 1993, SUSENAS has 
collected household and individual data across all provinces in Indonesia, including 
underdeveloped or remote areas. Each survey contains a core questionnaire that consists of roster 
household characteristic, healthcare and educational attainment, and labor force experience. 
SUSENAS conducts a quarterly survey that is stacked into yearly data sets; it samples around 
75,000 households on average for each study period: March, June, September, and December. 
Therefore, it typically includes 200,000 to 300,000 families in one-year data sets. 
Since SUSENAS does not have hospital information, I complemented this dataset by 
scraping Hospital Information System (SIRS) data from the Indonesian Ministry of Health website. 
This dataset covers all hospitals in Indonesia and provides detailed hospital characteristics such as 
the number of beds, number of general practitioners and specialists, hospital equipment, hospital 
address and municipality, and hospital establishment or extension regulation.  
I utilized Google Developers and Facebook to obtain hospital geographic coordinate 
information from the information provided in SIRS. In particular, I used Google Developers’ 
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Places API to find each hospital address and determine its geographic location. However, not all 
hospital addresses were found in Google Developers, since I am working on 
underdeveloped/remote areas. I used Facebook to complement what is missing from Google 
Developers. For example, when someone “checked in” or created a fan page for a hospital in 
Indonesia, I could obtain that hospital's coordinates from Facebook. With a similar method, I 
gathered coordinate locations for each centroid sub-district in our population interest. 
   
 
Source: Ministry of Transportation Republic of Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, 2011) 
Figure 1.4. Water Transportation Routes in Indonesia 
 
Next, I utilized Google Developers' Direction API to obtain travel distance from each sub-
district to both existing hospitals in the shared border municipality and a newly-built hospital 
within district. Figure A.1 provides example information of travel distances from Google 
Developers’ Direction API using R software. Google gives both origin and destination coordinates, 
address, polygon (travel routes), boundaries, travel time, travel distance, and travel mode.  I used 
driving travel mode to achieve a similar travel mode for all observations. Figure A.1 also shows a 
missing value when Google Developers cannot estimate travel distance from point A to point B. 
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Locations without ground transportation generate those missing values since Google Developers 
only estimates travel distance when there is ground transportation available between two points.   
I manually tracked and estimated travel distances for missing locations in Google 
Developers using either ArcMap software or Google Maps.  The Ministry of Transportation of the 
Republic of Indonesia provides maps for ferry or other boat routes across all Indonesian regions, 
as depicted in Figure 1.4. I followed these routes using Google Maps to determine the waterway 
travel distance from a sub-district to existing municipalities in which boats possibly pass an island 
in our population of interest. For example, I estimated the travel distance from a local island seaport 
in a sub-district in the Talaud Islands to a domestic seaport on Sulawesi Island; then I estimated 
the travel distance from a local seaport to a hospital location using Google Developers’ Direction 
API. Travel distance is the summation of the waterway travel distance between two local seaports 
and ground transportation travel distance from a local seaport to a hospital. Also, I estimated travel 
distance when people use river transportation, primarily in areas of main islands which do not have 
any ground transportation. Figure 1.2 above shows an example of a hospital located on the main 
river. I tracked and estimated the river distance from a sub-district to a hospital location to obtain 
the travel distance either using Google Maps or ArcMap software. Finally, I matched SUSENAS 
and all available information at the sub-district level.  
 
1.5. Identification strategy 
In this section, I describe identification strategy and estimation methods. I utilized central 
government criteria for building mobile hospitals based on geographic, accessibility, social, 
economic, culture, health analysis, and budget priorities. Our control groups are municipalities in 
Indonesia without hospitals, and they are not located on Java Island since it is the primary criteria 
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to build a mobile hospital in a particular area. Furthermore, the Indonesian government identified 
underdeveloped regions as areas that have less development than other sectors in their social, 
economic, culture, and health conditions. Therefore, I expected these targeted areas would more 
likely have high-risk people and a small number of municipalities that do not have any hospital 
and meeting all of those criteria. I identified 35 municipalities satisfying the above criteria, in 
addition to 9 areas in which mobile hospitals were constructed in 2012.  
The basic approach is a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. Our baseline regression 
is the following:  
 
Yikrt =  α0 +  α1(Tikr ∗ Postt) +  α2X`ikrt +  α3Z`krt +  k + 𝜇rt +  ϵikrt                  (3)  
 
where Yikrt is a binary variable whether an individual has outpatient/inpatient visit at the 
public/private hospital or household health expenditures per capita for an individual/family i living 
in region r and municipality k at time t. Tikr is a treatment indicator of whether an individual or a 
family is residing in a community where a mobile hospital was built. Postt indicates whether period 
t is after the implementation of the new policy (2008). X`ikrt is an individual or a household level 
vector of control variables including gender, age, married, year of education, family size, and 
whether a person is living in a rural area. Travel distance and nearby municipality hospital 
characteristics correlate with medical care utilization with community who live on areas under 
studies. Controlling travel distance and hospital characteristics are essential to capture 
heterogeneity between medical care utilization because of hospital existence in the neighborhood 
areas.  Z`krt is a sub-district vector of control variables for an indicator of sub-district total travel 
distance and travel distance using water transportation to the nearest shared border town hospital, 
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number of beds of a nearest hospital, and hospital type (public hospital governed by central 
government, public hospital run by local government, or private hospital) at time t. I included 
municipality fixed effect (𝑘) and region year fixed effect (μ𝑟𝑡) to capture unobserved differences 
for space and time, respectively, and ϵikrt is the idiosyncratic error term. I defined nine regions, one 
for each of the five main large islands, and outer small islands as the last four regions.  I clustered 
by household level to capture unobserved differences between families. 
I expanded the standard DID approach above with a matching-DID approach, due to the 
various demographic criteria developed in building a mobile hospital and compositional 
characteristics changes over time between the treatment and control group that may confound the 
impact of the treatment (Hong, 2013). For example, due to infrastructure and economic 
development in certain areas, one municipality may not be categorized as the countryside over 
time, and this composition change may confound the impact of the intervention. The effect 
magnitude is not only from the incidence of the existence of a mobile hospital in the area but also 
the effect of diffusion of the infrastructures in the areas, although this is less likely to happen due 
to harsh topography conditions.  
To begin matching difference-in-differences, I first estimated multivariate propensity score 
using standard propensity score matching methods (see, for examples Angrist & Pischke, 2008; 
Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). I estimated propensity scores of being treated separately for each 
time t, both pre-treatment-year and post-treatment-year following multivariate propensity score 
propensity score method from Hong (2013), using the following: 
 
P(Tikrt = 1 | Xikrt ,Z`krt) = ϕ(X`ikrtβ𝑡)                                               (4) 
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where 𝑇𝑖𝑘𝑟t , 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑟t , and 𝑋𝑘𝑟t are as described in equation (3). Each year, propensity score matching 
is used to balance the sample characteristics for both pre- and post-treatment periods from repeated 
cross-sectional data.  
Suppose I have an estimated propensity score 𝑃𝑖𝑘𝑟𝑡 for an individual/household i who lives 
in municipality k at time t. I then impute those propensity scores for all observations as probability 
weights. I use the matched-sample and apply DID in equation (3), but including probability weight 
for each matched observation. 
 
1.6. Empirical results  
In this section, I provide descriptive statistics, and empirical analysis of limited resource 
hospital existence. Our analysis includes the average treatment effects of limited hospital 
existence, heterogeneity between main islands and outer islands, and travel distance analysis 
regarding to new constructed hospitals. 
1.6.1. Descriptive statistics (Mobile hospitals available in 2008) 
Table 1.1 shows the means and standard deviations for medical care utilization outcomes 
and covariates. The outpatient variable is a binary variable of 0 or 1 showing whether an individual 
went to outpatient care in the last 30 days. Inpatient variable is a binary variable of whether a 
person received inpatient services in the last year. Nominal household health expenditures are 
continuous variables for nominal household health expenditures per capita in a given year.  
The treatment group has higher outpatient, inpatient, and household health expenditures 
per capita before the intervention period; it depicts the treatment group as having a higher health 
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risk. However, the treatment group has a more considerable increase in outpatient, inpatient trend, 
and household health expenditures per capita after the intervention period, implying preliminary 
evidence of improvement in medical care accessibility. One interesting evidence is similar 
inpatient and outpatient traffic at private hospitals for both periods between treatment and control 
groups. It may show evidence of no substitution effect between health facilities. 
 
Table 1.1. Means and Standard Deviations 
Variables Pre-Intervention (2004-2007) Post-Intervention (2009-2011) 
Treatment Control Treatment Control 
     
Outcomes     
Inpatient, Public Hospital 0.006(0.080) 0.005(0.067) 0.010(0.099) 0.005(0.099) 
Outpatient, Public Hospital 0.031(0.172) 0.020(0.139) 0.042(0.201) 0.016(0.201) 
Outpatient, Private Hospital 0.006(0.075) 0.005(0.068) 0.006(0.077) 0.006(0.077) 
Inpatient, Private Hospital 0.001(0.028) 0.001(0.032) 0.001(0.032) 0.002(0.032) 
Ln(HH Health 
Expenditures/Capita) 
11.459(1.303) 11.184(1.293) 12.675(1.267) 12.545(1.267) 
     
Control     
Male 0.511(0.500) 0.509(0.500) 0.507(0.500) 0.509(0.500) 
Married 0.447(0.497) 0.437(0.496) 0.456(0.498) 0.448(0.498) 
Age 26.76(18.90) 25.76(18.61) 27.43(19.49) 26.37(19.49) 
Year of Education 6.087(4.322) 5.012(4.124) 6.170(4.318) 4.869(4.318) 
HH Size 5.055(1.939) 5.093(1.942) 4.184(2.404) 4.202(2.404) 
Rural 0.907(0.290) 0.885(0.320) 0.854(0.353) 0.913(0.353) 
Travel Distance to Nearest 
Existing Hospital (km) 
188.1(126.9) 125.4(100.4) 170.8(126.9) 117.1(126.9) 
Nearby Hospital Beds 80.08(60.22) 77.64(44.35) 79.47(61.02) 77.93(61.02) 
Travel Distance to New Hospital 
(km) 
0.000 (0.000) 0.000(0.000) 101.9(124.0) 0.000(0.000) 
     
N 41,968 to 181,022 33,439 to 138,443 
     
 
For demographic characteristics, both groups have similar traits except for age and year of 
education. The treatment group tends to have older people and higher education levels compared 
to their counterparts. Most of the population lives in rural areas, which capture poor/remote areas. 
One substantial difference is the travel distance to existing hospitals in the nearest municipality 
since they have no hospital in their regions. Both treatment and control areas had a travel distance 
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of more than 125 km to shared-border neighborhood hospitals before the intervention, which 
decreased over time as hospitals opened in nearby municipalities. But the control group has 50 to 
60 km shorter distance both before and after the intervention.  
New hospitals provide substantial decreases in travel distance for the treatment group. For 
example, new hospitals constructed in the nearby town reduce travel distance up to 18 km on 
average from travel distance mean to existing hospitals before 2008, but mobile hospital 
construction further reduce travel distance up to 88 km on average. Furthermore, our analysis, later 
on, shows great variation in travel distances between sub-districts located on main islands and 
outer islands. There are some areas having closer distances to new hospitals, but there are some 
areas farther distance new hospitals than existing hospitals. 
 
1.6.2. The impact on medical care utilization 
The impact of public hospital existence and travel distance varies between main islands 
and outer islands because of geographic characteristics different such as reliability of 
transportation alternatives in those islands. For example, communities who live on main islands 
could either use ground transportation or water transportation to a hospital in nearby 
municipalities, but water transportation is the only transportation available for those who live on 
outer islands.   
1.6.2.1.All samples 
Figure 5 presents the outpatient at public hospital trend for the treatment and control groups 
for all samples. Figure 1.5 suggests the treatment group has bounced trends before the intervention 
period, but the treatment group has substantially higher outpatient use at public hospitals after the 
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intervention period. Although mobile hospitals were constructed at the end of the year 2008, the 
treatment group shows two years' lag before increased outpatient care in the year 2011. In the next 
section we are able to show smoother outpatient trends when we separate between main islands 
and outer islands. It indicates different medical care utilization between communities living on 
main islands versus outer islands.  
 
Figure 1.5. Outpatient in Public Hospital 
Figure 1.6 provides the inpatient in public hospital trend for the treatment and control 
groups for all samples. I excluded Malinau municipality from our primary analysis for inpatient 
care because of unusual patterns over time. Excluding Malinau municipality decreases 3 percent 
of all inpatient samples. Figure B.1 shows that the Malinau district trends up and down. Figure 1.6 
suggests the treatment group has a similar inpatient trend as the control group before the 
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intervention period, but then the treatment group has higher inpatient care use at the public hospital 
after the intervention period.  
 
Figure 1.6. Inpatient in Public Hospital 
Table 1.2 provides DID and matching-DID probability estimations in outpatient and 
inpatient at the public hospital for population interest. Column (1) contains the DID approach, and 
column (2) provides the matching-DID approach for outpatient at government hospitals, similarly 
applied for inpatient at government hospitals in columns (3) and (4). I imputed a propensity score 
from the matching process and treated it as a probability weight in the matching-DID computations 
in columns (2) and (4). Treatment is an indicator of whether an individual lived in a municipality 
in which a mobile hospital was built in 2008. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether a 
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person experienced outpatient (inpatient) care at a public hospital in the last 30 days (12 months). 
While inpatient includes all individuals in the community, outpatient only covers individuals who 
experienced any morbidity symptoms. I included municipality fixed effects and region year fixed 
effects and clustered the standard error by household level to capture unobserved differences 
between families. 
Table 1.2. The Impact on Medical Care Utilization at Public Hospital (2008) 
 Outpatient Inpatient 
VARIABLES Public Hospital Public Hospital 
 DID Matching DID DID Matching DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment*Post 0.0168*** 0.0119*** 0.0019** 0.0015 
 (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Travel distance to an existing  0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0009** -0.0010** 
hospital (100 Km) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
     
Observations 74,401 73,435 303,291 299,193 
R-squared 0.0189 0.0242 0.0050 0.0057 
Individual and HH Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Sub-District Controls**  YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Propensity Score***   YES  YES 
* Gender, marital status, education, HH Size, and rural  
** # beds of existing hospitals, type of existing hospital  
*** Imputed propensity scores from matching process  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The matching-DID model shows smaller magnitudes for both outpatient and inpatient 
medical care although they are not much different. This magnitude difference may be due to the 
wide variability distribution of travel distances in outer islands compared to main islands. While 
people who live on main islands travel 150 km to existing hospitals in the nearby municipality on 
average, people who live on outer islands travel 180 km on average. A matching approach gives a 
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higher weight to the control group, who has similar travel distances as people in the treatment 
group. It suggests that the matching-DID approach addresses the potential bias in the DID 
approach that confounds hospital availability and medical care utilization. I address this problem 
in the next section by showing the smaller difference in magnitudes when I separate main islands 
from outer islands.  
Both models suggest an individual who lives in the treatment municipality is more likely 
to have both outpatient and inpatient medical care at a public hospital after the intervention period. 
In particular, a city in which a mobile hospital was opened in the areas is more likely to have 
public-hospital outpatient services increase more than 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to 
more than a 40 percent increase from the pre-intervention period outpatient average. Similar for 
inpatient, municipalities in which mobile hospitals were opened in the areas are more likely to 
have public-hospital inpatient care increase by 0.2 percentage points, corresponding to a 33 percent 
increase from the pre-intervention period inpatient average. It supports the notion that primary 
health facilities are essential factors contributing to access to health care. Harsh topography and 
lack of transportation hamper individual access to appropriate medical care, and even an existence 
of limited healthcare facilities may improve their health care access. 
The model suggests travel distance to the nearest hospital in a neighboring municipality 
more likely affects medical care utilization, primarily for inpatient medical services. 100 Km 
increase travel distance more likely decreases inpatient medical care by 0.1 percentage points. The 
result indicates people who required intensive medical care utilization through hospitalization 
more likely have an adverse impact on the farther distance to the nearest hospital. It is very intuitive 
because people who experience severe health risks less likely to travel farther to obtain medical 
care.  
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1.6.2.2.Main islands and outer islands  
To further investigate heterogeneity between Indonesian regions, I estimate the impact on 
main islands, and small outer islands. I define small outer islands as any island which is located 
outside the five main islands. The main islands and outer islands have different geographic 
characteristics. For example, municipalities which are located in the outer islands are more likely 
surrounded by sea that makes them more isolated from other areas, and their island location may 
result in wide variability in travel distances. It makes them less accessible to existing hospitals in 
the nearby municipalities because people have to use either ferry, boat, or airplane to reach nearby 
cities. Also, it is harder for residents on different islands within the same municipalities to reach 
new hospitals located on another island.    
  
 
Talaud Municipality 
Sitaro Municipality 
Figure 1.7.Talaud and Sitaro Islands 
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Figure 1.7 shows Talaud and Sitaro Islands, two sample municipalities which have a 
mobile hospital. Although there is a mobile hospital on one island, people who live on another 
island may not be able to go to an island where a mobile hospital is located since the sea isolates 
them. Therefore, we expect only the fraction of people who live on the same island as a mobile 
hospital may benefit from newly-constructed health facilities. On one hand, more isolated areas 
may represent higher marginal utilities of medical care, thus greater impact. On the other hand, 
separated islands within municipalities would lower access to constructed mobile hospitals, thus 
lowering treatment effects. Therefore, the net effect depends on whether infrastructure effects 
outweigh utilities of medical care, or vice versa.  
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 provide public-hospital inpatient and outpatient trends for individuals 
who live in the municipalities located on the main islands of Indonesia, respectively. The main 
islands include Sumatera, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Table C.1 and C.2 present 
similar public hospital trends for inpatient and outpatient medical care utilization for outer islands. 
Outer islands include Nusa Tenggara, Halmahera, Talaud, Sitaro (Siau Tagulandang Biaro), 
Maluku, and Morotai. 
Figure 1.8 suggests the treatment and control groups have similar public-hospital inpatient 
trends before the intervention period, primarily in 2006 and 2007. Their trends started to diverge 
in 2009 where mobile hospitals were constructed. The treatment group has higher public-hospital 
inpatient medical care rates over time after the intervention period. Table C.1 provides similar 
inpatient medical care information as in Figure 1.8, but for the outer islands. Similarly, table C.1 
suggests that both the treatment and control groups have similar trends before the intervention 
period, but the treatment group are more often likely inpatients at public hospitals after the 
intervention period, although the trend is not as pronounced as with the main islands. Both 
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treatment and control groups depict a substantial reduction in inpatient care at public hospitals in 
2011.  
 
 
Figure 1.8. Inpatient in Public Hospital: Main Islands 
Figure 1.9 suggests similar trends for public-hospital outpatient care utilization on the main 
islands. Initially, the treatment and control groups have similar patterns before the intervention 
period, primarily year 2006 and 2007. In particular, the lines cross each other; the treatment group 
has higher inpatient rates in 2004 and 2005 but then lower in 2006 and 2007. For both groups, 
three percent of people on average seek public-hospital outpatient care before the intervention 
period, evidence that harsh topography hampers community access to appropriate medical care. 
While there is no substantial difference in outpatient rates for the control group after the 
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intervention period, the treatment group has a considerable increase in public-hospital outpatient 
rates after the intervention period. Table C.2 provides public-hospital outpatient information for 
the outer islands. The figure suggests no substantial difference after the intervention. Therefore, 
all figures indicate a consistent increase in the inpatient and outpatient trends over time for the 
main islands' treatment group but a slight increase for outer islands.  
 
 
Figure 1.9. Outpatient in Public Hospital: Main Islands 
 
Table 1.3 provides DID and matching-DID estimations for the main islands and outer 
islands of Indonesia. Panel A is the DID approach, and Panel B is the matching-DID approach. 
Column (1) is an outpatient estimator for municipalities located on the main islands, column (2) is 
the analogous estimator for those found on outer islands, column (3) is the inpatient estimator for 
those discovered in main islands, and column (4) shows the estimator for inpatient in public 
hospitals on outer islands. All columns use similar specifications as Table 1.2, and Panel B shows 
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matching-DID with imputed propensity scores for weighting. Main islands include Sumatera, 
Kalimantan, and Papua. Outer islands include Nusa Tenggara, Halmahera, Talaud, Sitaro (Siau 
Tagulandang Biaro), Maluku, and Morotai. 
Table 1.3. The Impact on Utilization at Public Hospital: Main Island, and Outer Island 
 Outpatient, Public Hospital Inpatient, Public Hospital 
VARIABLES Main Islands Outer Islands Main Islands Outer Islands 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A (DID)     
Treatment*Post 0.0490*** -0.0016 0.0051*** 0.0006 
 (0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
Travel distance to an existing  0.0041** -0.0036 -0.0006 -0.0014** 
hospital (100 Km) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
     
Observations 30,018 44,383 121,486 181,805 
R-squared 0.0263 0.0210 0.0045 0.0057 
Pre-Intervention Mean 0.021 0.037 0.005 0.006 
% Change 186% -4% 100% 21% 
     
Panel B (Matching DID)***     
Treatment*Post 0.0359*** -0.0019 0.0051*** 0.0002 
 (0.0078) (0.0059) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
Travel distance to an existing  0.0003 -0.0042 -0.0011** -0.0009 
hospital (100 Km) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
     
Observations 29,334 44,101 118,422 180,771 
R-squared 0.0281 0.0272 0.0046 0.0066 
Pre-Intervention Mean 0.021 0.037 0.005 0.006 
% Change 170% -5% 100% 3% 
Individual and HH Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Sub-district Controls**  YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
* Gender, marital status, education, HH Size, and rural  
** # beds of existing hospitals, type of existing hospital 
*** Imputed propensity scores from matching process  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models suggest the impact of public hospital existence on medical care utilization was 
driven by a municipality located on the main islands. For outpatient, while there was a slight 
smaller magnitude for matching-DID, both models suggest substantial increases in public-hospital 
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outpatient care on main islands. Public hospital existence on the main islands more likely increases 
outpatient rates in public hospitals more than 170 percent from the pre-intervention period. 
However, I find no evidence of such an increase for municipalities located on outer islands. A 
substantial outpatient increase on the main islands supports the notion that there are higher 
marginal utilities of having medical care utilization for communities with fewer health care 
facilities. 
For inpatient, the DID and matching-DID methods have similar magnitude. In particular, 
mobile hospital availability on the main islands of Indonesia is more likely to increase inpatient 
medical care at public hospitals by 0.5 percentage points, corresponding to a 100 percent increase 
from the pre-intervention period inpatient average. I do not find evidence of this for outer regions. 
It seems counter-intuitive; we expect more isolated areas would have higher marginal utilities of 
having medical care utilization. However, separated small islands within a municipality may be 
the reason for this. A mobile hospital is located in one of the various small islands within each 
district. Less infrastructure, especially roads and less reliable transportation would hamper 
individuals' hospital visits. For instance, ferry transportation may only run once or twice a week, 
or private boat only once or twice a day, for people who live on different islands that have no 
ground transportation, so sick people cannot reach the hospital. It suggests that either more similar 
hospitals on each different island but within the same cities, or infrastructure to connect those 
separated islands, is critical for those communities. 
Therefore, our findings support the notion that primary health facilities are critical in 
underdeveloped municipalities. Also, the results suggest that transportation and infrastructures are 
essential to improving access to health care facilities, in addition to the existence of healthcare 
facilities.  
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1.6.2.3.Robustness checks 
In this section, I employ some robustness checks and sensitivity analyses to test the primary 
results. Table D.1-D.4 provide robustness tests for mobile hospital availability estimations with 
specification variations of equation (1). I use five specifications for primary outcomes both for the 
DID approach and matching-DID approach. Column (1) is a simple DID. Column (2) includes 
individual and household controls. Column (3) includes sub-district controls, column (4) includes 
municipality and year fixed effects, and column (5) is our baseline regression. Table D.5-D.8 
reflect a similar robustness test when I include 2012-2014. I removed travel distance because, since 
2012, SUSENAS has not provided sub-district identifier information. In general, our results are 
robust to those specifications. Estimation magnitudes slightly decrease when I include travel 
distance, suggesting the importance of controlling travel distance to hospitals in nearby 
municipalities. 
Table D.9-D.12 provide similar regression information as Table D.1-D.4 for main islands 
and Table D.13-D.16 for outer islands. Our results are robust to those specifications, and the 
differences between the DID and matching-DID methods are smaller. I find only one weakly 
significant (10 percent significant level) value from 20 regressions for outer islands. That estimate 
was eliminated by either including travel distance to nearby existing hospitals or region-year fixed 
effects.  
To test our estimates' sensitivity from our choices of treatment and control groups, I either 
exclude municipalities in which mobile hospitals were constructed in 2012 as a control group, or 
I include those towns as a treatment group. Table D.17 presents DID estimates when I exclude 
cities in which 2012 mobile hospital construction took place in the control group and expand 
observations by including the year 2012-2014 for all samples and main islands. Column (1) is 
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outpatient in public hospitals for all samples; Column (2) is outpatient in government hospitals for 
main islands; Column (3) and (4) have similar specifications as in columns (1) and (2) for inpatient 
rates. As discussed above, the Indonesian government introduced the second wave of mobile 
hospital construction in 2012. If our results are sensitive to sample choices, then I may see 
substantial differences when I exclude those 2012 municipalities. I implement the base 
specification on equation (3) but without travel distances, since SUSENAS does not provide sub-
district identifiers for years 2012-2014. In general, the model suggests the estimator slightly 
increases when I exclude those municipalities and years 2012-2014. These results make sense 
since more information about new hospitals and their services spreads over time, thus more people 
visit new hospitals.   
Table D.18 presents DID estimates when I include municipalities in which 2012 mobile 
hospitals were opened as a treatment group. I define 2009-2014 as the post period for mobile 
hospitals opened in 2008 and 2012-2014 for mobile hospitals constructed in 2012.  Table D.18 has 
similar specifications as in table D.17. The model suggests similar magnitudes as the previous 
table. It supports the notion that our findings are not sensitive to treatment and control groups' 
choices.  
Table D.19-D.26 provide estimates when I include a morbidity symptom to test sensitivity 
of our estimates from omitted variables. Health condition is an important factor affecting medical 
care utilization. Severe health condition lead more medical treatment in hospitals. In general, our 
preliminary estimates show slight increase when we include health condition. But, it also shows 
that our findings are not sensitive to omitted variable biases. 
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1.6.2.4.Falsification tests 
The identifying assumption for the DID approach is common parallel trends between 
treatment and control groups without any intervention. It implies that, without any intervention, 
both treatment and control groups would have parallel trends over time before the treatment period. 
I estimate various specification tests for artificial effects during pre-treatment years using the DID 
and Matching DID approaches. Table E.1-E.4 provide falsification tests for our primary outcomes 
for all samples and municipalities within the main islands with total 24 regressions.  
I use the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 as our artificial effect. Columns (1)-(3) are falsification 
tests for outpatient and columns (4)-(6) are the same tests for inpatient using the base specification 
on equation (3). Column (1) and (4) are using 2005 as artificial year, column (2) and (5) are using 
2006 and, column (3) and (6) are using 2007. If the intervention drove our results instead of 
inherent differences between the treatment and control groups, then I would see no impact on the 
pre-treatment period. In general, the model suggests all but two estimators are not significant and 
reduce the estimation magnitude substantially. Those two significant estimates were eliminated 
when I separate between main islands and outer islands. These results support the notion that the 
actual interventions likely drive the difference in outcomes and importance of separating main 
islands and outer islands.  
 
1.6.3. Travel distance and transportation infrastructures matter 
In this section we explore travel distance and infrastructures heterogeneity to understand 
the importance of travel distance and transportation infrastructures. 
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1.6.3.1.Closer distance or farther distance 
The wide coverage area of a newly-built hospital within a municipality results in the newly-
built hospitals being closer than the existing hospital for some areas, but farther for others. Figure 
1.10 provides travel distance comparison between new-construction hospitals and existing 
hospitals per treated sub-district for people who are living on main islands. The X-axis is travel 
distance to existing hospitals, and the Y-axis is travel distance to newly-constructed hospitals. 
Therefore, people who are living in areas that are closer to new hospitals are below the 45-degree 
line. The figure shows that regions within 200 km of existing hospitals are more likely farther from 
new hospitals. In contrast, areas located over 200 km from existing hospitals are closer to new 
hospitals. Figure F.1 shows a similar graph for outer islands, but more areas are now closer to 
newly-constructed hospitals. We expect only people who are living closer to the new hospitals to 
benefit from the intervention. 
 
Figure 1.10. Travel Distance Between New and Existing Hospitals – Main Islands 
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Table 1.4 provides DID and matching-DID estimation for areas that are closer to newly 
hospitals. It is analogous to the specifications in Table 1.3. As expected, the models suggest more 
considerable impact for both outpatient and inpatient at public hospitals on main islands when I 
exclude people who are living farther from new hospitals than existing hospitals. I find no evidence 
of improvement of access to medical care utilization for people who are living in outer islands.  
Table 1.4. The Impact on Utilization at Public Hospital: Closer Distance 
 Outpatient, Public Hospital Inpatient, Public Hospital 
VARIABLES Main Islands Outer Islands Main Islands Outer Islands 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A (DID)     
Treatment*Post 0.0720*** -0.0030 0.0078*** 0.0005 
 (0.0099) (0.0055) (0.0017) (0.0012) 
Travel distance to an existing  0.0034 -0.0047* -0.0004 -0.0019*** 
hospital (100 Km) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
     
Observations 27,741 42,728 112,030 174,926 
R-squared 0.0300 0.0214 0.0046 0.0057 
     
Panel B (Matching DID)***     
Treatment*Post 0.0553*** -0.0034 0.0067*** 0.0001 
 (0.0098) (0.0062) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
Travel distance to an existing  -0.0010 -0.0063** -0.0009* -0.0018** 
hospital (100 Km) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
     
Observations 27,057 42,446 108,966 173,892 
R-squared 0.0316 0.0271 0.0046 0.0067 
Individual and HH Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Sub-district Controls**  YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
* Gender, marital status, education, household size, and rural  
** # beds of existing hospitals, type of existing hospital 
*** Imputed propensity scores from matching process  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1.5 provides similar estimators for areas that are farther from new hospitals. Mobile 
hospitals are limited resource hospitals compared with existing hospitals in nearby municipalities. 
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People may still visit a new-constructed hospital since it is located in their administrative areas if 
they have more benefits from local administrative government such as local government subsidy 
for hospital fees. Otherwise, people tend to visit existing hospitals because those hospitals are not 
only closer but also better perceived quality.  
Table 1.5. The Impact on Utilization in Public Hospital: Farther Distance 
 Outpatient, Public Hospital Inpatient, Public Hospital 
VARIABLES Main Islands Outer Islands Main Islands Outer Islands 
     
 (1) (3) (4) (6) 
Panel A (DID)     
Treatment*Post 0.0014 0.0054 0.0012 -0.0004 
 (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0023) (0.0015) 
Travel distance to an existing  0.0055** -0.0034 -0.0007 -0.0015** 
hospital (100 Km) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
     
Observations 24,362 34,077 108,511 137,127 
R-squared 0.0207 0.0172 0.0044 0.0053 
     
Panel B (Matching DID)***     
Treatment*Post -0.0004 0.0167 0.0030 -0.0001 
 (0.0087) (0.0115) (0.0026) (0.0021) 
Travel distance to an existing  0.0049** 0.0025 -0.0014** 0.0001 
hospital (100 Km) (0.0024) (0.0042) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
     
Observations 23,678 33,795 105,447 136,093 
R-squared 0.0251 0.0205 0.0043 0.0055 
Individual and HH Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Sub-district Controls**  YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
* Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, and Rural  
** Travel distance to existing hospital, # beds of existing hospitals, whether public or private hospital 
*** Imputed propensity scores from matching process  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
If travel distance drives the impact of new hospital construction, we expect either smaller 
or no impact for people who are farther from new hospitals. In general, the models suggest that no 
estimators are significant and estimation magnitude is substantially reduced. Inpatient in public 
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hospital estimates reduce more than by 55 percent from areas which closer to newly constructed 
hospitals and outpatient in public estimates reduce more than 97 percent. These results support the 
notion that travel distance to newly hospitals likely drives the difference in outcomes. 
 
1.6.3.2.How far people are from newly-built hospitals 
A community who lives closer to new hospitals within a municipality may have better 
access to medical care utilization. I estimate the relationship between travel distance and medical 
care utilization for the community in the treatment areas. Figure 1.11 provides a relationship 
between travel distance and outpatient care in public hospitals for treated areas after the 
intervention period (2009-2011). The X-axis is travel distance to the mobile hospital from a sub-
district and Y-axis is the percentage of the population in a sub-district who had outpatient care in 
the last 30 days. The red line is a local polynomial fitted line to show the relationship between 
travel distance and outpatient care at the public hospital.  
 
Figure 1.11. Travel Distance and Outpatient, Treated Sub-District 
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The picture suggests a negative relationship between travel distance and outpatient care; 
farther areas would have less outpatient access at public hospitals. Furthermore, most people in a 
community cannot reach new hospitals when they live more than 100 km from new hospitals. 
Figure G.1 shows a similar trend for the relationship between travel distance and inpatient access 
at public hospitals.  
Transportation alternative is another essential factor affecting medical care besides travel 
distance. Similar travel distance could end with longer travel time with water transportation 
compare to ground transportation. An individual has to wait for either a ferry or a boat schedule 
which often longer waiting time between two available schedules than a bus schedule. Also, a ship 
runs slower than if a person uses a bus with similar distance. It suggests small increase travel 
distance to new-constructed hospitals could decrease higher possibility an individual to visit that 
hospital if people have better transportation alternative to existing hospitals. In another side, small 
increase travel distance to new-constructed hospitals could only reduce smaller possibility an 
individual to visit new hospitals if he has worse transportation alternative to existing hospitals. 
Table 1.6 provides DID estimates between travel distance to mobile hospitals and medical 
care utilization by geographic condition both existing hospitals as well as new-constructed 
hospitals. Panel A is regression estimates for public-hospital outpatient care and Panel B is similar 
estimates for public-hospital inpatient services. Column (1) is estimators for people who can use a 
ground transportation both to new hospitals and existing hospitals; column (2) is the analogous 
estimators for those who can use ground transportation to new hospitals, but they requires water 
transportation to existing hospitals; column (3) is estimators for those required water transportation 
to reach new hospitals, but they have a ground transportation access to existing hospitals; column 
(4) is similar estimators for those need water transportation to new hospitals as well as existing 
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hospitals. I define ground transportation if an individual uses ground transportation more than 50% 
of their travel distance to a particular hospital. Similarly, water transportation was defined if an 
individual uses water transportation more than 50% of their travel distance to a hospital. 
Table 1.6. Travel Distance and Medical Care Utilization Relationship 
VARIABLES New Hospital: Ground 
Transportation 
New Hospital: Water 
Transportation 
Existing: 
Ground 
Existing: 
Water 
Existing: 
Ground 
Existing: 
Water 
Difference-in-differences (DID) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Outpatient in Public Hospital     
Ln(Travel Distance (100 km)) -0.0155*** -0.0051** -0.0106*** -0.0039 
 (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0028) 
Observations 62,570 62,194 56,562 56,596 
R-squared 0.0174 0.0198 0.0160 0.0161 
     
B. Inpatient in Public Hospital     
Ln(Travel Distance (100 km)) -0.0013** -0.0008* -0.0018*** -0.0015*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Observations 252,985 259,059 239,656 239,500 
R-squared 0.0046 0.0053 0.0046 0.0044 
     
Individual and HH Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Sub-district Controls**  YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE YES YES YES YES 
     
* Gender, marital status, education, household size, and rural  
** Travel distance to existing hospital, # beds of existing hospitals, type of existing hospital 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The model suggests increased travel distance likely reduces medical care utilization and 
estimates lower for those who have worse transportation alternative to existing hospitals. In 
particular, increase 1% travel distance more likely decreases outpatient in public hospitals by 0.016 
percentage points and decreases inpatient in public hospitals by 0.001 percentage points for those 
who have access to ground transportation for both new and existing hospitals. However, a similar 
increase in travel distance only reduces smaller magnitudes for those have just water transportation 
(worse transportation) to existing hospitals. In contrast, increase 1% travel distance more likely 
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decreases outpatient in public hospitals by 0.004 percentage points and decreases inpatient in 
public hospitals by 0.002 percentage points for those who have access to water transportation for 
both new and existing hospitals. A similar increase in travel distance reduces higher magnitudes 
for those have access to ground transportation (better transportation) to existing hospitals.  The 
model also suggests higher reduction for outpatient in public hospitals when an individual has less 
transportation mode. Our results support the notion that travel distance would have a more 
considerable impact if people have better transportation alternative to existing hospitals. Also, our 
results suggest less severe health condition that requires medical care would have higher reduction 
if people have choices for transportation alternative. It is intuitive because people with less critical 
health condition could choose to stay at home instead of going to a hospital as it farther from their 
house. But people with critical health condition fewer choices because they require urgent medical 
care. 
 
1.6.4. Substitution between public and private hospital 
When mobile hospitals open closer to public hospitals, does this lead to a substitution effect 
between hospital providers? This occurs primarily in main-island municipalities since they have a 
substantial increase in public-hospital outpatient and inpatient care. Private hospital openings 
along shared municipality borders may also lead to substitution between private and public health 
facilities. If there is substitution between health centers, then the net impact of health facility 
construction depends on the two magnitudes since they provide similar services.  
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Table 1.7. The Impact on Medical Care Utilization at Private Hospital, Main Islands 
 Outpatient Inpatient 
VARIABLES Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
 DID Matching DID DID Matching DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment*Post 0.0000 0.0010 0.0002 0.0007 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
     
Observations 29,370 28,695 121,097 118,035 
R-squared 0.0104 0.0096 0.0025 0.0034 
Individual and HH Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Municipality Controls**  YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Propensity Score***   YES  YES 
* Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, and Rural  
** Travel distance to existing hospital, # beds of existing hospitals, type of existing hospital 
*** Imputed propensity scores from matching process  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1.8 provides DID and matching-DID estimates for private-hospital outpatient and 
inpatient care for municipalities which are located on main islands. Columns (1) and (3) show DID 
approaches for outpatient in private hospitals and columns (2) and (4) matching-DID approaches 
for inpatient in private hospitals. The models suggest no evidence of substitution effect between 
private and public hospitals because of mobile hospital opening. Incorporated weights do not 
change the conclusion. Our conclusion does not change with many specifications, as shown in 
table H.1 to table H.4. These results suggest tough topography and lack of transportation hamper 
individual access to appropriate outpatient and inpatient medical care, even though many private 
health facilities are opening along shared municipality borders. Rough ground transportation, 
limited and expensive sea, river, and air transportation, may obstruct community hospital access 
in neighboring cities. 
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1.6.5. The impact on household expenditures 
An important feature of the mobile hospital is fulfilling medical care needs in harsh 
topography and isolated areas. Improving access to health care facilities can enhance medical care 
utilization, thus increasing household health expenditures. On the other hand, closer health 
facilities may reduce transportation costs, thus decreasing family health expenses. Substitution or 
complement effect between health centers may also either increase or decrease household health 
expenditures. Therefore, the impact depends on whether the reduction in transportation costs 
outweighs the increase in medical care cost due to higher medical care utilization and also cost 
differential between health facility. I estimate the impact of mobile hospital availability on yearly 
household health expenditures per capita. Nominal household health expenditures include 
preventive cost, curative cost, medicine, and medical devices bought at any medical facility. Figure 
1.12 shows trends in household medical expenditures per capita before and after the intervention 
period for a municipality located on the main islands. The treatment group has slightly higher 
household health expenditures than the control group in 2004 and 2007, but a similar trend in 2005 
and 2006. Although I find almost similar pattern before the intervention period, the treatment 
group continuously increases in medical spending after the intervention period. 
I estimate the impact of mobile hospital availability on household health expenditures. 
Table 1.9 provides DID and matching-DID results for household health expenditures for 
municipalities located on the main islands. The dependent variable is yearly household health 
expenditures per capita. Table 1.9 has similar specifications as Table 1.2. I am using household-
level data since household health expenditures are on the household level. I aggregate individual 
characteristics into the household level to obtain household-level demographics.  
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Figure 1.12. Household Health Expenditures, Main Islands 
Despite a small different in magnitude estimates between the two approaches, they offer 
the same general conclusion: that people living in treatment areas are more likely to increase 
household health expenditures per capita by IDR 2 million (US $153), assumes USD 1 equal to 
IDR 13,000. Household yearly income (household head and spouse income) in the treatment areas 
from 2004 to 2011 are around IDR 9.5 million (US $730), thus corresponding to 20 percent of 
household income. Large increase in household health expenditures per capita may due to high 
differential out of pocket cost between outpatient and inpatient medical care services. Inpatient 
medical care services could cost much larger than outpatient medical care services because it 
includes room fees, and it may include intensive treatment fees. Our finding supports the notion 
that people in the community would spend more on medical care utilization when they have a 
hospital in their neighborhood.  
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Table 1.8. The Impact on Household Health Expenditures 
 DID Matching DID 
VARIABLES Household Health Household Health 
 Expenditures/Capita (IDR) Expenditures/Capita (IDR) 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment*Post 1,957,518.680*** 2,027,835.166** 
 (735,385.273) (844,003.322) 
   
Observations 17,485 16,976 
R-squared 0.029 0.049 
Individual and HH Controls*  YES YES 
Sub-District Controls**  YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES 
Region*Year FE  YES YES 
Propensity Score***   YES 
* Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, and Rural  
** Travel distance to existing hospital, # beds of existing hospitals, whether public or private hospital  
*** Imputed propensity scores from matching process  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table I.1 provides falsification tests for household health expenditures per capita. Table I.1 
shows DID and matching-DID approach when we use three artificial years: 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
If our results were driven by differences in pre-treatment trends, then we might see a significant 
impact before the intervention period. In general, the models suggest no estimators are significant 
and estimation magnitude is substantially reduced. It implies that the actual intervention, instead 
of spurious regressions, likely drive the difference in outcomes. 
 
1.7. Discussion and conclusion 
The existence of facility health centers in underdeveloped and remote areas in developing 
countries is a major factor in improving access to medical care utilization. However, difficult 
topography also creates a burden on those attempting to visit newly-built hospitals. I examined the 
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impact of mobile hospital availability in underdeveloped and remote regions on medical care 
utilization using difference-in-differences and matching difference-in-differences approaches.  
I found evidence that mobile hospital existence likely increases inpatient and outpatient 
utilization at public hospitals for municipalities which are located on main islands without any 
substitution effect for medical care utilization in private hospitals. I did not find evidence of 
increased public-hospital utilization for municipalities located on outer islands when a mobile 
hospital is located in one of the various small islands within districts. It suggests either the building 
of similar hospitals on each different island within the same cities or creating infrastructure to 
connect those separated islands.  I have suggested that travel distance matters. I found that only 
areas in which new hospitals are closer than existing hospitals benefit from the intervention. Also, 
locations farther from newly-built hospitals are less likely to have inpatient and outpatient at public 
hospitals. Larger reduction for those who have better transportation mode to an alternative hospital. 
Households spend more on health when new hospitals appear. It suggests a family would spend 
more money and visit hospitals to get access to medical care when there is a hospital available in 
their neighborhood area. 
Our study contributes to facility health center planning in underdeveloped and remote areas 
in Indonesia and provides information to policymakers in developing countries. Our study suggests 
not only facility health center existence in remote areas, but also transportation infrastructure, in 
general, are both critical to improving medical care utilization. Policymakers may even consider 
growing limited facilities within hospitals because of medical care utilization growth over time.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC INSURANCE’S DEPENDENT COVERAGE 
ON MEDICAL CARE UTILIZATION 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Indonesia introduced public insurance for civil servants (Askes) in 1968 that covered 
parents and all of their children. They reformed this insurance scheme by both dropping and adding 
eligibility for some children within a household during the last three decades. A universal health 
coverage scheme (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial / BPJS) started on January 1, 2014, 
reducing cost sharing and covering three children but not the fourth and afterward children, while 
the previous insurance plan only covered two children but not the third and afterward children of 
a civil servant family. This study examines the causal effect of government-provided insurance for 
children on their medical care utilization by exploiting changes in public insurance coverage for 
third children in Indonesia. 
This government policy creates differential insurance coverage among eligible children 
and ineligible children within a household.  Reduction in cost sharing and access to health 
insurance for covered children will lower the effective price of medical care utilization in all public 
health facilities and member private health facilities, and reduce delays in getting medical care that 
may translate into better health outcomes. Also, better health outcomes could help children to 
invest in education, and improve their future labor market outcomes. 
I use difference-in-differences (DID) and triple different approaches (DDD) with newly 
eligible children (third child) because of the policy change as a treatment group and both eligible 
children already in place (first and second children) or ineligible children (fourth and above) within 
a household as a control group. The change in government policy over the last three decades 
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provides an opportunity to examine the impact of public insurance for children who have gained 
eligibility. Also, I employ nationally representative survey data of Indonesian families and 
individuals to discuss the impact of the public insurance program on a variety of outcomes. I find 
that eligible children are 4 percentage points more likely to have an outpatient care in hospitals, 
corresponding to a 210 percent increase from the pre-intervention period. There is a more 
substantial impact when I count both eligibility and co-payment reduction effects. That is, 
universal health coverage not only adds the third children to the scheme but also includes co-
payment reductions from their initial program.  
This study contributes a valuable resource for policy-makers in assessing the impact of 
public insurance for children in developing countries by exploiting quasi-experimental 
intervention of government intervention in public insurance. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the impact of insurance. Sections 3 and 4 
describe the history of public insurance in Indonesia and data sources. Section 5 discusses the 
identification strategy. In Section 6, I apply those methods on public insurance. Section 7 employs 
robustness and placebo tests, and section 8 concludes. 
 
2.2. Review of the relevant previous literature 
2.2.1. The universal health insurance program 
Many countries had legislation mandating health insurance; 75 out of 192 countries studied 
had a bill about universal health care (Stuckler, Feigl, Basu, & McKee, 2010). Social health 
insurance development started when Germany introduced The Sickness Insurance Law in 1883 
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and The Insurance Consolidation Act in 1911 (Bärnighausen & Sauerborn, 2002; Dawson, 1913). 
The insurance was compulsory, irrespective of age and no wages limit (Dawson, 1913). In 1953, 
United States (US) spent 0.4 cents out of each dollar government spending to a social security 
program that provided 18% of the income of the typical elderly household and continuously 
increases to 19 cents out of each dollar government spending in 2003. This program is labeled 
social insurance programs, government interventions to protect against adverse events, including 
unemployment insurance, disability insurance, workers’ compensation, and Medicare (Gruber, 
2007). 
Universal health insurance definition varies in several ways, including potential recipients, 
costs sharing, the range of services, and quality of care. World Health Organization (2008) 
proposes three ways moving towards universal coverage as depicted in figure 2.1: the breadth of 
coverage, the depth of coverage, and the height of coverage. 
 
Figure 2.1. Three Ways of Moving Towards Universal Coverage 
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The breadth of coverage asks how much population covered by the insurance scheme and 
whether it covers the poorest and most vulnerable population groups; how profound benefit of 
essential services covered that are necessary to address people’s health; and a system has a greater 
height when it has higher public spending so that individuals spend lower out-of-pocket costs 
(Stuckler et al., 2010; World Health Organization, 2008).  
There are many reasons for potential government interventions in public insurance 
programs. A classic rationale for government intervention in the insurance market is the negative 
externalities imposed on others through underinsurance. Individuals are concerned with the health 
of others, and each participant derives satisfaction from the contributions of all because the lack 
of insurance can be a cause of illness for the uninsured person, thereby exerting a negative physical 
externality to the society (Arrow, 1963; Gruber, 2007). Another negative externality rationale 
comes from pooling health insurance premium that may not exist in the private insurance market. 
Health insurance coverage systematically shields those covered from the full costs of illnesses. 
Since high-risk individual consumes significantly more medical resources than the low-risk one 
but pays the same health insurance premiums, they impose a negative externality on healthy 
individuals in their insurance pool (Bhattacharya & Sood, 2006; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1992).  
Another reason is an adverse selection that one party has more information than another 
side of the transaction, and it appears whenever an individual is independent to choose the amount 
and plan of health insurance. On the one hand, there is a tendency of the sick to choose differently 
the most generous plan (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000). On the contrary, the insurance company may 
pick out only the healthy individuals. Thus, no insurance market existence may appear at any given 
price (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1992).  In fact, this is one argument for a favorable 
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Medicare program, because the elderly want to buy insurance but no insurance company is willing 
to sell the insurance plan because it will attract too many “lemons” (Akerlof, 1970). Universal 
coverage limits this to happen. 
 
2.2.2. The impact on utilization of medical care 
The literature generally concludes that there is a positive association between health 
insurance and medical care utilization. But the extent to which those results could be generalizable 
is unclear. Furthermore, the association does not imply causation. People with higher demand of 
medical care utilization because of their health condition may choose to have health insurance; on 
another hand, healthier people may choose not to have an insurance plan.   
Research study findings in developed countries about insurance on medical care utilization 
might depend on the type of coverage and the population of interest. Medicaid expansion increases 
primary care, preventive services, and hospitalization, as well as emergency use (Baicker et al., 
2013; Currie & Gruber, 1995; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Taubman, Allen, Wright, Baicker, & 
Finkelstein, 2014). Massachusetts Health Reform suggests health insurance increases utilization 
for some preventive services, but decreases in inpatient, hospitalizations and emergency services 
(Kolstad & Kowalski, 2012; Miller, 2012a, 2012b).  The Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 
increases utilization of inpatient care for both emergency and non-emergency sources of 
admissions, with increases in having a primary care doctor (Antwi, Moriya, & Simon, 2013; 
Barbaresco, Courtemanche, & Qi, 2015a). While the Affordable Care Act and Massachusetts 
Health Reform are universal for all in a population, Medicaid is a program designed for low-
income families and the disabled. The previous studies above suggest the effect of health insurance 
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varies by context. Type of health insurance, insurance benefits offered, and a population that 
received health coverage could result in different health insurance impact on medical care in 
developed countries.  
Stuckler et al. (2010) randomly pick 100 papers from the most relevant international 
Universal Health Coverage literature to understand the different implementation of universal 
health insurance in developed and developing countries. They find the term Universal Health Care 
has most frequently been used in describing policies for care in high-income countries, while 
Universal Health “Coverage” has most often been applied to low- and middle-income countries; 
hence, the fact that population coverage may not guarantee sufficient breadth of care services in 
developing countries. 
Many research studies in developing countries focus on sub-population instead of universal 
coverage. There is recognition that one source of the problem is the weak capacity of health 
systems in developing countries (Stuckler et al., 2010). Limited health budget may also another 
problem faced by developing countries. In Rwanda, The Global Fund Against AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria (GFAMT) project in 2007 enhanced financial access to health care by subsidizing 
health insurance to the poor. The project improved health service utilization for those income 
groups (from 0.4 health center visits per person and year in 2005 to 0.5 visits in 2007), including 
better control of AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria (Kalk, Groos, Karasi, & Girrbach, 2010). 
Another study examines nine developing countries in Africa and Asia to understand the extent of 
universal health coverage implementation in those countries. They reported moving towards 
universal health coverage increases enrollment in government health insurance, expands benefit 
package, and decreasing out-of-pocket spending accompanied by increasing government share of 
spending on health (Lagomarsino, Garabrant, Adyas, Muga, & Otoo, 2012). However, the 
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available evidences in those studies were based on descriptive methodology.  Further research 
studies with better methodologies may be necessary to complement those studies on universal 
health coverage implementation in developing countries. 
In Indonesia, a research study utilizing the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 1997 and 
using logistic regression sampled 19- to 60-year-old citizens across a variety of occupations. Their 
results suggested that government-provided insurance scheme likely increases outpatient care in 
public health facilities (Hidayat, Thabrany, Dong, & Sauerborn, 2004). Another study, using IV 
and GMM methods, revealed that the same insurance scheme likely increased public outpatient 
care by 63%  (Hidayat & Pokhrel, 2009). However, the former study could have a potential 
endogeneity problem between occupation and choices of insurance. For example, sick people may 
choose to be civil servants. Even though civil servant insurance scheme (Askes) is mandatory for 
government employees, participation to be a civil servant is voluntary. In fact, our results using 
the same household survey datasets, utilizing four waves, reveal that government employee 
families are more likely to visit public hospitals than private employee families in any given year. 
The later research attempts to address a potential endogeneity issue with instrumental variable 
methodologies. They use occupation and spouse as selected instruments. However, occupation 
was the initial problem; if a person or his/her family is more likely to have health problems, then 
the more likely it is for him/her to take a government job in order to gain eligibility for public 
insurance. 
Previous research studies explain multiple channels by which health insurance may affect 
medical care utilization. The access effect is a distinct channel of health insurance impact on 
medical care utilization; health insurance will lower the effective price of health care, thus likely 
increasing its use (Dafny & Gruber, 2005). However, public insurance reimbursement payments 
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may differ from private ones (Baicker et al., 2013). For example, Indonesia's universal insurance 
scheme up to the year 2014 only covered 20 percent of private health facilities (Kompas, 2016). 
The lower level of reimbursement compared to private insurance level may be one apparent reason 
for those low private health facilities' participation.    
Insurance benefits may lead to a substitution across different types of services (the 
efficiency effect). For instance, an increase in preventive services such as general check-ups could 
decrease inpatient and emergency services (Antwi et al., 2013; Barbaresco, Courtemanche, & Qi, 
2015b; Kolstad & Kowalski, 2012). Also, health insurance plans may lead to a substitution effect 
across different types of healthcare facilities. That is when public insurance creates differential 
prices between the various kinds of healthcare facilities. For example, public insurance would 
increase utilization of public health care facilities, but it could decrease usage of private healthcare 
facilities.  
  Accessibility of medical care may increase ex-post and ex-ante moral hazard. Ex-ante 
moral hazard by people not taking preventive utilization such as receiving immunizations. Also, 
reducing the effective price of medical care would discourage self-protection because of decreased 
financial losses associated with illness. Ex-post moral hazard when health insurance increases 
medical care demanded in any given technology because the insurer would not purchase additional 
medical care if they had to pay its full cost. (Barbaresco et al., 2015b; Ehrlich & Becker, 1972; 
Manning & Marquis, 1996; Zweifel & Manning, 2000). Therefore, insurance may increase or 
decrease utilization of medical care from different medical care utilization channels. 
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2.3. History of public insurance in Indonesia 
The Indonesian government-provided insurance health reform started in 1968 when the 
government issued Presidential Decree 230 concerning government employee and retirees' health 
benefits (Indonesia, 1968). This policy mandated that each government employee have public 
insurance and pay the insurance premium, around five percent of their salary. The insurance 
scheme, Askes, covered parents and all children within a household. Askes provides insurance 
holder outpatient and inpatient benefits to the particular doctors and public health facilities. 
Dependent insurance coverage is one characteristic of interest in a government-provided 
insurance system for civil servants. Dependent insurance coverage has changed several times in 
the last three decades. In 1981, the insurance plan limited the number of children covered and 
imposed age limitations. On April, 1981, the government-provided insurance scheme covered all 
children born before that date, and otherwise only 3 children per family. New employee only had 
up to 3 children covered. Also, children would lose their coverage after their 21st birthday and are 
not in school, or at 25 years old if they are still in college. In 1994, the insurance scheme further 
limited the number of dependent coverage from three to only two children. Therefore, either their 
parents were working after March 22, 1994, or the third, fourth, and afterward children who were 
born after March 22, 1994, would not be covered by the insurance policy. The 1981 and 1994 
insurance schemes had grandfathered features. If the old rule covered a child and the newer law 
was applied, then he/she was still covered by the following insurance scheme. 
The Indonesian government expanded public insurance for private employees as well. The 
coverage was called Jamsostek (Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja). It has a different scheme from 
civil servant insurance. Law 3/1992 regarding the Social Security Act (SSA) mandates each private 
employer who has at least ten employees or at least pays IDR 1 million per month to have health 
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insurance. However, the health benefit is compulsory but optional. If a private employer already 
provides private insurance for their employees, then they are not required to provide public 
insurance managed by Jamsostek, a state-owned company, to their employees. In practice, 
Jamsostek covered less than 1.5% of the population in 2001 (Thabrany, 2008).  Jamsostek covers 
employees' spouses and up to three children under 21 years of age. Premiums, which are capped 
at 3 percent of basic salary for unmarried and 6 percent for married employees, are paid solely by 
employers (Hidayat & Pokhrel, 2009). While Jamsostek benefits include outpatient and inpatient 
care in public health centers, private insurance may consist of outpatient and inpatient services in 
private health centers. Therefore, provider choice depends on citizens' employer-provided health 
insurance; private employees could have more health provider choices if their employers provide 
them with private insurance.   
In 2014, Indonesia introduced universal health coverage (BPJS) through law number 
24/2011 and government regulation number 111/2013 that mandated each Indonesian citizen to 
join the national government health insurance starting January 1, 2014 (Indonesia, 2011, 2013). 
There are two health insurance coverage changes applied for civil servant children: reduction in 
cost sharing and restore eligibility for the third child. Previous civil servant health insurance 
scheme (Askes) requires cost sharing when services fall outside basic benefits package (Achadi, 
Achadi, Pambudi, & Marzoeki, 2014). Minister of Health regulation number 138/2009 and 
Minister of Home Affair regulation number 12/2009 states that cost sharing could be applied for 
outpatient, inpatient, emergency, midwifery and any medical care outside the basic package. In 
contrast, the national health insurance scheme does not require co-payments (Lagomarsino et al., 
2012). To achieve this objective, BPJS issued series of regulations about reimbursement payment 
system. BPJS health regulation number 1/2014 article (77) states that primary health care facilities 
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which cooperate with BPJS do not allow to charge additional fees. Also, Minister of Health 
regulation number 69/2013 regulates standard reimbursement fees for both primary and more 
advanced medical care facilities. Although most medical care services are covered, there are some 
medical care services that are not covered by the new insurance scheme, including health services 
for aesthetic purposes; service to overcome infertility; orthodontics; health problems or diseases 
caused by drug or alcohol dependence; interference health from deliberately hurting oneself, and 
traditional medicine (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial, 2014). Therefore, two children from 
government employee families that are covered by previous scheme benefit from co-payment 
reduction in the new insurance scheme.  
Additional to cost-sharing reduction, the universal health insurance scheme restores the 
third-child eligibility but not for the fourth and afterward children. Government regulation number 
111/2013 indicates that the new insurance scheme covers a household head, a spouse, and 
maximum three children. So, the new insurance scheme covered the third child who previously 
does not covered in Askes. Also, the new insurance scheme allows a household to cover their 
ineligible children by paying an extra insurance premium. While there were many changes in the 
dependent coverage for the insurance for government employees, there was no substantial change 
in the government-provided insurance for other professional workers.  
Public health centers (Puskesmas) and public hospitals were mandated to join the new 
insurance scheme. For private clinics and private hospitals, however, it is voluntary to join the new 
insurance scheme. Although some private clinics and hospitals may join their network, only a few 
of them enter the system, either because of lower reimbursement levels or other administrative 
reasons. Up to 2016, about 1,800 of the 2,500 hospitals have joined the network. However, only 
20% of those hospitals are private hospitals (Kompas, 2016). Public health centers serve most of 
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the government-provided health programs such as insurance for needy families (Askeskin) and 
health financial assistance; thus, we expect that more people will visit public health centers. 
 
2.4. Data 
I employ four waves’ of datasets (1997, 2000, 2007, and 2014) from the Indonesian Family 
Life Survey (IFLS). The IFLS is household and individual longitudinal data which represents 83 
percent of the Indonesian population living in 13 out of 33 provinces in Indonesia.  IFLS sampling 
scheme involved stratification into provinces, then a random sampling of 321 enumeration areas 
(EA) within provinces using the 1993 National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) sampling 
frame designed by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). It used oversampling of 
urban EAs and EAs in smaller provinces to facilitate urban-rural and Javanese-nonJavanese 
comparisons. Next, it randomly selected households within enumeration areas and then 
interviewed selected respondents within the household who knew household-level demographic 
and economic conditions. Finally, it randomly selected household members to provide individual-
level information. 
Recently, IFLS surveys have consisted of five waves: IFLS 1 (1993), IFLS 2 (1997), IFLS 
3 (2000), IFLS 4 (2007), and IFLS 5 (2014). Originally, IFLS data consisted of 57,072 households 
year (IFLS 1 [1993]: 7,224, IFLS 2 and 2+ [1998]: 8,347, IFLS 3 [2000]: 10,574; IFLS 4 [2007]: 
13,996; and IFLS 5[2014]: 16,931) . IFLS 5 interviewed 58,337 individuals, which included 6,131 
infants, 11,146 children (5-14 Years Old), and 41,06 adults. I use IFLS 2, 3, 4, and 5 to avoid an 
impact of treatment in 1981 and 1994. Moreover, I use government families and private employee 
families for my study. I use children age 0-20 years old because age 21 and above coverage 
depends on their education status. I exclude households that have twin sibling children because I 
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don’t know who is the third child and which sibling is older or younger, and I exclude household 
with missing values of key variables.  My final samples consist of 4,980 government employee 
children and 13,695 private employee children for our baseline regressions.  
 
2.5. Identification strategy 
In this section, we describe the identification strategy and estimation methods. I utilize 
government criteria for treatment selection. Our treatment group is the third child of a government 
employee’s family. Our control groups are the first two children, and the fourth children and 
afterward. The first two children represent eligible children already in place. This group gains 
benefits from the new universal health scheme from co-payment reduction. For example, while 
they had to pay the difference between the insurance coverage rate and medical care charges for 
having surgery, the new scheme is free of co-payment charges. The difference between the 
treatment group and this control group represents an eligibility effect since they are in the same 
plan after the intervention period.  
The fourth and afterward children represent ineligible children. They do not gain any 
benefits from the new insurance scheme. Those children could voluntarily join the new insurance 
scheme by paying an extra premium for each additional child. The difference between the 
treatment group and this control group represents both an eligibility effect and reduction in co-
payment effect. Therefore, I can estimate the reduction in copayment effect by subtracting the 
latter from the former estimates. The basic approach is a difference-in-differences estimation. Our 
baseline regression is the following:  
 
Yibmt =  α0 +  α1(Tibm ∗ Postt) +  α2X`ibmt +  𝛿𝑏  +  m + 𝜇t +  ϵibmt                  (1)  
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where Yibmt is the probability of having medical care utilization for individual i at birth order b 
living in municipality m at time t. Tibm is equal to one if the child is the third child of government 
employee children (one is the number of children beyond the two covered). Postt indicates whether 
period t is after the implementation of the 2014 policy. X`ibmt is an individual, or a household, level 
vector of control variables including educational attainment, gender, age fixed effect, whether a 
child is working, children's income, parents’ income, whether a child was born after March 1994 
to capture the 1994 policy change, hhsize, religion fixed effect and whether a child is living in 
rural areas. I include a birth order fixed effect (𝛿𝑏) to capture unobserved invariance of birth order. 
Also, I include a municipality fixed effect (m) and year fixed effect (μ𝑡) to capture unobserved 
differences in space and time, respectively; and ϵibmt is the idiosyncratic error term. I cluster by 
household level to capture the unobserved differences between families. The coefficient interest is 
α1, the effect of dependent insurance coverage, which captures the difference between the change 
in third child medical care utilization from the “before” to the “after” period and the change in the 
control group from the “before” to the “after” period and difference between those two groups; in 
other words, the “difference in differences”.  
I expand the difference-in-differences approach with a triple difference approach, including 
private employees as an additional control group, to understand different trends between 
government-employee children and private-employee children over time for the same birth order.  
Private employees have been required to have either private or public insurance (Jamsostek) since 
1992. Different from Askes, Jamsostek covers up to three children 20 years old or under. So, I 
expect there to be no substantial difference regarding dependent coverage for private employee’s 
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insurance schemes after the new insurance scheme implementation. Our triple difference-in-
differences regression is the following: 
 
Yibmt =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1(Tibm ∗ Postt ∗  𝐺𝑖𝑏𝑚𝑡) +  𝛽2(Tibm ∗ Postt) +  𝛽3(𝐺𝑖𝑏𝑚𝑡 ∗ Postt) +
𝛽4(Tibm ∗  𝐺𝑖𝑏𝑚𝑡)  + 𝛽5Gibmt+ 𝛽6X`ibmt +  𝛿𝑏  +  m + 𝜇t + εikrt                          (2)  
 
where Gibmt is an indicator whether a child is a government employee dependent i at birth order b 
living in municipality m at time t.  Other symbols specified are analogous to the specifications in 
equation (1). The coefficient interest is 𝛽1, which capture the different between the difference between 
the change in third child medical care utilization from the “before” to the “after” period and the 
change in the control group from the “before” to the “after”; the change in government-employee 
children medical care utilization from the “before” to the “after” period and the change in private-
employee medical care utilization from the “before” to the “after” period; the change in third child 
medical care utilization for government-employee families and the change in third child medical care 
utilization for private-employee families; and the change of those groups.  For example, additional 
effects include differences between third child and first two children within government-employee 
families; the triple difference-in-differences equation would capture different implications 
between a third child of government-employee families and third child of private-employee 
families on medical care utilization. Additionally, I can gather information about different medical 
utilization patterns between those two occupations.  
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2.6. Empirical results  
I provide analysis changes of public insurance dependent coverage on medical care 
utilization for children in this section. I employ both difference-in-differences and triple 
difference approach. 
 
2.6.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2.1 shows means and standard deviations for medical care utilization outcomes and 
covariates. The outpatient variable would be a binary variable equal to one if a child sought 
outpatient care in the previous four weeks. The inpatient variable would be a binary variable equal 
to one if a person received inpatient services during the last 12 months. I break down outpatient 
services into four types of health centers: public hospitals, private hospitals, public health centers 
(clinic / Puskesmas), and private clinics. 
In general, the treatment group has a slightly higher outpatient but smaller inpatient 
utilization level compared to the control group before the intervention period, but then the 
treatment group has more both outpatient and inpatient care after the new insurance scheme. For 
hospital outpatient care, the treatment group uses both public and private hospitals less frequently 
than the control group. It is as expected, as a control group includes the first two children who 
were already eligible for previous insurance schemes. In contrast, the treatment group has higher 
outpatient care use both in public and private hospitals after the intervention period. It implies 
preliminary evidence that insurance gives access to eligible children. Table 2.1 shows a reduction 
in public-health-center outpatient care but an increase in private-clinic outpatient service use. It 
suggests a substitution effect between health facilities. One potential reason is more private clinics 
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join the new insurance scheme. There is a slightly larger inpatient increase after the intervention 
period for the treatment group. 
 
Table 2.1. Means and Standard Deviations 
Description Pre-Intervention (1997,2000,2007) Post-Intervention (2014) 
 Treatment Control (Gov) Treatment Control (Gov) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outcomes     
Outpatient 0.181(0.386) 0.167(0.370) 0.233(0.424) 0.191(0.394) 
  Outpatient, Hospital 0.019(0.137) 0.025(0.157) 0.074(0.262) 0.036(0.186) 
     Outpatient, Public Hospital 0.013(0.112) 0.017(0.130) 0.049(0.217) 0.014(0.117) 
     Outpatient, Private Hospital 0.008(0.089) 0.008(0.090) 0.031(0.173) 0.022(0.146) 
  Outpatient, Clinic 0.137(0.344) 0.114(0.317) 0.123(0.329) 0.111(0.315) 
    Outpatient, Public Health Care 0.068(0.253) 0.051(0.221) 0.049(0.217) 0.042(0.200) 
    Outpatient, Private Clinic 0.070(0.255) 0.065(0.246) 0.080 (0.272) 0.070(0.256) 
Inpatient 0.022(0.148) 0.031(0.174) 0.074(0.262) 0.052(0.223) 
     
Control     
Year of Education 3.422(3.853) 4.201(4.240) 1.724(2.604) 3.026(3.806) 
Male 0.539(0.499) 0.527(0.499) 0.558(0.498) 0.524(0.500) 
Age 8.458(5.403) 9.453(5.662) 6.252(4.291) 7.947(5.276) 
Working Children 0.016(0.125) 0.024(0.153) 0.000(0.000) 0.011(0.106) 
Children’s Income (in thousands) 26.64(314.4) 70.55(1119.9) 0.000(0.000) 89.1(1177.5) 
Parents’ Income (in millions) 23.12 (23.99) 24.34(31.67) 96.05(133.2) 89.73(127.1) 
Rural 0.334(0.472) 0.352(0.478) 0.252(0.435) 0.296(0.457) 
Religion 1.328(0.858) 1.305(0.830) 1.276(0.803) 1.247(0.763) 
Birth Order 3.000(0.000) 1.873(1.253) 3.000(0.000) 1.528(0.709) 
     
N 3,702 1,312 
     
 
 
The control group has higher education levels and is more likely to work since they are 
also older siblings than the treatment group. Both the treatment and control group have similar 
gender and religion distributions before and after the intervention period. They also are more likely 
to live in urban areas. Indonesia GDP per capita in 2007 was around IDR 19 million (USD 1,860) 
and in 2014 approximately IDR 36 million (USD 3,499). Our sample parents’ income is higher 
than the GDP per capita both before and after the intervention period. It suggests that our sample 
comes from more middle-income families and higher-income families than the average Indonesian 
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population. One possible reason for the large increase in parents’ income after the intervention 
period is bureaucratic reform in the middle of 2007. Indonesia's Ministry of Finance initiated 
bureaucratic reform in 2007, gradually followed by the implementation of another ministry which 
substantially increased government employee salary over time. 
 
2.6.2. The impact on outpatient care utilization 
Figure 2.2 provides the trend in outpatient care at hospitals (public and private) for the 
treatment and the control group for both government and private employee families' children under 
21 years old of age. Blue and green lines are a third child (birth order equal 3); red and orange 
lines are first child and second child (birth order 1,2,4 and afterward).  Blue and red lines represent 
government employee family children; green and orange lines are private employee family 
children. The figure suggests third children, both from government-employee and private-
employee families, have lower outpatient care use in public hospitals before the new insurance 
scheme. In 1997, the third child of a government employee had similar outpatient care in the 
hospital. One possible reason is many third children who were born before 1994. Insurance would 
cover the third child if she/he was born before March 22, 1994, and their parent's works before 
that date. While the third children of private employees remain lower in receiving outpatient care 
from public hospitals, the treatment group (3rd children of government-employee families) has 
much higher outpatient care use at public hospitals after the intervention period.  
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Figure 2.2. Outpatient Care in Hospitals (1st, 2nd, 3rd Children) 
Figure J.1 and J.2 show similar figures for outpatient utilization in public hospitals and 
private hospitals, respectively. The outpatient in public hospital trend is analogous to figure 2.1. 
Third children have a lower outpatient care before the intervention period, but higher outpatient 
care after the intervention period for the third children of government employee families.  In 
contrast, both the first two children and the third children of government employee families have 
an increasing trend in private hospital utilization, primarily in 2014. One potential reason is the 
participation of private hospitals into the new insurance scheme. If more private hospitals join the 
new insurance network, insurance holders have more hospital choices. If this is the case, then it 
suggests the participation of private health facilities in the new insurance scheme could benefit the 
insurance holder and reduce public hospitals' patient load.  Furthermore, private employee families 
have a higher outpatient care in private hospitals while they have a lower outpatient care in public 
hospitals.  It indicates private employees have more access to private hospitals than government-
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employee children. It is as expected because some private employee families may have private 
insurance from their employer instead of public insurance (Jamsostek).  
 
Figure 2.3. Outpatient Care in Hospitals (3rd and afterward children) 
Figure 2.3 shows outpatient care in hospitals for 3rd children, 4th children, and their younger 
siblings. Despite they voluntary join the new insurance scheme, 4th and afterward children do not 
benefit from the new intervention period. Contrary to figure 2.2, the third children have a higher 
outpatient care before the intervention period. Figure 2.2 and 2.3 indicate younger sibling have 
less medical care utilization. It is intuitive because younger sibling more likely healthier thus less 
likely have outpatient care for medication. However, they may not necessarily have lower 
preventive care. The third children of government employee families have much higher outpatient 
care than their younger sibling after the intervention period. The medical care utilization gaps are 
larger than depicted in figure 2.2. It indicates the more substantial impact on medical care 
utilization when we account both eligibility effects and reduction in cost sharing.   
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Figure J.3 and J.4 provide outpatient care in public and private hospitals for third children 
and afterward. Figure J.3 shows ineligible children (4th and later children) of government employee 
families in our samples have increasing outpatient in public hospitals before the intervention period 
but decrease substantially after the intervention period. Figure J.4 depicts those younger siblings 
more likely have outpatient in private hospitals after the intervention period. All 4th and afterward 
children of private employee families visit private hospitals instead of public hospitals both before 
and after the insurance scheme period; slightly larger outpatient in private hospitals after the 
intervention period. These evidence indicate substitution effect between public and private medical 
care facilities. An individual choose private hospitals instead of the public hospital when more 
people go to public hospitals. 
Table 2.2 provides difference-in-difference estimators and triple difference estimators for 
the probability in the outpatient populations of interest. Columns (1) and (3) are estimators for the 
difference-in-difference approach; columns (2) and (4) are estimators for the triple difference 
methodology. R-squared are populated in one field for outpatient, outpatient in public and 
outpatient in private. I separate public hospitals, private hospitals, public health centers, and private 
clinics. Treatment is an indicator whether an individual is the third child of government-employee 
families. Control is an indicator whether a child is either older siblings (1st, 2nd children) or younger 
siblings (4th and afterward children). The dependent variable is an indicator whether a person 
experienced outpatient services in the last four weeks. I include birth order fixed effect, age fixed 
effect, religion fixed effect, municipality fixed effect, and year fixed effect, clustering the standard 
error by household level to capture the unobserved differences between families. 
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Table 2.2. The Impact on Outpatient Care for Third Child 
 Outpatient at Hospital Outpatient at Clinic 
VARIABLES DID Triple DID DID Triple DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Outpatient  0.041* 0.044** -0.011 -0.022 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.035) 
  Outpatient, Public 0.039** 0.039** -0.005 -0.015 
   (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) 
  Outpatient, Private 0.006 0.010 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.014) 0.010 (0.025) (0.028) 
Observations 4,980 18,675 4,980 18,675 
R-squared 0.074; 0.063; 
0.070 
0.032; 0.025; 
0.026 
0.077; 0.088; 
0.071 
0.050; 0.039; 
0.044 
Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES 
Age FE  YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
* Gender, education level, whether a child is working, child’s income, parents’ income, rural residency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The difference-in-differences and triple DID models suggest similar results for outpatient 
care utilization in hospitals. These results suggest eligible children for universal health public 
insurance scheme are more likely to have an outpatient medical care in hospitals after the 
intervention period by four percentage points or corresponding to a 210 percent increase from the 
pre-intervention period outpatient in hospital average. Also, both models suggest the result is 
driven by an increase in public hospitals. These results are very intuitive. Public hospitals are 
mandated to join the public insurance scheme. Therefore public hospitals must accept public 
insurance holders, and people visit public hospitals when they are eligible for public insurance. 
The mandatory participation of public hospitals also creates less of an endogeneity issue.  
I find a slight increase in outpatient care use in private hospitals, although it is not 
statistically significant. There are two possible reasons for this finding. Private hospitals may 
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voluntarily join the insurance scheme, and limited private hospitals accept the insurance plan. 
Voluntary participation may create an endogeneity participation problem on the supply side. For 
example, a hospital which has very few public insurance holders in the area chooses to join the 
insurance scheme. Also, only 20 percent private hospital from all hospital network in the insurance 
system implies a limited private hospital supply. It makes insurance holders have limited choices 
for private hospitals; that is, they cannot go to the private hospital with their insurance just because 
limited hospitals accept the insurance. Figure J.3 and J.4 indicate the last reason more likely 
happened. Both the treatment and control groups increase outpatient utilization in private hospitals 
over time. If this increase because of more private hospitals joins the insurance network, then it 
supports the notion that not only insurance but also health facility availability is an essential factor 
contributing to access to health care. 
I find a slight reduction of outpatient utilization in public healthcare, although it is not 
statistically significant. While the explanations for this are somewhat similar to those of the private 
clinics, there are two possible reasons why people are less likely to visit public health care after 
the new insurance:  the negligible price differential between insured and uninsured outpatient care 
in public health centers, and different medical technology between public hospitals and public 
health centers. Outpatient care in public health centers is highly subsidized both by central and 
local governments, making it affordable for all citizens with very low prices for most utilization 
services. For instance, Figure B.1 provides a summary of outpatient and inpatient utilization fees 
in public health centers in Jakarta based on Governor Regulation 68/2012 regarding public health 
center fees. Twenty-five percent outpatient medical care utilization in public health care costs less 
than IDR 5,000 or corresponding to less than 0.5 USD, and 85 percent costs less than IDR 50,000 
or corresponding to less than 5 USD. 
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Figure 2.4. Reasons Visit Clinic and Hospital 
 
Figure 2.4 shows six doctor treatments (consultation and check-up, injection, surgery, 
medication, x-ray, and laboratory services) on average when children under 21 years of age went 
to hospitals and clinics. We sought to understand why children went to those two places. The graph 
shows around 80% children visit hospitals and clinics for medication, also consultation and check-
up. It indicates children mostly visit clinics and hospitals because they want to have medication 
and check-ups at the same time.  The medication reason is more prominent when they are going 
to clinics, but hospital visits for consultations and check-ups are slightly higher than those for 
medication. Another important finding is they are more likely to have advanced medical care 
treatment, indicated by higher amounts of lab and x-ray procedures when they visit hospitals. It 
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suggests parents visit a hospital when they need advanced medical technology for their children, 
either for preventive or curative reasons.  
 
2.6.2.1.Eligibility and co-payment  
Two essential features in the new universal health coverage scheme are to add eligibility 
for the third child and cost-sharing reduction for most medical care utilization.  The first two kids 
represent eligible children already in place. This group benefits from the new universal health 
scheme from co-payment reduction. For example, while policyholders had to pay the difference 
between insurance coverage rate and the medical care charge for having surgery, the new scheme 
is free of co-payment charges. The difference between the third child and the first two children 
represents an eligibility effect since they are in the same plan after the intervention period.  
The fourth and afterward children represent ineligible children. They do not gain any 
benefit from the new insurance scheme if they do not voluntarily join the new insurance scheme. 
The difference between the treatment group and this control group represents both an eligibility 
effect and reduction in co-payment effect. Therefore, I can estimate the co-payment reduction 
effect by subtracting the latter from the former estimates.   
Table 2.3 provides difference-in-differences and triple difference estimators for the 
probability of outpatient care utilization in public hospitals for the two different groups. Columns 
(1) and (3) contain the difference-in-difference approach for the first three children; columns (2) 
and (4) correspond to the third and afterward. The Table 2.3 specifications are analogous to those 
in Table 2.2. Treatment is an indicator whether an individual is the third child of government 
employee families. The control group in columns (1) and (3) is the first two children, and the 
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control group in columns (2) and (4) reflects the fourth and afterward children. The dependent 
variable is an indicator whether a person experienced outpatient care in public hospitals in the prior 
four weeks. I only use outpatient care at a government hospital in this section, following our 
previous finding that public hospitals drive different outpatient medical care utilization patterns.  
Table 2.3. Eligibility and Co-payment 
 DID Triple DID 
VARIABLES Birth Order Birth Order Birth Order Birth Order 
 1,2,3 3,4-13 1,2,3 3,4-13 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Outpatient, Public  0.037** 0.065*** 0.037** 0.054*** 
Hospital (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) 
Observations 4,542 1,223 17,116 4,161 
R-squared 0.070 0.149 0.026 0.073 
     
Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES 
Age FE  YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
* Gender, education level, whether a child is working, child’s income, parents’ income, rural residency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All columns point to the same general conclusion that the new insurance scheme more 
likely increases the probability of outpatient care utilization in public hospitals. The triple 
difference estimators do not change much from the difference-in-differences estimators. However, 
triple differences approach shows smaller R-squared. It suggests triple differences approach 
explained less variation in government and private employee children outpatient care.  As 
expected, both models suggest a larger estimate of magnitude when I use the fourth to tenth 
children as a control group, which represents the impact of eligibility status of dependent insurance 
and lower co-payment. In particular, being an eligible child (eligibility effect) in the new insurance 
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scheme more likely increases outpatient care utilization in public hospitals by 3.7 percentage. 
Furthermore, being an eligible dependent and having a co-payment reduction with the new 
insurance scheme more likely increases outpatient utilization in public hospitals by more than 5.4 
percentage points. Subtracting the former and the latter provides the effect of lower co-payment 
effect; that is, lower co-payment in the new insurance scheme more likely increases outpatient 
utilization in public hospitals by more than 1.7 percentage points (5.4 percentage points - 3.7 
percentage points).  
 
2.6.3. The impact on inpatient care utilization 
Figure 2.5 provides the trend in inpatient care use at public hospitals for the treatment and 
control groups over time. Control group is the first and second children both government employee 
families and private employee families. The figure suggests an increase in inpatient care at 
hospitals over time for both third children and other children for government- and private-
employee families. The trend for inpatient care at public hospitals for third children for 
government-employee families is similar over time to that of outpatient care above. That is, the 
third children are less likely have inpatient medical care in a hospital in any given year. It indicates 
younger siblings more likely healthier thus less likely have inpatient care for medication. The third 
children of government-employee families are more likely to have more frequent use of inpatient 
care after the new insurance scheme than the control group. It indicates improvement in access to 
inpatient medical care.   
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Figure 2.5. Inpatient Care in Hospitals (1st, 2nd, 3rd Children) 
Figure J.5 and J.6 show trends between the two groups for inpatient care in private hospitals 
and all hospitals. The third child of government families has lower inpatient care in public hospitals 
but higher inpatient utilization in private hospitals before the new insurance scheme. While the 
third child has slight larger inpatient care in public hospitals after the new intervention period, 
she/he has lower inpatient gap in a private hospital after the intervention period compares to pre-
intervention period. Similarly, the third child of private-employee families more likely has higher 
inpatient care use in private hospitals after the introduction of the new insurance scheme. These 
suggest indication of substitution for both civil servant’ and private employee’s family on hospital 
usage. In particular, the third children of government families visit public hospitals and limited 
private hospitals which joins the new insurance scheme when they are eligible for the new 
insurance scheme. On the other hand, private-employee families who have more access to private 
hospitals more likely visit private hospitals when more people visit public hospitals because of the 
new insurance scheme.   
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Figure 2.6 provides inpatient in hospitals for the third children and afterward. Figure 2.6 
has similar specification as previous tables. 4th and afterward children had higher inpatient in 1997, 
but the third children have higher in 2007. In general, the third children have higher inpatient at a 
public hospital in general because they are an older than their siblings. There is no substantial 
difference between the treatment group and the control group after the intervention period.  
 
Figure 2.6. Inpatient Care in Hospitals (3rd and afterward children) 
Figure J.7 and J.8 provide inpatient in public hospitals and private hospitals for the same 
groups as in figure 2.6. In general, both figures indicate government employee families more likely 
visit public hospital for inpatient care, but private employee families more likely visit the private 
hospital for having inpatient. The similar indication with the outpatient care that private employee 
families choose to have medical care utilization in private hospitals because some of them have 
private insurance which allows them having more hospital alternatives.  
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Table 2.4. The Impact on Inpatient Care 
 Inpatient at Hospital Inpatient at Clinic 
VARIABLES DID Triple DID DID Triple DID 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Inpatient  0.008 -0.004 0.018 0.024* 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) 
  Inpatient, Public 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.013 
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) 
  Inpatient, Private -0.002 -0.013 0.009 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 4,980 18,679 4,980 18,679 
R-squared 0.049; 0.042; 
0.053 
0.030; 0.019; 
0.026 
0.053; 0.054; 
0.049 
0.023; 0.020; 
0.017 
Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES 
Age FE  YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
* Gender, education level, whether a child is working, child’s income, parents’ income, rural residency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.4 provides difference-in-difference and triple difference estimators for the 
probability in the inpatient populations of interest. Columns (1) and (3) give the difference-in-
difference approach; columns (2) and (4) show triple difference-in-difference. I use similar 
specifications as table 2.2. Treatment is an indicator whether an individual is the third child of 
government-employee families. The dependent variable is an indicator whether a person 
experienced inpatient services in the last 12 months. I include birth order fixed effect, age fixed 
effect, religion fixed effect, municipality fixed effect, and year fixed effect, clustering the standard 
error by household level to capture the unobserved differences between families. 
Two models suggest eligible children for universal health public insurance are more likely 
to visit public hospitals and clinics but less likely to visit private hospitals, although only inpatient 
utilization in clinics for triple difference-in-difference is statistically significant. There is a more 
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substantial impact reduction when I include private-employee families because of their increased 
visits to private hospitals for inpatient care after the intervention period, as depicted in figure J.6 
and A.8. Therefore, our results indicate parents reoptimize their utility when the new insurance 
takes effect. Families who are eligible for public insurance more likely visit public hospitals and 
limited private hospitals member of the new insurance scheme, and families who have more access 
to private hospitals more likely visit private hospitals when more people visit public hospitals.   
 
2.6.3.1.Eligibility and cost-sharing reduction 
Table 2.5 provides difference-in-differences and triple differences methodologies for an 
inpatient in public hospitals for two birth order groups to investigate whether universal health 
insurance program affects inpatient in public hospitals differently between children who benefit 
cost-sharing reduction and children who do not benefit from the new insurance scheme. Table 2.5 
has analogous specification as table 2.3. Birth order 1 and 2 benefits from cost-sharing reduction, 
but birth order 4 and afterward do not benefit from the new insurance scheme. Therefore, the 
difference between the third children and their older siblings capture eligibility impact since they 
are in the same new insurance plan. The difference between the third children and their young 
siblings capture both eligibility effects and cost-sharing reduction. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable whether a child had inpatient in public hospitals in the last 12 months.  
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Table 2.5.Eligibility and Co-payment 
 DID Triple DID 
VARIABLES Birth Order Birth Order Birth Order Birth Order 
 1,2,3 3,4-13 1,2,3 3,4-13 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Inpatient, Public  0.008 0.011 0.008 0.004 
Hospital (0.016) (0.030) (0.017) (0.030) 
Observations 4,484 1,216 17,120 4,161 
R-squared 0.043 0.129 0.019 0.056 
     
Controls*  YES YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES 
Age FE  YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
* Gender, education level, whether a child is working, child’s income, parents’ income, rural residency 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The models suggest the third children more likely visit public hospitals for inpatient care 
after the new insurance scheme period although they are not statistically significant. DID shows 
larger impact when we account for eligibility impact and cost-sharing reduction impact on 
inpatient care. The triple different approach shows similar magnitude for the first and second 
children from DID, but smaller magnitudes for the third and afterward children. Substantial 
inpatient reduction for the 4th and afterward private employee children after the new insurance 
scheme, as depicted in figure J.8., could drive the different. Similar as an outpatient, R-squared for 
triple differences methodologies shows smaller than difference-in-differences approach. It 
suggests triple differences approach explained less variation in government and private employee 
children inpatient care.  
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2.7. Robustness checks and falsification tests 
I provide robustness checks, and falsification tests to test sensitivity of our estimates from 
omitted variable biases, sample chosen and difference-in-differences identifying assumption. 
 
2.7.1. Robustness checks 
In this section, I employ robustness checks and sensitivity analyses to test the robustness 
of our primary result. Table L.1-L.8 provide robustness tests for the public insurance dependent 
coverage specification variations of equation (1). I use five specifications for primary outcomes 
(hospital, public hospital, and private hospital) both for outpatient and inpatient. Column (1) is a 
simple difference-in-difference model without any control. Column (2) includes age fixed effects. 
Column (3) provides education, column (4) consists of all controls, and column (5) is the baseline 
regression provided in our primary results. Our results are robust to those specifications. Our 
estimation is smaller when I include municipality fixed effects, specifically in the private hospital 
regression. It suggests different cities may have different private hospital availability that 
correlates with hospital outpatient care. For example, families with only two children live in towns 
where there is no private hospital which joined the new insurance scheme, but families with three 
children live in cities with a private hospital which has joined the new insurance scheme.  
To check our sample sensitivity, I either strike or relax our sample restriction. I relax our 
sample restriction by including twin siblings except those family having birth order 2nd and 3rd 
twin children since I am not able to determine which sibling is treatment or control. To do so, I 
adjust the birth order for twin siblings. For example, I use birth order equal to one for both siblings 
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if they are either first or second twins since I don’t know which one is an older or younger sibling. 
Table L.9-L.14 provide our main regression when I relax our sample restrictions. Table L.9-L.14 
have similar specifications as previous tables. Our results do not change with this alteration of the 
sample. It suggests our results are not sensitive to sample choices.    
One concern is whether a family with only one or two children may have a different 
preference with a family who has three children or more. To answer this problem, Table L.15-L.17 
provide our principal regression when I use the only family with at least three children. It gives 
treatment impact within the family, that is, the only family which the treatment group is the third 
child and the control group is their siblings. Table L.15-L.17 are analogous specifications as 
previous tables.  Our results do not change much with this sample choices; It suggests our result 
are robust to sample options. 
In 1994, the government-provided scheme made dependent coverage changes that covered 
only two children after initially covering three children. On March 22, 1994, government insurance 
scheme covered three children born before that date, and otherwise only two children per family. 
New government employee only had up to two children covered.  To test the sensitivity of our 
sample to that policy, I restricted our samples to only children who were born after March 1994. 
Table L.18-L.20 provide our primary results for children who were born after March 1994. I apply 
five different specifications analogous to previous tables. The results indicate that hospital 
utilization slightly increases from our primary findings. In particular, hospital outpatient care 
increases from 4.1 percentage points to 4.4 percentage points and public-hospital outpatient care 
increases from 3.9 percentage points to 4.8 percentage points. It might suggest that some children 
were the third child, born before March 1994 with their parents working before that date, who 
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received public insurance coverage benefits before the universal health coverage scheme. 
However, it also suggests that issue may not change our primary estimates substantively.    
 
2.7.2. Falsification tests 
The identifying assumption for the difference-in-differences approach is common parallel 
trends between treatment and control groups without any intervention. It implies without any 
interference, both treatment and control groups would have parallel trends over time before the 
treatment period. To check this assumption, I estimate various specification tests for artificial 
effect during pre-treatment years. Table M.1-M.10 provide falsification tests for our primary 
outcomes. I use the years 2000 and 2007 as our artificial effects, and I implement five different 
specifications analogous to previous tables. If the intervention drove our results instead of inherent 
differences between the treatment and control groups, then I would see no impact on the artificial 
treatment period. In general, the model suggests no estimators are statistically significant (except 
four estimators in private hospitals from 50 regressions which disappear when I include 
municipality fixed effect) and reduce the estimation magnitude. These results support the notion 
that the actual interventions likely drive the difference in outcomes. 
 
2.8. Discussion and conclusion 
Improving access to medical care is one primary public policy objective both in developed 
and developing countries. Indonesia first introduced its universal insurance scheme in 2014.  Two 
interesting features are reduction in cost-sharing and expansion dependent coverage from only the 
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first two children to three children. A unique dependent coverage scheme for government-provided 
insurance allows us to analyze the impact of public insurance on medical care utilization.  
Our results are more substantial than previous studies in Indonesia even though we achieve 
a similar conclusion. I account differential occupation medical care usage by using different triple 
methodology. I find that eligible children are more likely to go to public hospitals for outpatient 
utilization.  There is a more considerable impact when I include both eligibility and co-payment 
reduction effects. That is, universal health coverage not only adds the third children to the scheme 
but also consists of a co-payment reduction from their initial program (Askes). I find a slight 
reduction in clinic outpatient care although they are not statistically significant. The negligible 
price differential between insured and uninsured children in the public health center (Puskesmas) 
and different medical technological equipment between clinics and hospitals may be two reasons 
why there is a slight reduction on public health centers.  
My empirical results should be of interest to policymakers for their public insurance 
improvement programs. My findings suggest public insurance benefits insurance holders on 
having access to medical care, primarily in public health centers. Also, the expansion of public 
insurance health facility networks to all private health centers may advantage public insurance 
holders because it reduces the public health center patient load. Minimizing the number of 
physicians' patient load per day could result in an adequate treatment time per patient.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE IMPACT OF COMPULSORY AND FREE SCHOOL PROGRAMS 
ON CHILD LABOR AND HEALTH OUTCOMES 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Improving education, reducing child labor, and increasing health outcomes are widely 
accepted public policy goals in developed as well as developing countries. Although a strong 
empirical correlation between education, labor, and health is now well established, the debate 
among economists currently lies in possible mechanisms explaining that correlation (Albouy & 
Lequien, 2009). Correlation doesn’t imply causation; as poor health may inhibit people investing 
in education (reverse causality). Many factors affect both education and health outcomes (omitted 
variable bias).  This study estimates the causal effect of compulsory education together with free 
school programs on child labor and health outcomes by exploiting changes in compulsory 
government education and free tuition programs in Indonesia. 
The Indonesian government has mandated primary nine-year school since 2003, from 
previous (1993) mandates of only up to six years of education. However, in developing countries, 
mandates per se may not be optimal to bring children into school and keep them away from 
working. Additional interventions are required in developing countries because of the nature of 
developing countries' limited financing ability or limited education facilities to put their children 
into school.  
Previous literature accords with this idea. For developed countries, such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, raising the minimum dropout age from 14 to 15 years old in the 
United Kingdom or changes in compulsory state schooling in the United States from 1915 to 1930 
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increased future labor earning and health outcomes, and reduced the mortality rate (Lleras-Muney, 
2005; Oreopoulos, 2006).  
However, evidence shows additional interventions are required in developing countries. In 
addition to extending compulsory education from six to nine years, the Taiwanese government 
opened over 150 new junior high schools in 1968; uses school opening as an instrument for 
mother’s or father’s schooling, they find that parent’s schooling reduce infant mortality (Chou, 
Liu, Grossman, & Joyce, 2007). Indonesia's education reform which constructed over 61,000 
primary schools between 1973 and 1978 led to an increase in education and future labor earnings 
(Duflo, 2000). In contrast, even after reforms to decentralize education and introduce basic free 
education in Indonesia in the 1990s, such policies often fail to increase access and quality of 
education, household expenditures on child education are high and increasing, and extensive social 
and geographical disparities exist (Kristiansen, 2006; Rosser & Joshi, 2013).  
To address this problem, in 2005, through the School Operational Grant Program (Bantuan 
Operasional Sekolah / BOS), the government supported nine-year compulsory education with free 
tuition for all Indonesian citizens. The government spent more than IDR 15 trillion (1.5 billion 
USD) each year to finance primary and junior high schools in Indonesia to support compulsory 
education and free tuition programs. Access to a free school for eligible children may lower the 
effective price of schooling, enabling children to invest in education. Also, schooling could 
decrease child labor. Increasing schooling opportunities and decreasing child labor would improve 
health behavior and health outcomes. 
I apply difference-in-differences (DID) and matching DID approaches with 13- to 15-year-
old junior high school students as a treatment group and 16- to 18-year-old senior high school 
students as a control group. I employ representative large-scale multi-purpose socioeconomic 
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survey data of Indonesian families and individuals (SUSENAS) for the years 1997-1999 and 2003-
2014. The SUSENAS is household and individual data which covers the Indonesian population 
living in all provinces in Indonesia. Each survey contains a core questionnaire which consists of 
roster household characteristics, health care, and educational attainment. 
I find compulsory education and free tuition programs likely lead to reductions in child 
labor and fewer experiences with diarrhea and migraines. It suggests the program eases household 
budget constraints. For children who come from lower-income family or children who live in rural 
areas, the impact is larger on the probability of working. It supports the notion the loss in utility 
from sending the child to school is inversely related to the level of parental income, and school 
subsidy for the cost of going to school would decrease the disutility of household consumption, 
primarily in rural areas which less likely have access to the credit market. Our results are robust to 
many specifications. Our results suggest the benefit of government expenditures in education on 
child labor and health outcomes.  
This study contributes a valuable resource for policy-makers and research studies in 
assessing the impact of public expenditures in developing countries. Our solution to the problem 
of compulsory education in developing countries, by exploiting additional quasi-experimental 
intervention of government expenditures in education to give free tuition programs reduces child 
labor and improves health outcomes.  
 
3.2. Review of the relevant previous literature: Theory and empirics 
I provide both theoretical and empirical research studies regarding school and child labor 
to understand mechanism of school subsidy could affect child labor. 
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3.2.1. Education and child labor: Basic model  
A conceptual framework of education and labor market outcomes assumes individuals face 
a market opportunity that gives the level of earnings associated with alternative schooling choice 
and reaches an optimal schooling decision by balancing the benefits of higher schooling against 
the cost (Card, 1999).  Particularly for children, there is a trade-off between child labor and the 
accumulation of human capital, and it is socially inefficient when it has a sufficiently adverse effect 
on ability. Child labor exists because of family hardship, working children as a substitute for 
negative bequest (to transfer income from children to parents), and a substitute of borrowing 
because of limited access to credit (Baland & Robinson, 2000; Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2004). 
In constructing an economic model of child labor, I develop a model of child labor from 
Ranjan (1999) by including the cost of going to school because the cost of schooling is one 
important variable that affects child labor. Parents think that the cost of education when deciding 
to enroll their children in school because it reduced household consumption. In this economy, there 
are three types of labor: child labor, adult unskilled labor, and skilled adult labor. Skilled labor is 
more productive than unskilled labor (rs/ru >1), and child labor is less productive than unskilled 
labor (rc/ru <1), where rs, ru, and rc are adult skilled wages, adult unskilled wages, and child wages, 
respectively.   
Each household consists of parents and a child who live in two periods. Parents have 
income in both periods (𝑌𝑝1, 𝑌𝑝2), which we may conceptualize as parent salary and retirement. If 
a child is working in the first period, they will have child wages in the first period and adult 
unskilled wages in the second period, otherwise they will have no child wages in the first period 
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and skilled wages in the second period. Parents also have to pay child’s school tuition and any 
other associated school cost (𝐶𝑠) when their children attend school.  
 
3.2.1.1.No credit constraint case 
The no credit constraint case assumes each household has access to credit market at the 
market interest rate (r). Parents maximize household utilities to choose whether to put their 
children to school or work, modeled using the following maximization problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐶1
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
 +  𝛽 
𝐶2
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
                                             (1) 
subject to 
𝐶1 +  𝐶𝑠. (1 − 𝟏(𝑊𝑐)) ≤  𝑌𝑝1 +  𝑟𝑐. 𝟏(𝑊𝑐) − 𝑆 
𝐶2 ≤ (1 + 𝑟)𝑆 + 𝑌𝑝2 +  𝑟𝑢. 𝟏(𝑊𝑐) +  𝑟𝑠. (1 − 𝟏(𝑊𝑐)) 
where 𝐶1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶2 are household consumption in first and second period, 𝟏(𝑊𝑐) is an indicator 
whether a child is working, 𝑆 is savings, 𝜃 is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
and 𝛽 is the time discount factor.  
Considering the household utility maximization for a household who sends children to 
work (𝟏(𝑊𝑐) = 1), the maximization on equation (1) becomes: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐶1
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
 +  𝛽 
𝐶2
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
                                             (2) 
subject to 
𝐶1 ≤  𝑌𝑝1 +  𝑟𝑐 − 𝑆 
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𝐶2 ≤ (1 + 𝑟)𝑆 + 𝑌𝑝2 +  𝑟𝑢 
This maximization problem yields: 
𝑆𝑢 =  
𝑌𝑝1+ 𝑟𝑐+ 𝛽
∗(𝑌𝑝2+ 𝑟𝑢)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
                                                 (3) 
𝐶1𝑢 =  
𝛽∗(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1+ 𝑟𝑐)+ 𝛽
∗(𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑢)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
                                              (4) 
𝐶2𝑢 =  
(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1+ 𝑟𝑐)+ (𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑢)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
                                                     (5) 
𝛽∗ = (𝛽(1 + 𝑟))−
1
𝜃                                                        (6) 
The two-period household utility for a household who sends children to work has the 
following indirect utility function: 
𝑈𝑢 =  
[
𝛽∗(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1+ 𝑟𝑐)+ 𝛽
∗(𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑢)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
](1−𝜃)−1
(1−𝜃)
+ 𝛽
[
(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1+ 𝑟𝑐)+ (𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑢)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
](1−𝜃)−1
(1−𝜃)
              (7)       
Alternatively, if parents send their children to school (𝟏(𝑊𝑐) = 0), their household utility 
function becomes: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐶1
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
 +  𝛽 
𝐶2
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
                                             (8) 
subject to 
𝐶1 +  𝐶𝑠 ≤  𝑌𝑝1 − 𝑆 
𝐶2 ≤ (1 + 𝑟)𝑆 + 𝑌𝑝2 +   𝑟𝑠 
The maximization problem results in: 
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𝑆𝑠 ≤  
(𝑌𝑝1− 𝐶𝑠)+ 𝛽
∗(𝑌𝑝2+ 𝑟𝑠)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
                                                            (9) 
𝐶1𝑠 ≤  
𝛽∗(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1− 𝐶𝑠)+ 𝛽
∗(𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑠)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
                                                    (10) 
𝐶2𝑠 ≤  
(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1− 𝐶𝑠)+ (𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑠)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
                                                            (11) 
The lifetime household utility for a household who sends children to school has the 
following indirect utility function: 
𝑈𝑠 =  
[
𝛽∗(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1− 𝐶𝑠)+ 𝛽
∗(𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑠)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
](1−𝜃)−1
(1−𝜃)
+ 𝛽 
[
(1+𝑟)(𝑌𝑝1− 𝐶𝑠)+ (𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑠)
(1+ 𝛽∗(1+𝑟))
](1−𝜃)−1
(1−𝜃)
             (12) 
Parents would send their children to school if utility from attending school (𝑈𝑠) is preferred 
to the utility from sending children to work (𝑈𝑢). Comparing equation (7) and equation (12), 
parents will send their children to school if and only if the first term in equation (12) satisfies  𝑟𝑠 >
(1 + 𝑟)(𝑟𝑐 + 𝐶𝑠) + 𝑟𝑢; that is, their future skilled child wages are larger than the future value of 
the current child wage, cost of going to school and future unskilled wages. Rearranged, we could 
also consider the rate of education with the following equation: 
𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑢
𝑟𝑐+𝐶𝑠
 ≥ (1 + 𝑟)                                                       (13) 
Therefore, as long as the rate of education is larger than the interest rate, parents would 
always send their children to school. Equation (13) also shows that as the cost of going to school 
(𝐶𝑠) is smaller, then larger is the net return of education. However, there are still children who are 
not in school in the real world. These important results provide the importance of access to credit 
and cost of education. For example, urban areas such as a capital city may have a better credit 
market than a rural area since cities have better financial infrastructure such as banks. 
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3.2.1.2.Credit constraint case 
An alternative condition is provided next. Assume each household does not have access to 
the credit market. I also assume each household cannot save or borrow. These assumptions are 
more probable for a family with child labor since they usually come from a low-income family 
that cannot save and may not have access to the credit market. The household maximization 
problem could be represented by the following equation: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝐶1
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
+ 𝛽
𝐶2
(1−𝜃)
 −1
(1−𝜃)
                                                        (14) 
subject to 
𝐶1 +  𝐶𝑠(1 − 𝟏(𝑊𝑐)) ≤  𝑌𝑝1 +  𝑟𝑐𝟏(𝑊𝑐) 
𝐶2 ≤ 𝑌𝑝2 +  𝑟𝑢𝟏(𝑊𝑐) + 𝑟𝑠(1 − 𝟏(𝑊𝑐)) 
After substituting the budget constraints into household utility maximization for having 
working children (𝟏(𝑊𝑐) = 1), the maximization on equation (14) becomes: 
𝑈𝑢 =  
(𝑌𝑝1+ 𝑟𝑐)
(1−𝜃)
−1
(1−𝜃)
+ 𝛽
(𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑢)
(1−𝜃)−1
(1−𝜃)
                                 (15) 
Similarly, the household maximization problem for a household who sends children to 
school is (𝟏(𝑊𝑐) = 0): 
𝑈𝑠 =  
(𝑌𝑝1− 𝐶𝑠)
(1−𝜃)
−1
(1−𝜃)
+ 𝛽
(𝑌𝑝2+𝑟𝑠)
(1−𝜃)−1
(1−𝜃)
                                 (16) 
Comparing equations (15) and (16), there exists a threshold level of parental income 𝐼𝑝1 ∗
= (𝑌𝑝1 ∗ − 𝐶𝑠 ∗) such that: 
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                           𝑈𝑠(𝐼𝑝1) ≥ 𝑈𝑢(𝐼𝑝1)          for all     𝐼𝑝1  ≥  𝐼𝑝1 ∗ 
and 
                           𝑈𝑠(𝐼𝑝1) ≤ 𝑈𝑢(𝐼𝑝1)          for all     𝐼𝑝1  ≤  𝐼𝑝1 ∗ 
where 𝑌𝑝1 ∗, 𝐶𝑠 ∗, and 𝐼𝑝1 ∗ are threshold of parent income in first period, threshold of cost of 
education, and threshold of parent net income after cost of education that creates indifferent utility 
between schooling and working, respectively.   
There are two important intuitions. The loss in utility from sending the child to school is 
inversely related to the level of parental income and very high for low-income families due to 
diminishing marginal utility. Thus, extreme low-income families are forced to send their children 
to work (Ranjan, 1999). Various combinations of parental income and educational costs would 
determine parents' decision to send their children to school. Increases in subsidies for the cost of 
schooling would increase parents' utility for sending their children to school. However, even the 
full subsidy may not eliminate school dropouts and child labor.  
In general form, the household maximization problem would be the following equation: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝐶1) + 𝛽 𝑈(𝐶2)                                                      (17) 
subject to 
 𝐶1 +  𝐶𝑠(1 − 𝑊𝑐) ≤  𝑌𝑝1 +  𝑟𝑐(𝑊𝑐) 
𝐶2 ≤ 𝑌𝑝2 +  𝑟𝑢 + 𝑟𝑠(1 − 𝑊𝑐) 
After substituting the budget constraint into the objective function, the maximization yields 
the optimal schooling condition: 
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 𝑈𝑐2
′ (𝑌𝑝2, 𝑟𝑢, 𝑟𝑠). 𝑟𝑠 ≥
1
𝛽
𝑈𝐶1
′ (𝑌𝑝1, 𝐶𝑠, 𝑟𝑐)(𝐶𝑠 + 𝑟𝑐)                                     (18) 
The marginal benefits of schooling because of higher second-period consumption due to 
higher wage from their skilled children are equal to the disutility of foregone first-period 
consumption because of the higher costs of education and foregone child labor wages. A larger 
subsidy for the cost of going to school would decrease the disutility of first-period consumption, 
thus increasing the likelihood of parents sending their children to school. However, the higher 
child labor wage (rc) would cause a higher disutility of foregone first-period consumption; hence, 
higher child wages would decrease the probability of parents sending children to school. Therefore, 
the net impact depends on how successfully the subsidy eases household budget constraints and 
how important the child wages are for household consumption. 
 
3.2.2. Education and child labor: Empirics 
Developed and developing countries have different integration levels in implementing one 
particular policy. It may drive different conclusions for these two country groups. While citizens' 
compulsory education is supported by other pro-education policies in developed countries, 
developing countries often mandate their citizens to go to school and support that policy later 
rather than preparing it before the main policy being implemented. This differential policy 
implementation calls for different empirical strategies to estimate the impact of compulsory 
education on education and child labor outcomes between developed and developing countries.    
One developed country, the United Kingdom, changed its compulsory schooling laws in 
the second half of the twentieth century, increasing the minimum dropout age from 14 to 15 years 
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old. Those policies had a powerful impact on redirecting almost half the population of 14-year-
olds in the mid-twentieth century to stay in school for one more year (Oreopoulos, 2006; Silles, 
2009). Similar evidence also found that, in the United States, there were at least 30 states that 
implemented compulsory schooling from 1915 to 1930. The enforcement of compulsory schooling 
increased educational attainment by 5% a year (Lleras-Muney, 2005). Developed countries are 
more likely than developing countries to enforce child labor regulations, which may drive less 
research on how education affects child labor.  
However, conclusive evidence may not be reached in developing countries. Extending 
compulsory education from 6 to 9 years in Taiwan increased junior high school enrollment in 1968 
(Chou et al., 2007). In contrast, even after the decentralization of education, with the 1990s reform, 
such policies often fail to increase access to and quality of education. Additionally, household 
expenditures for children's education are high and increasing, and huge social and geographical 
disparities exist in Indonesia (Kristiansen, 2006; Rosser & Joshi, 2013). Related to labor outcomes 
in Indonesia, the construction of primary schools led to an increase in education, and the increase 
has translated into an increase in future wages more than 1.5 percent (Duflo, 2000).  
Additional pro-education intervention policies to support main education policies and 
demographic differences may drive these different findings between developed and developing 
countries.  Before developed countries implemented compulsory education, they provided other 
education policies to support the main education policies. For instance, the United Kingdom's 
compulsory education in the second half of the twentieth century was supported by the 1944 
Education Act (the Butler Act), which provided free universal secondary education for all pupils 
(Silles, 2009). Taiwan compulsory education in 1968 was supported by opening 150 junior high 
schools at a differential rate among regions (Chou et al., 2007). Indonesian primary school 
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construction provides an access to education, especially in rural areas which are less likely to have 
high-quality school infrastructures and more likely to have rough geographic conditions.  
Also, developed and developing countries have different demographics, governance levels, 
and political will. For instance, people in developing countries simply have less income than 
people in developed countries. Moreover, developing countries' corruption level may be higher 
than that of developed countries. The different local governments may also have differing levels 
of corruption or political will. Kristiansen and Pratikno (2006) find the administration of education 
services is without transparency and accountability in Indonesia, even after decentralization of 
education. Many parents in Indonesia also paid illegal fees to principals or teachers for various 
reasons (Rosser & Joshi, 2013).   
 
3.2.3. Health: General model 
A natural extension from the child labor model above is assuming each household cares 
about their children's health (𝐻). Child health may be modeled as a function of child consumption 
(𝐶𝑐), child education (1 − 𝑊𝑐), and given previous child health (𝐻0). The general form of parents' 
maximization problem is: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝐶𝑝1, 𝐶𝑐1, 𝐻1(𝐶𝑐1, (1 − 𝑊𝑐), 𝐻0)) + 𝛽 𝑈(𝐶𝑝2, 𝐶𝑐2, 𝐻2(𝐶𝑐2, 𝐻1(𝐶𝑐1, (1 − 𝑊𝑐), 𝐻0)))   (19) 
subject to 
𝐶𝑝1 +  𝐶𝑐1 +  𝐶𝑠(1 − 𝑊𝑐) ≤  𝑌𝑝1 +  𝑟𝑐(𝑊𝑐) 
𝐶𝑝2 + 𝐶𝑐2 ≤ 𝑌𝑝2 +  𝑟𝑢 + 𝑟𝑠(1 − 𝑊𝑐) 
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This maximization yields the following optimal health: 
 𝑈𝐻1
′ (𝐻1𝑆𝑐
`  − 𝐻1𝐶𝑐1
` (𝐶𝑠 + 𝑟𝑐)) + 𝛽 (𝑈𝐶𝑐2
′ . 𝑈𝐻2
′ . 𝐻2𝐶𝑐2
` . 𝑟𝑠 + 𝑈𝐻2
′ . 𝐻2𝐻1
` (𝐻1𝑆𝑐
`  − 𝐻1𝐶𝑐1
` (𝐶𝑠 + 𝑟𝑐))) ≤
𝑈𝐶𝑐1
′ (𝐶𝑠 + 𝑟𝑐)                                                                                                                                           (20) 
The marginal benefit of child health as a function of the price of schooling and child wages. 
The marginal utility of first-period child health depends on the direct impact of child health on 
schooling (not working) and the foregone consumption because of the higher price of schooling 
and household income reduction from foregone child wage. In theory, this sign is ambiguous 
depending on the sign of the impact of the school on health, the sign of the impact of foregone 
consumption on health, and which one has a larger impact on health if they both have a common 
sign.  
The marginal utility of the second period is ambiguous as well. It depends on the impact 
of future child consumption on future child health because of higher skilled wages, and how first-
period health may affect second-period child health.   
 
3.2.4. Health: Empirics 
Theoretically, there are many channels by which education can affect health outcomes. 
Education improves the rate of conversion of inputs into health (productive efficiency) and 
improves health behavior because education increases someone's knowledge about healthy 
behaviors (allocative efficiency) (Grossman, 1972). A growing number of studies find education 
improves health outcomes through improvements in self-reported health, preventing illness, and 
reducing mortality (Chou et al., 2007; Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Silles, 2009). 
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However, efficiency theory may be less demanding for children since young people are less likely 
to understand that they should care about their health status and health behavior. 
School food may also affect children's health either positively or negatively. Healthy 
school breakfasts or lunches may have a beneficial impact on child health. However, unhealthy 
school snacks may have a deleterious impact on child health. One study found reduced-price 
lunches contributed to childhood obesity (Schanzenbach, 2009). However, other studies argued 
that the receipt of reduced-price breakfasts or lunches improves the health of children, or were a 
valuable tool for reducing childhood obesity (Bhattacharya, Currie, & Haider, 2006; Gundersen, 
Kreider, & Pepper, 2012; Millimet, Tchernis, & Husain, 2010).  Those research studies are related 
with developing countries, primarily when we concern about school snacks sold by school 
cafeteria or street vendors. 
Education may also affect health outcomes from other channels including improvement of 
labor earnings and less physically demanding labor. Beegle et al. (2004) found child labor in 
Vietnam led to substantially higher earnings than their friends who do not work, however, the 
majority of children were working as unpaid family workers in agriculture or non-agriculture 
businesses run by the household. Improvement in labor earnings for children implies higher 
household income and higher consumption levels. It may increase health outcomes if they 
consume healthy foods. However, it may harm health outcomes if children use their earnings for 
fast food, snacks, or other unhealthy food. Children in developing countries often work long hours, 
sometimes in physically-demanding areas such as agricultural settings, street work, or garbage 
scavenging (Beegle et al., 2004; USDOL, 2015). Going to school implies less time allocation for 
children, so less physically demanding labor may have a beneficial impact on children. 
98 
 
There are various reasons for this inconclusive evidence. The production of health is a 
complex process. Health depends not only on education or medical care but also a host of other 
factors such as stress, income, health behaviors, and genetic predisposition to disease (Levy & 
Meltzer, 2004). 
 
3.3. Compulsory education and free tuition program in Indonesia 
Indonesian government mandated six-year primary education for all Indonesian citizens in 
1993. In 2003, Law 20/2013 regarding the National Education System was issued, which expanded 
the mandates up to nine-year primary education, elementary school, and junior high school. Article 
(6) mandated each Indonesian citizen who is seven to fifteen years old to have a nine-year primary 
education.   
However, mandates per se may not be a strong incentive to put children into school if there 
is no other incentive to alleviate budget constraints for a household in putting their children into 
school. To address this problem, the Indonesian government, through the School Grant Operational 
Program (BOS), provided all Indonesian citizens with free tuition for a primary education starting 
in July 2005, the enrollment period for the 2005/2006 school year.  
The government allocates more than IDR 15 trillion (1.5 billion USD) in 2005/2006 and 
always increases its contribution each year. In 2012, they provided IDR 24 trillion (2.4 billion 
USD) for this program. The funding was allocated based on the number of pupils in a school; it 
covers new student registration, textbooks, teaching and learning activities, teacher development, 
and other school operations and maintenance (SMERU, 2006; The World Bank, 2015). Figure 3.1 
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shows BOS funding per pupil from 2005 to 2014 for both elementary and junior high schools. The 
program provides general education subsidies for each student in a school, and the nominal 
magnitudes keep growing over time. During the 2005/2006 school year, the program provided IDR 
235,000 per year for each elementary student and IDR 324,500 per year for each junior high school 
student. The education subsidy per pupil increased to IDR 580,000 per year for elementary schools 
and IDR 720,000 per year for junior high schools in the 2012/2013 school year.   
Although legal tuition fees are supposed to be eliminated, a significant challenge concerned 
the receipt of illegal fees paid to some principals and teachers in the first few years of program 
implementation (Rosser & Joshi, 2013; SMERU, 2006; The World Bank, 2015). However, the 
government continued strengthening their program by issuing presidential decree 14/2008 for 
Compulsory Education in 2008. Article (9) states that both central and local governments should 
ensure the implementation of compulsory education without tuition fees for students. Furthermore, 
the Ministry of Culture and Education issued regulation 60/2011 that prohibited schools levying 
any investment or operational fees against their students. 
 
Figure 3.1. The School Operational Program (BOS) Amount Per Pupil 
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In 2003, household education expenditures were around IDR 570 thousand per elementary 
student and IDR 1.47 million per junior high school student (The World Bank, 2015). School fees 
and school materials contributed the biggest shares of household spending. The funding amount 
in 2005/2006 suggests the program subsidized around 41% of household education expenditures 
for elementary school students and 22% of household education expenditures for junior high 
schoolers. 
Despite law 20/2013 mandating tuition assistance only for children who were seven to 
fifteen years old, the free tuition program was applied for all children who were still in primary or 
junior high school, regardless of their age at that time. Therefore, we expect the compulsory 
education and free tuition program will impact not only seven- to fifteen-year-old children but also 
all other children who are still in primary and junior high school.  
 
3.4. Data 
I use representative survey data of Indonesian families and individuals (SUSENAS) for the 
years 1997 to 2014 but with gaps. It is a series of large-scale multi-purpose socioeconomic surveys 
initiated in 1963-1964 and fielded every year or two since then. Since 1993, the SUSENAS has 
contained household and individual data which covers the Indonesian population living in all 
provinces in Indonesia. SUSENAS is not a freely available source; the author does not have the 
years 2000, 2001, and 2002. I also exclude 1997, 2005, and 2009 from the main analysis since 
they do not provide some important variables such as labor data and household member income.  
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Each survey contains a core questionnaire which consists of roster household 
characteristics, labor, health care, and educational attainment. SUSENAS conducted a quarterly 
survey stacked into yearly data sets; it sampling around 75,000 households on average for each 
survey period: March, June, September, and December. Therefore, it is typically composed of 
200,000 to 300,000 households in one-year data sets. 
For our research purposes, I use only children who are still in junior high school and senior 
high school, age groups between 13 and 18 years old. Our final sample consists of 418,207 
observations, corresponding to 63% of total junior high school and senior high school students. 
For sensitivity check purposes, I include the years 1997, 2005 and 2009 in our analysis. To include 
these years, I exclude parent income data since they are not available, but I still have main health 
outcome variables.  
 
3.5. Empirical method 
Because the program was implemented at a national level, there is no obvious comparable 
control group available. Also, the program was implemented not only based on age but also on 
school level; that is, elementary and junior high school. Thus, some students in particular age 
groups who are supposed to be in the next school level may be still eligible if they are in either 
elementary or junior high school. For example, in Indonesia, the normal school age for junior high 
school students is from 13 to 15 years old. However, older children are still eligible if they are in 
junior high school.  
Many factors confounded the impact of compulsory education and free tuition programs. 
Our economic model shows that higher parent income is more likely to increase the indirect utility 
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of schooling, and students in urban areas are more likely to go to school because of more school 
facilities available lead to lower cost of schooling in term of transportation costs. Economic 
conditions, specifically countrywide hardships due to the recession and monetary crisis, could 
decrease schooling and force children to work. Increased medical care prices due to inflation could 
also reduce investment in child health care if increase household income less than increase in 
inflation. Thus, it may deteriorate child health. It complicates measuring the impact without any 
control group. 
To address those problems, I construct 13- to 15-year-old children in junior high school 
as a treatment group and children 16- to 18-years-old in senior high school as a control group. 
Although eligible children are all elementary and junior high school students, I restricted the junior 
high group to 13-15 years and senior high group to 16-18 years because those are normal age 
groups in those school levels and mandated age to be at junior high school by the regulation. For 
example, 16- to 18-year-old students in senior high schools today were in junior high schools two 
to three years ago; thus, they might have similar ability as 13- to 15-year-old junior high school 
students today. But 16- to 18-year-olds who may be in junior high schools represent either children 
with less ability or children with household financing problems resulting in lower school 
performance. Also, I exclude elementary school students to avoid the impact of the 1993 
elementary school mandates, which may confound our result, and to avoid too far of an age gap 
between the treatment and control groups.  
The basic approach is a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation. Our baseline 
regression is of the form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑇𝑖𝑠 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3(𝑇𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) +  𝛼4𝑋`𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝑠 + 𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡     (21) 
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where Yit is an indicator variable of working, and health-related outcomes for individual i living 
in municipality s at time t. Tis, a treatment variable, is an indicator whether an individual is 13-15 
years old and in junior high school, while the control group is 16-18 years old and in senior high 
school. Postt indicates whether period t is after the implementation of the new policy (2005 or 
later). X`ist is a vector of control variables for sex, age fixed effect, year of education, parent 
income, household size, and whether an individual life in a rural area. Control variables include 
the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, the 2008-2009 US recession, and the 2012-2014 worldwide 
recession. I separate the impact of the economic crisis/recession for the treatment and control 
groups to capture the different impacts of economic turmoil on those groups. I include municipality 
fixed effect (𝑠) and year fixed effect (𝑡) to capture unobserved differences in space and time, 
respectively; and ϵist is the idiosyncratic error term. I cluster by household level to capture 
unobserved similarities among families. 
I expand the standard DID approach above with a matching DID approach. Because of 
different age and school level between the treatment and control groups, some characteristics 
between those two groups may differ. Moreover, those compositional characteristics of the 
treatment and control groups may change over time since I observe different people over time 
using repeated cross-sectional data (Hong, 2013). For example, senior high school students are 
more likely to be married; thus, they are more likely to be out of school and instead working. 
Senior high school students are more likely than junior high school students to live in urban areas 
because of senior high school facility limitations in rural areas. However, due to senior high school 
construction, senior high schools become more common in rural areas over time, and this 
composition change may confound the impact of compulsory and free tuition programs. The 
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impact magnitude is affected not only by the impact of compulsory and free tuition programs, but 
also the impact of the diffusion of schools opening.  
To begin matching difference-in-differences, I first estimate multivariate propensity 
scores using standard propensity score matching methods (see, for examples Angrist & Pischke, 
2008; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). I thus estimate propensity scores treated separately for each 
year, both pre-treatment-year and post-treatment-year, following multivariate propensity score 
propensity score method from Hong (2013) using the following: 
𝑃(𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1 | 𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡) = 𝜙(𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛽)                                                  (22) 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a treatment indicator as described in equation (21), and 𝑍𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of covariates 
for gender, marital status, a log of parent income, household size, and whether a child is living in 
rural areas. I include the municipality in which children live in order to make sure that I matched 
children within the same municipality. Each year propensity score matching is used to balance the 
sample characteristics for both pre- and post-treatment periods from repeated cross-sectional data.  
Suppose I have an estimated propensity score 𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 for an individual i who lives in 
municipality s at time t. I then impute those propensity scores for all observations as probability 
weights. I use the matched-sample and apply DID in equation (21), but including the probability 
weight for each matched observation.  
 
3.6. Empirical results 
In this section, I provide descriptive and our regression analysis for child labor and health 
outcomes. Robustness checks and falsifications are provided to tests sensitivity of our estimates. 
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3.6.1. Trends and descriptive statistics 
 Table 3.1 shows means and standard deviations for child labor and health outcomes. Work 
is a binary variable whether a child was working last week, or he is working but he was off last 
week. Illnesses outcomes are binary variables whether a child experienced either diarrhea, asthma, 
or migraine symptoms last month. Upper row for each variable is treatment group means and 
standard deviations, lower row for each variable is control group means and standard deviations. 
Column (1), (3), and (5) are means without matching procedures, column (2), (4), and (6) are 
means after matching process. I separate after intervention period into two groups, compulsory 
per-se (2003-2004) which compulsory education was implemented without any free tuition, and 
compulsory and free tuition period implemented. 
Table 3.1. Means and Standard Deviations, Outcomes 
Variables Pre-Reform (<2003) Compulsory (2003-2004) +Free Tuition (>=2005) 
w/o Matching Matching w/o Matching Matching w/o Matching Matching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Child Labor:       
   Treatment   0.045(0.206) 0.045(0.085) 0.017(0.129) 0.016(0.032) 0.063(0.242) 0.063(0.117) 
   Control 0.062(0.241) 0.071(0.131) 0.040(0.195) 0.040(0.077) 0.132(0.242) 0.139(0.239) 
Health Outcomes:       
Illness                 (T) 0.038(0.190) 0.038(0.072) 0.031(0.174) 0.032(0.061) 0.034(0.182) 0.034(0.066) 
                           (C) 0.037(0.188) 0.038(0.073) 0.032(0.176) 0.030(0.059) 0.038(0.182) 0.040(0.077) 
   Diarrhea          (T) 0.004(0.066) 0.006(0.011) 0.008(0.092) 0.008(0.017) 0.007(0.086) 0.007(0.015) 
                           (C) 0.001(0.0008) 0.005(0.010) 0.006(0.076) 0.005(0.009) 0.007(0.086) 0.008(0.015) 
   Asthma            (T) 0.005(0.074) 0.005(0.011) 0.004(0.064) 0.004(0.008) 0.005(0.072) 0.005(0.010) 
                           (C) 0.004(0.066) 0.005(0.010) 0.004(0.065) 0.004(0.008) 0.006(0.072) 0.006(0.012) 
   Migraine          (T) 0.028(0.164) 0.028(0.054) 0.021(0.144) 0.021(0.042) 0.025(0.155) 0.024(0.048) 
                           (C) 0.029(0.168) 0.029(0.056) 0.024(0.152) 0.023(0.045) 0.028(0.155) 0.030(0.057) 
N 31,328 25,625 23,805 19,287 325,381 267,484 
 
For child labor, 4.5 percent of junior high schoolers were working, and 7 percent of senior 
high schoolers were working before the intervention period. Figure 3.2 provides the trend for child 
labor. Although both groups have a higher probability of working over time, the treatment group 
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has a less steep trend of working after the intervention period. It supports the notion that there is a 
trade-off between time for schooling and time for working. 
Table 3.1 suggests both groups have similar illness symptoms before the intervention 
period, but less likely experience illnesses symptoms after free tuition period were implemented. 
The treatment group less likely experience diarrhea, asthma and migraine symptoms after the free 
tuition period even though they either had a higher likelihood of diarrhea and asthma symptoms 
and similar migraine symptom before the intervention period. It indicates preliminary evidence of 
health outcomes improvement for the treatment group.  
 
Compulsory Free Tuition 
Figure 3.2. Probability of Working 
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Figure 3.3 provides the trend of children experiencing diarrhea, asthma, or migraine 
symptoms. The trend suggests economic crisis and turmoil in 1998 increased the gap between the 
two groups. It also suggests the probability of experiencing illnesses is lower for the treatment 
group after the intervention period.   
  
Table 3.2 provides control variables, means, and standard deviations. Even though outcome 
variables are similar between the two groups, sample demographics in columns (1), (3), and (5) 
suggest the control group is more likely to be married, have higher parental income, and reside in 
Compulsory Free Tuition 
Figure 3.3.Probability of Experiencing Diarrhea, Asthma, Migraine 
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urban areas. I don’t find any substantial difference in gender and household size between two 
groups. Columns (2), (4), and (6) provide demographics for the two groups after using propensity 
score matching. Propensity score matching balances marital status, parental income, and the 
household location, as previously shown in pre-matching. Also, propensity matching also balances 
geographic location between the two groups by eliminates control group from different 
municipalities (not shown), ensuring that the treatment and control groups are coming from the 
same municipalities. 
Table 3.2. Means and Standard Deviations, Controls 
Variables Pre-Reform (<2003) Compulsory (2003-2004) +Free Tuition (>=2005) 
w/o Matching Matching w/o Matching Matching w/o Matching Matching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Control       
Male                   (T) 0.501(0.500) 0.502(0.500) 0.513(0.500) 0.512(0.500) 0.507(0.499) 0.507(0.500) 
                           (C) 0.501(0.500) 0.511(0.500) 0.509(0.500) 0.510(0.500) 0.509(0.499) 0.513(0.500) 
Married              (T) 0.001(0.030) 0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.049) 0.002(0.005) 0.004(0.060) 0.004(0.007) 
                           (C) 0.004(0.065) 0.001(0.001) 0.006(0.079) 0.002(0.005) 0.015(0.060) 0.004(0.007) 
Age                     (T) 14.00(0.783) 14.00(0.475) 13.93(0.786) 13.93(0.480) 13.90(0.787) 13.90(0.483) 
                           (C) 17.00(0.785) 17.00(0.463) 17.00(0.789) 17.00(0.481) 16.92(0.787) 16.92(0.486) 
Education           (T) 7.438(0.626) 7.437(0.369) 8.076(0.773) 8.077(0.464) 8.113(0.775) 8.113(0.463) 
                           (C) 10.547(0.645) 10.55(0.390) 11.20(0.778) 11.19(0.474) 11.219(0.775) 11.20(0.475) 
Ln(Parent Inc)    (T) 15.176(0.815) 15.18(0.056) 16.30(0.777) 16.302(0.068) 16.683(0.920) 16.68(0.075) 
                           (C) 15.326(0.742) 15.20(0.056) 16.41(0.734) 16.320(0.069) 16.794(0.920) 16.68(0.078) 
HH Size              (T) 5.637(1.685) 5.637(0.501) 5.374(1.557) 5.376(0.482) 5.136(1.652) 5.135(0.488) 
                           (C) 5.739(1.809) 5.671(0.496) 5.410(1.636) 5.435(0.484) 5.165(1.652) 5.180(0.490) 
Rural                  (T) 0.424(0.494) 0.424(0.488) 0.362(0.481) 0.361(0.461) 0.548(0.498) 0.548(0.495) 
                           (C) 0.298(0.458) 0.423(0.488) 0.276(0.447) 0.353(0.457) 0.466(0.498) 0.547(0.496) 
N 31,328 25,625 23,805 19,287 325,381 267,484 
       
 
 
Table 3.2 also shows substantial compositional changes between the two groups over time. 
Both groups are more likely to be married, have larger parent income, have a smaller household 
size, and be spread more evenly between rural and urban areas over time. It is common that 
widespread school opening in rural areas over time would increase the probability of schooling in 
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those rural areas. Also, previous research studies find that school openings significantly increases 
the probability of schooling (Chou et al., 2007; Duflo, 2000). It could cause positive bias because 
the effect estimated consists of not only the impact of compulsory education and free tuition but 
also differential impact for junior high school and senior high school opening in the rural areas. 
People may be less likely to go to school and more likely to work when they are married. 
Therefore, there may be a positive effect estimated from the standard DID approach which may 
reflect this covariate difference. Similarly, parents with higher income are more likely to send their 
children to school and less likely to send their children to work. The treatment group consists of 
lower-income families; therefore, there may exist negative bias since the estimation includes the 
impact of being in a lower-income family. Propensity score matching, both pre- and post-
intervention period, controls for those observable sources of bias, balancing their differences 
between two groups over time. 
 
3.6.2. The impact on child labor 
Table 3.3 provides DID and matching DID estimators for the probability of child labor for 
the populations of interest. Column (1) provides an estimator for standard DID, and column (2) 
shows the same child labor estimator for the matching DID approach. The dependent variable is 
an indicator equal to 1 if a child is working last week, or she/he usually works but is currently off 
this week. The questionnaire defines working as regular activities to earn income or profit for at 
least one hour per week.  
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Treatment is an indicator whether an individual is 13-15 years old and in junior high school, 
while the control group is 16-18 years old and in senior high school. In these regressions, there are 
five age dummy variables corresponding to age fixed effect for each age group, and interactions 
between the treatment variable and crisis/recession (the Asian economic crisis (1997-1998), the 
US recession (2008-2009), the global recession (2012-2014)) to capture the different impact 
between two groups.  I include municipality fixed effect and year fixed effect and cluster the 
standard error by household level to capture unobserved differences among families. 
 
Table 3.3. The Impact on Child Labor 
 Standard DID Matching DID 
VARIABLES Compulsory and Free Tuition Compulsory and Free Tuition 
 Work Work 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment*Post -0.037*** -0.035*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
   
Observations 418,206 343,291 
R-squared 0.115 0.118 
Age FE YES YES 
Controls* YES YES 
Crisis and Recession** YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Both models suggest similar results for the impact of compulsory education and free tuition 
on child labor. It implies bias from covariate imbalance does not greatly affect the estimated result. 
Both models suggest compulsory education and free tuition programs likely decrease working 
children more than 3.5 percentage points; it corresponds to more than 77-percent reduction from 
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the pre-intervention period. It suggests free tuition more likely relaxes household budget 
constraints, and there is a trade-off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital for 
children. When children are more likely to stay in school, they are less likely to work in the labor 
market.  
Although I find a substantial reduction in child labor, I find a partial instead of full trade-
off between schooling and child labor. There are many children who both stay in school and are 
working. Our economic model suggests that the net impact of child labor depends not only on how 
important the reduction of cost of education is to easing household budget constraints, but also on 
how important child wages are to household consumption. One possible reason for this partial 
trade-off is there are some children who earn substantial wages for their household, probably 
children from very low-income families. Thus, they are forced to allocate their time between 
school and working. 
 
3.6.3. Heterogeneity and the impact on child labor 
I investigate whether the magnitude of compulsory and free tuition program impacts on 
child labor vary systematically by parental income, geographic location, and gender. 
 
3.6.3.1.Parent income 
My model predicts the loss in utility from sending the child to school is inversely related 
to the level of parental income, and this loss is very high for low-income families due to 
diminishing marginal utility. Low income families have less choice to put their children into school 
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since they need their children's help in either household production, farms or labor market. If this 
is the case, then we would see a larger impact for low-income families than their counterparts.  
Table 3.4. Heterogeneity Impact by Parent Income 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.4 provides DID and matching DID estimators. Column (1) is the impact on child 
labor for parents with income in less than the 50% quartile, and column (2) is parent income from 
over the 50% quartile, for the population of interest. Panel A shows the DID method while panel 
B shows the matching DID model results. In line with our theoretical predictions, the results 
suggest compulsory education and free tuition programs relax household budget constraints and 
have higher impacts for lower-income families.  Incorporates weight in matching DID models do 
not change our estimates. 
 
 Heterogeneity Impact by Parent Income 
 Parent Income <50% Parent Income >50% 
VARIABLES Work Work 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A: DID   
Treatment*Post -0.046*** -0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Observations 213,617 204,266 
R-squared 0.136 0.087 
Panel B: Matching DID   
Treatment*Post -0.044*** -0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Observations 180,356 162,935 
R-squared 0.128 0.085 
   
Controls* ** YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
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3.6.3.2.Geographic location 
Urban and rural areas could create different impacts on child labor in at least three ways:  
My theory predicts parents more likely send their children to school when return on education 
investment is larger than interest rates. If rural areas have more restrictive credit institutions, then 
I expect school subsidy would have a larger impact for households with credit constraints. On the 
other hand, rural areas have fewer school facilities, which hampers individuals attending school. 
Also, child labor in rural areas is a more common phenomenon due to cultural norms and farming 
or fishing occupations of the parents, thus resulting in less impact in education investment for rural 
communities. 
Table 3.5. Heterogeneity Impact by Geographic Location 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 Heterogeneity Impact by Rural/Urban 
 Urban Rural 
VARIABLES Work Work 
 (1) (2) 
Standard DID   
Treatment*Post -0.034*** -0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Observations 212,312 205,571 
R-squared 0.083 0.134 
   
Matching DID   
Treatment*Post -0.029*** -0.043*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 166,661 176,630 
R-squared 0.077 0.123 
   
Control* ** YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
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Table 3.5 provides similar regressions as Table 3.4 for urban and rural areas. The model 
suggests compulsory education and free tuition programs more likely reduce child labor for 
children in rural areas than children in urban areas. Therefore, the results support the notion that 
subsidies help lower-income families with more credit constraints. 
3.6.3.3.Gender 
It is a common phenomenon in developing countries that males more likely work in the 
farm or labor market, while females more likely work in household production. If compulsory 
education and free tuition programs reduce the probability of children who are working to earn 
income or profit for their families, then we would expect a larger impact for male than female 
children.   
Table 3.6. Heterogeneity Impact by Gender 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Heterogeneity Impact by Gender 
 Female Male 
VARIABLES Work Work 
 (1) (2) 
Standard DID   
Treatment*Post -0.033*** -0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Observations 205,543 212,340 
R-squared 0.103 0.136 
   
Matching DID   
Treatment*Post -0.028*** -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Observations 168,621 174,670 
R-squared 0.102 0.127 
   
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
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Table 3.6 provides estimators for male and female children. Table 3.6 has specifications 
analogous to Tables 3.4 and 3.5. All columns point to the general conclusion that the compulsory 
education supported by free tuition programs more likely decreases the probability of working. It 
shows the impact on child labor is higher for males than females. It supports the notion that boys 
are more likely to work in the labor market than girls. Thus, free tuition decreases the chance of 
children working in the labor market earning income and profit for their parents. 
 
3.6.4. The impact on health outcomes 
3.6.4.1.Diarrhea, asthma or migraine  
Table 3.7 provides the estimated results for the probability of illness. Morbidity is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if a child experienced either diarrhea, asthma, or a migraine last month. Column 
(1) presents the standard DID approach while column (2) is the matching DID approach. Similar 
to previous schooling and working outcomes, both include controls for gender, marital status, age 
fixed effect, year of education, household size, a log of parent income, and whether a child is living 
in rural or urban areas. I also include crisis/recession period, municipality fixed effect and year 
fixed effects. 
Both models suggest similar results on the impact of compulsory education and free tuition 
on morbidity symptoms, larger for the matching DID than for the standard DID approach. It 
suggests bias from covariate imbalance does not vastly affect the estimated result. Both models 
suggest compulsory education and free tuition program are more likely to decrease experiences of 
morbidity symptoms more than 0.5 percentage points; it corresponds to more than a 15-percent 
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reduction from the pre-intervention period. It supports the notion that compulsory education and 
free tuition significantly increase schooling and decrease child labor, making children healthier. 
Table 3.7. The Impact on Illnesses’ Symptoms 
 Standard DID Matching DID 
VARIABLES Compulsory and Free Tuition Compulsory and Free Tuition 
 Illnesses Symptoms Illnesses Symptoms 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment*Post -0.005** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
   
Observations 418,207 343,292 
R-squared 0.014 0.015 
Age FE YES YES 
Controls* YES YES 
Crisis and Recession** YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6.4.2.By type of morbidity group  
I provide standard DID and matching DID estimates for three different morbidity groups 
in Table 3.8. Column (1) provides diarrhea symptoms, column (2) shows asthma symptoms, and 
column (3) shows migraine symptoms. Table 3.8 has specifications analogous to previous tables. 
The models suggest compulsory education and free tuition programs more likely reduce the 
probability of experiencing diarrhea symptoms by more than 0.2 percentage points, or more than 
a 25-percent reduction from the pre-free-tuition period. The intervention policy also more likely 
reduces migraine-symptom probability by more than 0.3 percentage points, or more than a 14-
percent reduction from the pre-free-tuition period. I find negative sign, although not significant, 
for asthma symptoms. 
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Table 3.8. The Impact on Diarrhea, Asthma, or Migraine 
 Standard and Matching DID 
VARIABLES Compulsory and Free Tuition 
 Diarrhea Asthma Migraine 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Standard Difference-in-Difference    
Treatment*Post -0.002* -0.000 -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 418,207 418,207 418,207 
R-squared 0.004 0.003 0.014 
    
Matching Difference-in-Difference    
Treatment*Post -0.003** -0.001 -0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations 343,292 343,292 343,292 
R-squared 0.005 0.003 0.015 
    
Age FE YES YES YES 
Controls* YES YES YES 
Crisis and Recession** YES YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Diarrhea may occur because of bacterial infection, parasites, or food poisoning. It is a 
morbidity symptom that causes the highest inpatient medical care in hospitals in Indonesia 
(Ministry of Health, Republic of Indonesia, 2011). Stress may cause migraine symptoms. 
Physically-demanding labor and long work hours for children may cause child stress. Asthma is a 
chronic inflammation disorder of the airways that leads to recurrent episodes of wheezing, 
breathlessness, chess tightness, and coughing (World Health Organization, 2003). Half cases of 
asthma are due to heredity and half result of environmental factors, including air pollutants 
(Oryszczyn et al., 2000; World Health Organization, 2003).  These findings support the notion that 
increasing schooling and lowering child labor for children may have a beneficial health impact on 
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children. They have more leisure playing with their friends at school. They are also less exposed 
to unhealthy environments because of a reduced chance of working long hours in physically-
demanding and/or unhealthy jobs such as garbage scavenging, food sales, or newspaper delivery. 
 
3.7. Impact of compulsory education per se 
The timing difference between the implementation of compulsory education per se and 
supporting free tuition creates an opportunity to investigate the impact of compulsory education 
per se without any other supporting education policy such as free tuition. Table 3.9 provides DID 
and matching DID estimators for child labor, and morbidity symptoms. The specifications in Table 
3.9 columns (1) and (2) are analogous to previous tables. The compulsory education period was 
the years 2003 and 2004 before free tuition was implemented. Column (1) is the impact on child 
labor, and column (2) is the impact on diarrhea, asthma, or migraine symptoms.   
The model suggests compulsory education per se does not significantly affect child labor 
and illness symptoms. Even though they are not significant, the matching DID model suggests 
compulsory education per se may increase the probability of child labor. However, smaller sample 
size might also cause insignificant results. It supports the economic model that compulsory 
education per se may increase household financial burdens, because families need to raise more 
money to pay school tuition and any other associated costs, when previously they had not needed 
to send their children to school. Raising the household burden may force children to work harder. 
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Table 3.9. The Impact of Compulsory Education 
 Compulsory Education 
VARIABLES Year <=2004 
 Work Illness 
 (1) (2) 
Standard DID   
Treatment*Post -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.004) 
Observations 55,133 55,133 
R-squared 0.060 0.019 
   
Matching DID   
Treatment*Post 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.005) 
Observations 44,913 44,913 
R-squared 0.067 0.022 
   
Age FE YES YES 
Controls* YES YES 
Crisis and Recession** YES YES 
Municipality FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.8. Robustness checks and falsification tests 
I employ robustness checks and falsification of our regression estimates to tests 
sensitivity of our estimates to omitted variable biases and difference-in-differences identifying 
assumption. 
3.8.1. Robustness checks 
In this section, I employ robustness checks to test the robustness of our primary results. I 
estimate variations of equation (21) both for compulsory education and free tuition and compulsory 
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education per se as robustness checks. Table N.1 provides robustness test results for compulsory 
and free tuition intervention. I use four specifications for each primary outcome both for standard 
DID and matching DID approaches.  Column (1) is a baseline regression provided in our primary 
results.  Column (2) excludes municipality fixed effect and time effects. If the particular local 
government was decreasing or increasing their budget allocation to the school, then I would expect 
substantial impacts on the program. Our results are robust to those specifications. Column (3) 
excludes years 2012-2014, and column (4) excludes 2009-2014, as the government substantially 
increased the amount of school funding per student in 2009 and 2012. I find periods with larger 
funding leads to a larger reduction in the probability of child labor.    
 
3.8.2. Falsification tests 
The identifying assumption for the DID approach is common parallel trends between 
treatment and control groups without any intervention. It implies that, without any intervention, 
both treatment and control groups would have parallel trends over time before the treatment period. 
I estimate various specification tests for artificial effects during the pre-treatment years.  Table O.1 
provides falsification tests for our three primary outcomes. I use the year 1999 as our artificial 
intervention since 1997, 1998 and 1999 are our pre-treatment years.   
I implement four different specifications for each outcome. In column (1), I exclude log of 
parent income since income data were not available in 1997. It gives us a two-year pre-artificial-
intervention (1997-1998) and one post-artificial-intervention period (1999). I include a log of 
parent income in column (2), thus excluding 1998 in our regression. Columns (3) and (4) follow 
similar specifications as columns (1) and (2), respectively. But I include both compulsory effects, 
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compulsory and free tuition effect in the regression to capture any impact that comes from those 
interventions. These specifications give us three treatment*post and post variables, one for 
artificial intervention and the rest for the actual intervention periods. In general, the model suggests 
that no estimators are significant and substantial reduced estimation magnitude. This result 
supports the notion that difference in outcomes is likely driven by the actual interventions. 
 
3.9. Conclusion 
It is widely accepted, in both developed and developing countries, that improvements in 
education, reduction in child labor, and increases in positive health outcomes are important public 
policies. The Indonesian government mandated all elementary and junior high schoolers to have a 
nine-year education, and they also supported the program with free tuition for these children as a 
natural experiment allowing us to analyze the impacts of compulsory education and free tuition 
programs on child labor and health outcomes. Overall, I find that children affected by compulsory 
and free tuition programs are less likely to provide child labor and have improved health outcomes. 
Larger impacts occur for low-income families, children in rural areas, and males. These imply free 
tuition eases their household budget constraints to keep their children in school and away from 
working. 
Our empirical results should be of interest to researchers and policymakers for designing 
and assessing compulsory education programs in developing countries. Our model implies 
compulsory education per se may not be effective to put children into school if the government 
does not give additional incentives for relaxing families' household budget constraints.  
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CONCLUSION REMARKS 
 
This dissertation examines three government policies about health and education in 
Indonesia and how their implication to the society.  The first chapter examines the impact of mobile 
hospital availability in underdeveloped and remote regions on medical care utilization using 
difference-in-differences and matching difference-in-differences approaches.  I found evidence 
that mobile hospital existence likely increases inpatient and outpatient utilization at public 
hospitals for municipalities which are located on main islands without any substitution effect for 
medical care utilization in private hospitals. I did not find evidence of increased public-hospital 
utilization for municipalities located on outer islands. A mobile hospital is located in one of the 
various small islands within districts. I have suggested that travel distance matters. I found that 
only areas in which new hospitals are closer than existing hospitals benefit from the intervention. 
Also, locations farther from newly-built hospitals are less likely to have inpatient and outpatient 
at public hospitals. Household more likely spends more on health when new hospitals appear. Our 
study suggests not only facility health center existence in remote areas, but also infrastructure, in 
general, are both critical to improving medical care utilization. 
Indonesia first introduced its universal insurance scheme in 2014.  One interesting feature 
is expansion dependent coverage from only the first two children to three children. A unique 
dependent coverage scheme for government-provided insurance allows us to analyze the impact 
of public insurance on medical care utilization in this second chapter. I find that eligible children 
are more likely to go to public hospitals for outpatient utilization.  There is a more considerable 
impact when I include both eligibility and co-payment reduction effects. That is, universal health 
coverage not only adds the third children to the scheme but also includes a co-payment reduction 
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from their initial program (Askes). I do not find evidence of increases in outpatient care in clinics, 
though there is a slight reduction in clinic outpatient care. The negligible price differential between 
insured and uninsured children in the public health center (Puskesmas) and different medical 
technological equipment between clinics and hospitals may be two reasons why there is slight 
reduction on public health centers.  
The Indonesian government mandated all elementary and junior high schoolers to have a 
nine-year education, and they also supported the program with free tuition for these children as a 
natural experiment allowing us to analyze the impacts of compulsory education and free tuition 
programs on child labor and health outcomes in our last chapter. Overall, I find that children 
affected by compulsory and free tuition programs are less likely to seek child labor and have 
improved health outcomes. Larger impacts occur for low-income families, children in rural areas, 
and males. These imply free tuition eases their household budget constraints to keep their children 
in school and away from working. 
Our empirical results should be of interest to researchers and policymakers for designing 
and assessing health and education policies in developing countries. On the whole, government 
policies understudies here are essential to the society in general. Deepen understanding population 
and geographic characteristics for those implemented systems such as household income, 
household occupation, rural/urban areas and a municipality archipelago could improve policy 
targeting. Furthermore, comparing how similar policy works in developed and developing 
countries may understand to promote those systems. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Travel Distance Information From Google Developer 
 
 
 
Figure A. 1. Travel Distance Information Obtained from Google Developer using R 
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Appendix B: Include Malinau Municipality 
 
 
 
Figure B. 1. Inpatient in Public Hospital (Include Malinau Municipality) 
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Appendix C: Medical Care Utilization, Outer Islands 
 
 
 
Figure C. 1. Inpatient in Public Hospital: Outer Islands 
 
 
  
 
Figure C. 2. Outpatient in Public Hospital: Outer Islands 
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Appendix D: Robustness Checks, Primary Outcomes 
 
Table D. 1. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Inpatient in Public Hospital (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0026*** 0.0019** 0.0020** 0.0023*** 0.0019** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Treatment 0.0013*** 0.0011** 0.0009*   
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
Post 0.0007** 0.0008*** 0.0008**   
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)   
Male  -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0003 0.0003 0.0007* 0.0007* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Rural  -0.0084*** -0.0082*** -0.0073*** -0.0074*** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
HH Size  -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0018** -0.0005 -0.0005 
(Central Gov)   (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Public Hospital    -0.0007** 0.0001 0.0002 
(Local Gov)   (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Travel Distance   -0.0009*** -0.0009** -0.0009** 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Travel Distance   0.0010*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
# of Beds/1000   -0.0002 -0.0007* -0.0009** 
population   (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.0046*** 0.0087*** 0.0097*** 0.0039*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
Observations 308,968 307,279 303,291 303,291 303,291 
R-squared 0.0003 0.0028 0.0029 0.0048 0.0050 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 2. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Inpatient in Public Hospital (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0014 0.0008 0.0009 0.0013 0.0015 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Treatment 0.0022*** 0.0017*** 0.0016***   
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)   
Post 0.0010** 0.0008* 0.0010**   
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)   
Male  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 0.0009 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education  0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0081*** -0.0079*** -0.0068*** -0.0069*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
HH Size  0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0024 0.0040 0.0038 
(Central Gov)   (0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0046) 
Public Hospital    -0.0014*** 0.0000 0.0001 
(Local Gov)   (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Travel Distance   -0.0009*** -0.0010** -0.0010** 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Travel Distance   0.0010*** 0.0029*** 0.0032*** 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
# of Beds/1000   -0.0008*** -0.0016*** -0.0018*** 
population   (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Constant 0.0045*** 0.0030*** 0.0052*** 0.0050*** 0.0099*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0022) 
Observations 299,193 299,193 299,193 299,193 299,193 
R-squared 0.0004 0.0028 0.0030 0.0054 0.0057 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 3. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Outpatient in Public Hospital (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0156*** 0.0134*** 0.0152*** 0.0171*** 0.0168*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0043) 
Treatment 0.0108*** 0.0103*** 0.0066***   
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)   
Post -0.0038*** -0.0023* -0.0029**   
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)   
Male  0.0010 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0008 0.0008 0.0011 0.0011 
  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Education  0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Rural  -0.0335*** -0.0338*** -0.0350*** -0.0350*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
HH Size  0.0006* 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Public Hospital   0.0079** -0.0040 -0.0019 
(Central Gov)   (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
Public Hospital    -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0010 
(Local Gov)   (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
Travel Distance   0.0011 0.0016 0.0015 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Travel Distance   0.0034*** 0.0030* 0.0028 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
# of Beds/1000   0.0025*** 0.0013 -0.0003 
population   (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Constant 0.0197*** 0.0392*** 0.0359*** 0.1001*** 0.1227*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0196) (0.0206) 
Observations 75,407 75,104 74,401 74,401 74,401 
R-squared 0.0031 0.0090 0.0103 0.0164 0.0189 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year  2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 4. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Outpatient in Public Hospital (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0115*** 0.0100** 0.0115*** 0.0118** 0.0119*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Treatment 0.0126*** 0.0103*** 0.0058**   
 (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025)   
Post -0.0038** -0.0045** -0.0046**   
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)   
Male  0.0023 0.0020 0.0015 0.0013 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  0.0011 0.0010 0.0014 0.0014 
  (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Education  0.0005** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Rural  -0.0432*** -0.0439*** -0.0465*** -0.0459*** 
  (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) 
HH Size  0.0005 0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Public Hospital   0.0086 -0.0129** -0.0144** 
(Central Gov)   (0.0063) (0.0058) (0.0062) 
Public Hospital    -0.0021 -0.0056* -0.0052* 
(Local Gov)   (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0031) 
Travel Distance   -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0021 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Travel Distance   0.0053*** 0.0046** 0.0050** 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
# of Beds/1000   0.0026** 0.0015 -0.0014 
population   (0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0025) 
Constant 0.0210*** 0.0494*** 0.0464*** 0.1392*** 0.1570*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0059) (0.0064) (0.0264) (0.0280) 
Observations 73,435 73,435 73,435 73,435 73,435 
R-squared 0.0030 0.0114 0.0137 0.0197 0.0242 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 5. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Inpatient in Public Hospital (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0025*** 0.0034*** 0.0023*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Treatment 0.0013*** 0.0008* 0.0003   
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)   
Post 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0007**   
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)   
Morbidity  0.0122*** 0.0122*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Male  -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education  0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Rural  -0.0077*** -0.0075*** -0.0068*** -0.0069*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
HH Size  0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Inaccessible    -0.0004 0.0012** 0.0015** 
Nearby   (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Public Hospital    0.0005*** 0.0003** 0.0007*** 
Nearby   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Ln(GRDP/Cap)   0.0001 -0.0018*** -0.0022*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Ln(Population)   -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0005 
   (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.0044*** 0.0017** 0.0112*** 0.0219*** 0.0181** 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0062) (0.0073) 
Observations 555,286 547,536 547,536 547,536 547,536 
R-squared 0.0004 0.0084 0.0086 0.0102 0.0105 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 6. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Inpatient in Public Hospital (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0024*** 0.0021*** 0.0026*** 0.0036*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Treatment 0.0011** 0.0004 -0.0001   
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
Post 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0009***   
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)   
Morbidity  0.0129*** 0.0130*** 0.0126*** 0.0126*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Male  -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Education  0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Rural  -0.0073*** -0.0072*** -0.0065*** -0.0066*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
HH Size  0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0002** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Inaccessible    0.0001 0.0012** 0.0015** 
Nearby   (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Public Hospital    0.0006*** 0.0002* 0.0007*** 
Nearby   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Ln(GRDP/Cap)   -0.0001 -0.0014** -0.0017** 
   (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Ln(Population)   -0.0008*** -0.0008** -0.0004 
   (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.0049*** 0.0010 0.0116*** 0.0174*** 0.0123 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0031) (0.0067) (0.0079) 
Observations 547,536 547,536 547,536 547,536 547,536 
R-squared 0.0004 0.0088 0.0089 0.0104 0.0107 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 7. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Outpatient in Public Hospital (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0208*** 0.0188*** 0.0230*** 0.0223*** 0.0217*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0036) 
Treatment 0.0108*** 0.0097*** 0.0037   
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023)   
Post 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0050***   
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014)   
Male  0.0015* 0.0011 0.0012 0.0010 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Age  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  -0.0000 -0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 
  (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Education  0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0336*** -0.0337*** -0.0333*** -0.0335*** 
  (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
HH Size  0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0004 0.0005* 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Inaccessible    0.0042*** 0.0094*** 0.0101*** 
Nearby   (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
Public Hospital    0.0027*** 0.0026*** -0.0001 
Nearby   (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
Ln(GRDP/Cap)   -0.0015** 0.0042 0.0038 
   (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
Ln(Population)   -0.0083*** -0.0012 0.0026 
   (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0021) 
Constant 0.0198*** 0.0343*** 0.1474*** 0.0306 -0.0006 
 (0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0141) (0.0320) (0.0377) 
Observations 120,939 117,259 117,259 117,259 117,259 
R-squared 0.0043 0.0109 0.0131 0.0193 0.0213 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year  2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 8. Robustness Checks: The Impact on Outpatient in Public Hospital (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0212*** 0.0187*** 0.0226*** 0.0218*** 0.0214*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036) 
Treatment 0.0085*** 0.0069*** 0.0005   
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023)   
Post 0.0020 -0.0000 -0.0044***   
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015)   
Male  0.0018* 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Age  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0001 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Education  0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Rural  -0.0347*** -0.0353*** -0.0337*** -0.0341*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
HH Size  0.0013*** 0.0010*** 0.0004 0.0005 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Inaccessible    0.0050*** 0.0090*** 0.0086*** 
Nearby   (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0029) 
Public Hospital    0.0030*** 0.0023*** -0.0012 
Nearby   (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Ln(GRDP/Cap)   -0.0030*** 0.0037 0.0040 
   (0.0007) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
Ln(Population)   -0.0085*** -0.0013 0.0031 
   (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0024) 
Constant 0.0205*** 0.0337*** 0.1629*** 0.0381 -0.0034 
 (0.0010) (0.0033) (0.0156) (0.0350) (0.0417) 
Observations 117,259 117,259 117,259 117,259 117,259 
R-squared 0.0036 0.0116 0.0138 0.0193 0.0214 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 9. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0053*** 0.0049*** 0.0048*** 0.0053*** 0.0051*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Treatment 0.0007 0.0003 0.0002   
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)   
Post -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0004   
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)   
Male  -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Education  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0049*** -0.0047*** -0.0046*** -0.0044*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
HH Size  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0019** -0.0009 -0.0008 
(Central Gov)   (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Public Hospital    0.0015*** 0.0003 0.0003 
(Local Gov)   (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Travel Distance   -0.0007*** -0.0005 -0.0006 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Travel Distance   0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
# of Beds/1000   0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0004 
population   (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Constant 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0037*** 0.0013 0.0107*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0024) 
Observations 123,957 123,249 121,486 121,486 121,486 
R-squared 0.0006 0.0026 0.0028 0.0043 0.0045 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 10. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0049*** 0.0046*** 0.0050*** 0.0054*** 0.0051*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Treatment 0.0010 0.0006 -0.0003   
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)   
Post -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004   
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)   
Male  -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Age  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Education  0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0043*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
HH Size  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Public Hospital   0.0054* 0.0038 0.0050 
(Central Gov)   (0.0029) (0.0046) (0.0048) 
Public Hospital    0.0025*** 0.0002 0.0004 
(Local Gov)   (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Travel Distance   -0.0008*** -0.0009* -0.0011** 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Travel Distance   0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
# of Beds/1000   -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0012 
population   (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.0040*** 0.0027* 0.0022 0.0019 0.0082*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0024) 
Observations 118,422 118,422 118,422 118,422 118,422 
R-squared 0.0008 0.0028 0.0031 0.0043 0.0046 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 11. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0459*** 0.0444*** 0.0465*** 0.0510*** 0.0490*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0078) 
Treatment 0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0045   
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0033)   
Post -0.0065*** -0.0026 -0.0036   
 (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022)   
Male  0.0039** 0.0040** 0.0037** 0.0037** 
  (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Age  0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0024 -0.0023 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Education  0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Rural  -0.0275*** -0.0279*** -0.0270*** -0.0256*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0062) 
HH Size  0.0029*** 0.0027*** 0.0013* 0.0014* 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Public Hospital   0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0040 
(Central Gov)   (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Public Hospital    0.0074*** -0.0029 -0.0006 
(Local Gov)   (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Travel Distance    0.0041** 0.0041** 
(Total (100 Km))    (0.0020) (0.0019) 
Travel Distance    -0.0058** -0.0074*** 
(Water (100 Km))    (0.0024) (0.0024) 
# of Beds/1000    0.0017 0.0015 
population    (0.0023) (0.0021) 
Constant 0.0203*** 0.0174** 0.0102 0.0851*** 0.1055*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0199) (0.0218) 
Observations 30,385 30,243 30,018 30,018 30,018 
R-squared 0.0082 0.0146 0.0159 0.0223 0.0263 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 12. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0373*** 0.0372*** 0.0368*** 0.0406*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0078) 
Treatment -0.0009 -0.0035 -0.0052   
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0036)   
Post -0.0067*** -0.0021 -0.0027   
 (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0030)   
Male  0.0059*** 0.0058*** 0.0052** 0.0052** 
  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Age  0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0013 
  (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Education  0.0006** 0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0007** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Rural  -0.0332*** -0.0340*** -0.0315*** -0.0289*** 
  (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0080) 
HH Size  0.0045*** 0.0044*** 0.0026** 0.0028** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Public Hospital   -0.0001 -0.0144** -0.0131* 
(Central Gov)   (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0067) 
Public Hospital    0.0062 -0.0079* -0.0051 
(Local Gov)   (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0046) 
Travel Distance    0.0016 0.0003 
(Total (Km))    (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Travel Distance    -0.0030 -0.0047 
(Water (Km))    (0.0030) (0.0033) 
# of Beds    0.0017 -0.0015 
    (0.0032) (0.0031) 
Constant 0.0203*** 0.0114 0.0051 0.1135*** 0.1324*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0273) (0.0303) 
Observations 29,334 29,334 29,334 29,334 29,334 
R-squared 0.0065 0.0174 0.0179 0.0256 0.0281 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 13. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Public Hospital, Outer Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0010 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Treatment 0.0014** 0.0015** 0.0008   
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)   
Post 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 0.0017***   
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
Male  -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0011** 0.0012** 0.0014*** 0.0014** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0103*** -0.0100*** -0.0087*** -0.0088*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
HH Size  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0019 -0.0010 -0.0015 
(Central Gov)   (0.0015) (0.0091) (0.0092) 
Public Hospital    -0.0020*** -0.0017 -0.0018 
(Local Gov)   (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Travel Distance   -0.0010*** -0.0014** -0.0014** 
(Total (Km))   (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Travel Distance   0.0014*** 0.0042*** 0.0043*** 
(Water (Km))   (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
# of Beds   -0.0003 -0.0014* -0.0009 
   (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Constant 0.0049*** 0.0115*** 0.0131*** 0.0070*** 0.0060*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
Observations 185,011 184,030 181,805 181,805 181,805 
R-squared 0.0003 0.0031 0.0034 0.0053 0.0057 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 14. Robustness Checks: Inpatient at Public Hospital, Outer Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0002 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Treatment 0.0026*** 0.0022*** 0.0013*   
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)   
Post 0.0019*** 0.0015** 0.0015**   
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)   
Male  -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0011* 0.0012* 0.0014** 0.0014** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Education  0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0098*** -0.0092*** -0.0077*** -0.0078*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
HH Size  -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0005 -0.0051 -0.0085 
(Central Gov)   (0.0021) (0.0063) (0.0066) 
Public Hospital    -0.0037*** -0.0031** -0.0026* 
(Local Gov)   (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
Travel Distance   -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0009 
(Total (Km))   (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Travel Distance   0.0011** 0.0042*** 0.0044*** 
(Water (Km))   (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
# of Beds   -0.0014*** -0.0025*** -0.0022* 
   (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Constant 0.0047*** 0.0105*** 0.0135*** 0.0058** 0.0048*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0018) 
Observations 180,771 180,771 180,771 180,771 180,771 
R-squared 0.0003 0.0029 0.0037 0.0063 0.0066 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 15. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Outer Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post -0.0055 -0.0079* -0.0058 -0.0038 -0.0016 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0051) 
Treatment 0.0178*** 0.0187*** 0.0100***   
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0029)   
Post -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0010   
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)   
Male  -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0019 
  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Age  0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0019 0.0024 0.0027 0.0026 
  (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Education  0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0005** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Rural  -0.0364*** -0.0353*** -0.0374*** -0.0366*** 
  (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
HH Size  -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0007 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Public Hospital   0.0101 -0.0257*** -0.0206*** 
(Central Gov)   (0.0070) (0.0046) (0.0056) 
Public Hospital    -0.0065*** -0.0019 -0.0033 
(Local Gov)   (0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0033) 
Travel Distance    -0.0050** -0.0036 
(Total (Km))    (0.0025) (0.0026) 
Travel Distance    0.0154*** 0.0148*** 
(Water (Km))    (0.0025) (0.0025) 
# of Beds    -0.0005 0.0004 
    (0.0038) (0.0043) 
Constant 0.0193*** 0.0499*** 0.0511*** 0.0471*** 0.0397*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0075) (0.0066) 
Observations 45,022 44,861 44,383 44,383 44,383 
R-squared 0.0024 0.0095 0.0133 0.0188 0.0210 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 16. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Outer Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post -0.0041 -0.0064 -0.0033 -0.0060 -0.0019 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0059) 
Treatment 0.0204*** 0.0189*** 0.0086**   
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0034)   
Post -0.0020 -0.0050* -0.0039   
 (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)   
Male  -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0013 
  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Age  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  0.0021 0.0023 0.0021 0.0024 
  (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Education  0.0005* 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Rural  -0.0480*** -0.0488*** -0.0527*** -0.0516*** 
  (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062) 
HH Size  -0.0012** -0.0010* -0.0010* -0.0009 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Public Hospital   0.0170 -0.0196*** -0.0218*** 
(Central Gov)   (0.0132) (0.0055) (0.0069) 
Public Hospital    -0.0062** -0.0062* -0.0062* 
(Local Gov)   (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0034) 
Travel Distance    -0.0050* -0.0042 
(Total (Km))    (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Travel Distance    0.0125*** 0.0128*** 
(Water (Km))    (0.0029) (0.0030) 
# of Beds    0.0008 -0.0035 
    (0.0042) (0.0047) 
Constant 0.0213*** 0.0675*** 0.0677*** 0.0658*** 0.0588*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0076) (0.0083) (0.0107) (0.0094) 
Observations 44,101 44,101 44,101 44,101 44,101 
R-squared 0.0034 0.0130 0.0174 0.0233 0.0272 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 17. Medical Care Utilization, Excluding Municipality with 2012 Opening as Control 
Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public Hospital 
 All Samples Main Islands All Samples Main Islands 
Treatment*Post 0.0229*** 0.0607*** 0.0029*** 0.0064*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0075) (0.0007) (0.0013) 
Morbidity   0.0122*** 0.0142*** 
   (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Male 0.0005 0.0038** -0.0007*** -0.0001 
 (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Age 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married -0.0004 -0.0067*** 0.0005 -0.0006 
 (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Education 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Rural -0.0332*** -0.0234*** -0.0073*** -0.0045*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0055) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
HH Size 0.0005 0.0028*** 0.0002*** 0.0003** 
 (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Inaccessible  0.0084** 0.0190*** 0.0030*** 0.0009 
Nearby (0.0033) (0.0064) (0.0008) (0.0011) 
Public Hospital  -0.0007 -0.0105*** 0.0010*** -0.0003 
Nearby (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Ln(GRDP/Cap) 0.0047 -0.0322*** -0.0030*** -0.0016 
 (0.0033) (0.0093) (0.0007) (0.0014) 
Ln(Population) 0.0047** 0.0127** -0.0010** 0.0019** 
 (0.0024) (0.0050) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
Constant 0.0284*** 0.0462 0.0284*** -0.0101 
 (0.0081) (0.0972) (0.0081) (0.0162) 
     
Observations 93,903 32,442 431,882 168,775 
R-squared 0.0240 0.0454 0.0110 0.0150 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Year 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 18. Medical Care Utilization Including Municipality with 2012 Opening as Treatment 
Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public Hospital 
 All Samples Main Islands All Samples Main Islands 
Treatment*Post 0.0171*** 0.0417*** 0.0021*** 0.0067*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0080) (0.0005) (0.0012) 
Morbidity   0.0118*** 0.0114*** 
   (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Male 0.0010 0.0045*** -0.0006*** -0.0006** 
 (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Age 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married 0.0004 -0.0034* 0.0002 -0.0010** 
 (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
Education 0.0009*** 0.0012*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Rural -0.0340*** -0.0313*** -0.0069*** -0.0047*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0044) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
HH Size 0.0006* 0.0021*** 0.0002** 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Inaccessible  0.0114*** -0.0023* 0.0016*** 0.0013* 
Nearby (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Public Hospital  0.0006 -0.0085 0.0008*** 0.0003 
Nearby (0.0010) (0.0079) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Ln(GRDP/Cap) 0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0026*** -0.0015 
 (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0007) (0.0012) 
Ln(Population) 0.0032 0.0812 -0.0006 -0.0008 
 (0.0021) (0.0763) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Constant 0.0055 -0.0023* 0.0294*** 0.0238* 
 (0.0385) (0.0013) (0.0077) (0.0133) 
     
Observations 117,259 46,877 547,536 226,362 
R-squared 0.0211 0.0308 0.0105 0.0108 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Year 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 19. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0053*** 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 0.0056*** 0.0055*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Treatment 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0029*   
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0016)   
Post -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0005   
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)   
Morbidity  0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Male  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Education  0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0048*** -0.0048*** -0.0044*** -0.0041*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
HH Size  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0017* -0.0001 -0.0000 
(Central Gov)   (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Public Hospital    0.0012** -0.0002 -0.0000 
(Local Gov)   (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Travel Distance   -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0041*** 0.0012 0.0016 0.0011 0.0101*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0026) 
Observations 123,957 123,249 121,486 121,486 121,486 
R-squared 0.0006 0.0063 0.0066 0.0079 0.0082 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 20. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0062*** 0.0066*** 0.0056*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
Treatment 0.0013 0.0001 -0.0027   
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0024)   
Post -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005   
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)   
Morbidity  0.0100*** 0.0102*** 0.0100*** 0.0100*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Male  0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Age  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0016 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Education  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0044*** -0.0045*** -0.0042*** -0.0042*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
HH Size  0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Public Hospital   0.0055 0.0063 0.0074 
(Central Gov)   (0.0038) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Public Hospital    0.0016** -0.0009 -0.0006 
(Local Gov)   (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Travel Distance   -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0040*** -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0043 
 (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0028) 
Observations 106,331 106,331 106,331 106,331 106,331 
R-squared 0.0012 0.0074 0.0078 0.0085 0.0087 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 21. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0459*** 0.0444*** 0.0481*** 0.0520*** 0.0504*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0081) 
Treatment 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0065   
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0066)   
Post -0.0065*** -0.0026 -0.0031   
 (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022)   
Male  0.0039** 0.0041** 0.0038** 0.0038** 
  (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Age  0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0023 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Education  0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Rural  -0.0275*** -0.0274*** -0.0264*** -0.0253*** 
  (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
HH Size  0.0029*** 0.0027*** 0.0012 0.0013* 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Public Hospital   0.0057 -0.0036 -0.0039 
(Central Gov)   (0.0038) (0.0056) (0.0057) 
Public Hospital    0.0131*** -0.0001 0.0017 
(Local Gov)   (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) 
Travel Distance   0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0001** 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0000 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0203*** 0.0174** 0.0139* 0.0819*** 0.1031*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0203) (0.0221) 
Observations 30,385 30,243 30,018 30,018 30,018 
R-squared 0.0082 0.0146 0.0170 0.0229 0.0267 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 22. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Main Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0498*** 0.0491*** 0.0474*** 0.0489*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0080) (0.0081) 
Treatment -0.0047 -0.0070** 0.0013   
 (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0074)   
Post -0.0098*** -0.0048 -0.0045   
 (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0036)   
Male  0.0069*** 0.0067** 0.0060** 0.0059** 
  (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Age  0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  -0.0046 -0.0045 -0.0055 -0.0052 
  (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Education  0.0006* 0.0007** 0.0007* 0.0007* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Rural  -0.0283*** -0.0283*** -0.0227** -0.0222** 
  (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0090) 
HH Size  0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0024** 0.0027** 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Public Hospital   -0.0040 -0.0230** -0.0263** 
(Central Gov)   (0.0066) (0.0103) (0.0119) 
Public Hospital    0.0089** -0.0110** -0.0115** 
(Local Gov)   (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0055) 
Travel Distance   0.0000** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   0.0000 0.0001* 0.0001* 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant 0.0235*** 0.0034 -0.0122 0.0702*** 0.0656*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.0243) (0.0253) 
Observations 26,756 26,756 26,756 26,756 26,756 
R-squared 0.0102 0.0209 0.0222 0.0323 0.0343 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 23. Robustness Checks: Inpatient at Public Hospital, Outer Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0010 0.0008 0.0016 0.0015 0.0013 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) 
Treatment 0.0014** 0.0015*** 0.0018   
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011)   
Post 0.0016*** 0.0013*** 0.0012**   
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)   
Morbidity  0.0114*** 0.0115*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Male  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0014*** 0.0014** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Education  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0100*** -0.0095*** -0.0083*** -0.0083*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) 
HH Size  0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0042 
(Central Gov)   (0.0015) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
Public Hospital    -0.0026*** 0.0017 0.0019 
(Local Gov)   (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Travel Distance   -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0049*** 0.0067*** 0.0079*** 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0015) 
Observations 185,011 184,030 181,805 181,805 181,805 
R-squared 0.0003 0.0078 0.0083 0.0098 0.0102 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 24. Robustness Checks: Inpatient at Public Hospital, Outer Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0003 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Treatment 0.0037*** 0.0028*** 0.0028**   
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0012)   
Post 0.0032*** 0.0026*** 0.0026***   
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)   
Morbidity  0.0145*** 0.0140*** 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 
  (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Male  -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Age  0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0012 0.0013* 0.0013* 0.0013* 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Education  0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0116*** -0.0104*** -0.0076*** -0.0076*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
HH Size  -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0029 -0.0062 -0.0080 
(Central Gov)   (0.0043) (0.0059) (0.0062) 
Public Hospital    -0.0053*** -0.0004 0.0005 
(Local Gov)   (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Travel Distance   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   -0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Constant 0.0044*** 0.0073*** 0.0085*** 0.0063*** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0019) 
Observations 143,899 143,899 143,899 143,899 143,899 
R-squared 0.0005 0.0100 0.0109 0.0132 0.0134 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 25. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Outer Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post -0.0055 -0.0079* -0.0048 -0.0022 0.0003 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0052) 
Treatment 0.0178*** 0.0187*** 0.0166***   
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0049)   
Post -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0007   
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)   
Male  -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0019 
  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Age  0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0019 0.0023 0.0026 0.0025 
  (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Education  0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0005** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Rural  -0.0364*** -0.0349*** -0.0366*** -0.0358*** 
  (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
HH Size  -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0007* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Public Hospital   0.0101 -0.0223*** -0.0175*** 
(Central Gov)   (0.0070) (0.0055) (0.0063) 
Public Hospital    -0.0073*** 0.0082 0.0064 
(Local Gov)   (0.0023) (0.0057) (0.0056) 
Travel Distance   -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0000* 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
   (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant 0.0193*** 0.0499*** 0.0504*** 0.0478*** 0.0411*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0075) (0.0066) 
Observations 45,022 44,861 44,383 44,383 44,383 
R-squared 0.0024 0.0095 0.0135 0.0192 0.0215 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table D. 26. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Outer Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post -0.0091 -0.0093 -0.0060 -0.0084 -0.0041 
 (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0061) 
Treatment 0.0203*** 0.0163*** 0.0156***   
 (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0058)   
Post -0.0008 -0.0049 -0.0025   
 (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033)   
Male  -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0015 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Age  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married  0.0023 0.0023 0.0021 0.0023 
  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Education  0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Rural  -0.0657*** -0.0637*** -0.0636*** -0.0626*** 
  (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0079) 
HH Size  -0.0015** -0.0012* -0.0013* -0.0012* 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Public Hospital   0.0194 -0.0065 -0.0066 
(Central Gov)   (0.0185) (0.0066) (0.0088) 
Public Hospital    -0.0093** 0.0073 0.0107* 
(Local Gov)   (0.0036) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Travel Distance   -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(Total (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Travel Distance   0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(Water (Km))   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# of Beds   0.0001*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
   (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant 0.0231*** 0.0894*** 0.0800*** 0.1030*** 0.1072*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0102) (0.0110) (0.0227) (0.0235) 
Observations 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 35,000 
R-squared 0.0028 0.0182 0.0220 0.0294 0.0332 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix E: Falsification Test, Primary Outcomes   
 
Table E. 1. Falsification Test, All Samples (DID) 
VARIABLES Outpatient Public Hospital Inpatient Public Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment*Post 0.009 0.003 0.011* -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Morbidity    0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HH Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Hospital -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Central Gov) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Hospital  0.007* 0.007** 0.007* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Local Gov) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Travel Distance 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Total (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Travel Distance 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(Water (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Beds -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.081*** 0.035** 0.084*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Observations 41,483 41,483 41,483 171,834 171,834 171,834 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 
Artificial Year 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E. 2. Falsification Test, All Samples (Matching DID) 
VARIABLES Outpatient Public Hospital Inpatient Public Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment*Post 0.010 0.008 0.013** -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Morbidity    0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HH Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Hospital -0.017** -0.017** -0.018** 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(Central Gov) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Public Hospital  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(Local Gov) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Travel Distance -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Total (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Travel Distance 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(Water (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Beds -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.131** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Observations 41,099 41,099 41,099 170,085 170,085 170,085 
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 
Artificial Year 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E. 3. Falsification Test, Main Islands (DID) 
VARIABLES Outpatient Public Hospital Inpatient Public Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment*Post -0.003 -0.012 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Morbidity    0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HH Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Hospital -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(Central Gov) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Public Hospital  0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(Local Gov) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Travel Distance 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Total (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Travel Distance -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(Water (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Beds -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.067*** 0.013 0.067*** 0.002 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Observations 16,549 16,549 16,549 67,183 67,183 67,183 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 
Artificial Year 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table E. 4. Falsification Test, Main Islands (Matching DID) 
VARIABLES Outpatient Public Hospital Inpatient Public Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment*Post -0.014 -0.016 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Morbidity    0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HH Size 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Hospital -0.030** -0.030** -0.031** 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(Central Gov) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Public Hospital  -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
(Local Gov) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Travel Distance 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(Total (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Travel Distance -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(Water (Km)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of Beds 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.050 0.004 0.005* 0.005 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
       
Observations 14,810 14,810 14,810 59,109 59,109 59,109 
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Region*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 
Artificial Year 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix F: Travel Distance Between New Hospital and Existing Hospital, Outer Islands 
 
 
 
Figure F. 1. Travel Distance Between New Hospital and Existing Hospital, Outer Islands  
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Appendix G: Travel Distance and Inpatient, Treated Sub-District 
 
 
 
Figure G. 1. Travel Distance and Inpatient, Treated Sub-District  
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Appendix H: Robustness Checks, Private Hospital, Main Islands 
 
Table H. 1. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Private Hospital, Main Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0030 0.0021 0.0018 0.0036 0.0000 
 (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Treatment 0.0012 0.0010 0.0016   
 (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017)   
Post -0.0018* -0.0019* -0.0017   
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)   
Male  0.0019*** 0.0020*** 0.0018** 0.0018** 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Age  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0009 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Education  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0047* -0.0044* -0.0032 -0.0035 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
HH Size  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Public Hospital   0.0046* 0.0050 0.0049 
(Central Gov)   (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0035) 
Public Hospital    0.0032*** 0.0004 0.0005 
(Local Gov)   (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Travel Distance   -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0012 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Travel Distance   0.0004 0.0005 -0.0001 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
# of Beds/1000   -0.0011*** 0.0001 -0.0000 
Population   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Constant 0.0048*** 0.0075** 0.0059* 0.0011 -0.0023 
 (0.0008) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0057) 
Observations 29,731 29,593 29,370 29,370 29,370 
R-squared 0.0004 0.0014 0.0020 0.0072 0.0104 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table H. 2. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Private Hospital, Main Islands (DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0009 0.0006 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Treatment 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003   
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)   
Post 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003   
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)   
Male 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Age 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0007** 0.0006** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education 0.0001** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Rural -0.0012** -0.0011** -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0012** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
HH Size -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 
(Central Gov)   (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Public Hospital    0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005 
(Local Gov)   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Travel Distance   -0.0004*** -0.0005** -0.0005** 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Travel Distance   0.0002* -0.0007 -0.0008 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
# of Beds/1000   -0.0005*** -0.0002 -0.0002 
Population   (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Constant 0.0011*** 0.0011* 0.0015** 0.0010 -0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0016) 
Observations 123,567 122,859 121,097 121,097 121,097 
R-squared 0.0001 0.0005 0.0007 0.0020 0.0025 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table H. 3. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Private Hospital, Main Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0037 0.0034 0.0023 0.0033 0.0010 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Treatment 0.0008 0.0004 0.0011   
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)   
Post -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0005   
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)   
Male  0.0011 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Age  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0012 0.0013 0.0011 0.0011 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Education  -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Rural  -0.0073** -0.0074** -0.0068** -0.0066** 
  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
HH Size  0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Public Hospital   0.0030 -0.0042** -0.0036* 
(Central Gov)   (0.0060) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
Public Hospital    0.0013 -0.0013 0.0003 
(Local Gov)   (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
Travel Distance   0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 
(Total (1000 Km))   (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Travel Distance   -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0031** 
(Water (1000 Km))   (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
# of Beds/1000   -0.0012*** -0.0002 -0.0004 
Population   (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Constant 0.0036*** 0.0084** 0.0075** 0.0065 0.0050 
 (0.0008) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0044) 
Observations 28,695 28,695 28,695 28,695 28,695 
R-squared 0.0005 0.0020 0.0025 0.0061 0.0096 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table H. 4. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Private Hospital, Main Islands (Matching DID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Treatment*Post 0.0009 0.0008 0.0006 0.0010 0.0007 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Treatment 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000   
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)   
Post 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004   
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)   
Male  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Age  0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Married  0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0007** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Education  0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Rural  -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0023*** -0.0024*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
HH Size  0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Public Hospital   -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 
(Central Gov)   (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Public Hospital    0.0001 -0.0009* -0.0008 
(Local Gov)   (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Travel Distance   -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 
(Total (100 Km))   (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Travel Distance   -0.0001 -0.0011* -0.0014** 
(Water (100 Km))   (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
# of Beds/1000   -0.0006*** -0.0003 -0.0002 
population   (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0011*** 0.0016* 0.0021*** 0.0020* 0.0007 
 (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0014) 
Observations 118,035 118,035 118,035 118,035 118,035 
R-squared 0.0001 0.0009 0.0013 0.0030 0.0034 
Municipality FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Region*Year FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 2004-2011 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix I: Falsification Test, Household Health Expenditures 
 
Table I. 1. Falsification Test, Household Health Expenditures, Main Islands (DID and Matching 
DID) 
VARIABLES Difference in Difference Matching Difference in Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Household Health Expenditures Household Health Expenditures 
Treatment*Post -27,486.448 -44,208.012 74,238.718 -25,312.307 28,875.119 93,300.930 
 (53,941.841) (60,764.900) (100,839.627) (63,231.799) (78,189.427) (115,287.869) 
Male -27,402.072 -27,331.244 -26,649.470 -107,929*** -106,993*** -106,809*** 
 (49,467.949) (49,322.461) (49,297.482) (39,235) (38,923.948) (38,975.582) 
Age 3,184.492** 3,178.681** 3,183.030** 2,030.941 2,034.051 2,031.306 
 (1,306.388) (1,310.652) (1,308.566) (1,372.147) (1,384.379) (1,375.456) 
Married -29,225.423 -29,384.343 -28,308.166 3,188.946 3,992.208 4,232.868 
 (46,967.691) (47,255.762) (47,082.572) (67,633.301) (68,229.465) (67,890.196) 
Education 49,992.859*** 50,053.191*** 49,865.165*** 34,318.918** 34,221.875** 34,205.858** 
 (15,291.336) (15,264.797) (15,281.679) (14,356.303) (14,329.154) (14,356.582) 
Rural 20,087.633 20,095.064 20,090.972 -49,987.554 -50,793.428 -51,856.871 
 (98,160.124) (98,162.528) (98,170.757) (36,030.649) (35,589.490) (35,244.090) 
HH Size 4,345.408 4,298.102 4,393.323 6,740.020 6,806.071 6,759.004 
 (4,310.933) (4,297.845) (4,313.660) (4,793.144) (4,780.208) (4,810.554) 
Public Hospital -192,789*** -192,846*** -194,417*** -217,832*** -222,207*** -224,104*** 
(Central Gov) (67,726.509) (67,726.798) (67,734.449) (67,201) (67,400.600) (67,314.557) 
Public Hospital  -74,337.674*** -73,097.343*** -76,566.605*** -34,627.063 -38,228.364 -38,706.656 
(Local Gov) (25,838.211) (26,445.920) (26,257.777) (25,474.231) (28,033.548) (26,364.114) 
Travel Distance 8,002.761 8,728.885 8,191.572 31,154.607 32,004.033 31,159.882 
(Total (100 
Km)) 
(15,533.534) (15,445.355) (15,442.869) (24,041.646) (22,246.016) (21,978.073) 
Travel Distance -64,109** -64,049.238** -65,559.172** -105,646* -106,878** -105,610** 
(Water (100 
Km)) 
(29,454.097) (29,467.474) (29,420.080) (56,660.990) (53,902.845) (52,860.456) 
# of Beds -188.599 -178.671 -227.339 372.927* 362.752* 337.670* 
 (507.489) (507.442) (506.828) (196.500) (191.495) (199.230) 
Constant -403,601.086 108,109.486 -480,480.832 18,560.415 27,160.450 -67,641.206 
 (394,791.846) (431,079.595) (391,911.818) (71,172.423) (68,644.921) (85,790.910) 
Observations 16,457 16,457 16,457 14,536 14,536 14,536 
R-squared 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.036 0.036 0.037 
Subdistrict FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Reg*Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 2004-2007 
Artificial Year 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix J. Medical Care Utilization, Hospital 
 
 
Figure J. 1. Outpatient in Public Hospital (1st, 2nd, 3rd Children) 
Figure J. 2. Outpatient in Private Hospital (1st, 2nd, 3rd Children)  
 
165 
 
 
Figure J. 3. Outpatient in Public Hospital (3rd and afterward children) 
 
 
Figure J. 4. Outpatient in Private Hospital (3rd and afterward children) 
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Figure J. 5. Inpatient in Private Hospital (1st, 2nd, 3rd Children) 
 
 
Figure J. 6. Inpatient in Private Hospital (1st, 2nd, 3rd Children) 
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Figure J. 7. Inpatient in Public Hospital (3rd and afterward children) 
 
 
Figure J. 8. Inpatient in Private Hospital (3rd and afterward children) 
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Appendix K. Public Health Center Medical Care Utilization Service Fees in Jakarta (Jakarta 
Governor Regulation 68/2012) 
Utilization 
Fees (IDR) 
<=5000 5001-10000 10001-50000 50001-100000 >100000 
Outpatient (%) 25.28% 17.84% 41.64% 7.43% 7.81% 
Services Policlinic includes 
lung, skin, dental; 
laboratory;  
Emergency 
Specialist, 
Dental; 
Emergency 
Birth control 
programs, 
healthy 
women and 
children 
services 
ultrasound, 
laboratory, 
vasectomy 
Surgical 
operation, 
tubectomy, 
prosthesis 
Inpatient (%) 6.38% 21.28% 55.32% 6.38% 10.64% 
Services healthy baby/day,  doctor visit Inpatient 
room/day, 
doctor visit, 
ambulance 
Inpatient 
room/day 
Birth 
delivery 
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Appendix L: Robustness Checks, Primary Outcomes 
Table L. 1. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Hospital 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
      
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.045** 0.043** 0.043** 0.042** 0.041* 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 5,014 4,995 4,985 4,980 4,980 
R-squared 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.074 
      
      
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.044* 0.045** 0.045** 0.044* 0.044** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 18,820 18,761 18,737 18,675 18,675 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.032 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table L. 2.Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.041** 0.039** 0.039** 0.038** 0.039** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 5,014 4,995 4,985 4,980 4,980 
R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.063 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.039** 0.039** 0.039** 0.039** 0.039** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 18,820 18,761 18,737 18,675 18,675 
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.025 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table L. 3. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Private Hospital 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 5,014 4,995 4,985 4,980 4,980 
R-squared 0.004 0.011 0.012 0.018 0.070 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 18,820 18,761 18,737 18,675 18,675 
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.026 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table L. 4. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Birth Order 1st ,2nd , and 3rd 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.040** 0.038** 0.038** 0.037** 0.037** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Observations 4,573 4,557 4,547 4,542 4,542 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.070 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 0.037** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 17,251 17,198 17,176 17,116 17,116 
R-squared 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.026 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 5. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Birth Order 3rd , 4th-10th 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 1,233 1,224 1,223 1,223 1,223 
R-squared 0.010 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.149 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050** 0.050*** 0.054*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 4,194 4,173 4,183 4,161 4,161 
R-squared 0.016 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.073 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 6. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Hospital 
      
VARIABLES Inpatient 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Hospital 
Inpatient 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 5,014 4,995 4,985 4,980 4,980 
R-squared 0.004 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.049 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 18,824 18,765 18,741 18,679 18,679 
R-squared 0.005 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.030 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 7. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Public Hospital 
 Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Observations 5,014 4,995 4,985 4,980 4,980 
R-squared 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.042 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 18,824 18,765 18,741 18,679 18,679 
R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.019 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 8. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Private Hospital 
 Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient 
VARIABLES Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 5,014 4,995 4,985 4,980 4,980 
R-squared 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.053 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 18,824 18,765 18,741 18,679 18,679 
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.026 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 9. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Hospital (Only Excluding Family Who Has Twins 
2nd and 3rd Children) 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.045** 0.043** 0.043** 0.041* 0.039* 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 5,110 5,091 5,081 5,076 5,076 
R-squared 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.074 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.043* 0.045** 0.045** 0.043* 0.044** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Observations 19,073 19,014 18,990 18,928 18,928 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.032 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 10. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Only Excluding Family Who 
Has Twins 2nd and 3rd Children) 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.040** 0.039** 0.039** 0.038** 0.038** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 5,110 5,091 5,081 5,076 5,076 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.063 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 0.038** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 19,073 19,014 18,990 18,928 18,928 
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.026 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 11. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Private Hospital (Only Excluding Family Who 
Has Twins 2nd and 3rd Children) 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.006 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 5,110 5,091 5,081 5,076 5,076 
R-squared 0.004 0.011 0.012 0.018 0.070 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 19,073 19,014 18,990 18,928 18,928 
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.026 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 12. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Hospital (Only Excluding Family Who Has Twins 
2nd and 3rd Children) 
 Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient 
VARIABLES Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.008 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 5,110 5,091 5,081 5,076 5,076 
R-squared 0.005 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.054 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 19,077 19,018 18,994 18,932 18,932 
R-squared 0.005 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.031 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 13. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Public Hospital (Only Excluding Family Who Has 
Twins 2nd and 3rd Children) 
 Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 5,110 5,091 5,081 5,076 5,076 
R-squared 0.003 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.050 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 19,077 19,018 18,994 18,932 18,932 
R-squared 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.022 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 14. Robustness Checks: Inpatient in Private Hospital (Only Excluding Family Who Has 
Twins 2nd and 3rd Children) 
 Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient Inpatient 
VARIABLES Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 5,110 5,091 5,081 5,076 5,076 
R-squared 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.052 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 19,077 19,018 18,994 18,932 18,932 
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.026 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 15. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Hospital (Family with at least 3 children) 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.051** 0.045** 0.046** 0.044** 0.044** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 3,145 3,132 3,123 3,119 3,119 
R-squared 0.008 0.015 0.016 0.026 0.086 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.051** 0.051** 0.052** 0.051** 0.051** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Observations 10,584 10,552 10,532 10,478 10,478 
R-squared 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.039 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 16. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Family with at least 3 children) 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.043** 0.037** 0.037** 0.036** 0.036** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 3,145 3,132 3,123 3,119 3,119 
R-squared 0.006 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.090 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.040** 0.040** 0.040** 0.039** 0.040** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 10,584 10,552 10,532 10,478 10,478 
R-squared 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.039 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 17. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Private Hospital (Family with at least 3 children) 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 3,145 3,132 3,123 3,119 3,119 
R-squared 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.028 0.078 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 10,584 10,552 10,532 10,478 10,478 
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.035 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 18. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Hospital, Born after March 1994 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A:DID      
Treatment*Post 0.054** 0.053** 0.053** 0.051** 0.044* 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Observations 2,820 2,820 2,820 2,819 2,819 
R-squared 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.027 0.102 
Panel B:DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.052** 0.053** 0.053** 0.053** 0.051** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Observations 11,600 11,600 11,599 11,582 11,582 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.040 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 19. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Public Hospital, Born after March 1994 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
Public 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 2,820 2,820 2,820 2,819 2,819 
R-squared 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.026 0.080 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.048** 0.048** 0.048** 0.049** 0.048** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Observations 11,600 11,600 11,599 11,582 11,582 
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.030 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table L. 20. Robustness Checks: Outpatient in Private Hospital, Born after March 1994 
 Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient Outpatient 
VARIABLES Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
Private 
Hospital 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Observations 2,820 2,820 2,820 2,819 2,819 
R-squared 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.098 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 11,600 11,600 11,599 11,582 11,582 
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.035 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix M: Falsification Tests, Primary Outcomes 
 
Table M. 1. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2007) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Observations 3,702 3,702 3,692 3,688 3,688 
R-squared 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.087 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Post -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 -0.018 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 12,399 12,399 12,375 12,331 12,331 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.016 0.044 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality 
FE 
NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
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Table M. 2. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2007) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Public 
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 3,702 3,702 3,692 3,688 3,688 
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.078 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Observations 12,403 12,403 12,379 12,335 12,335 
R-squared 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.023 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
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Table M. 3. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Private Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2007) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
Outpatient 
Private 
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Observations 3,702 3,702 3,692 3,688 3,688 
R-squared 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.017 0.092 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Observations 12,403 12,403 12,379 12,335 12,335 
R-squared 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.035 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
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Table M. 4. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2000) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Observations 3,702 3,702 3,692 3,688 3,688 
R-squared 0.003 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.087 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.013 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 12,399 12,399 12,375 12,331 12,331 
R-squared 0.004 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.044 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
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Table M. 5. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2000) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient  
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient  
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 3,702 3,702 3,692 3,688 3,688 
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.079 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 12,403 12,403 12,379 12,335 12,335 
R-squared 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.023 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
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Table M. 6. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Private Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2000) 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient  
Private  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Private  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Private  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Private  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Private  
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 3,702 3,702 3,692 3,688 3,688 
R-squared 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.017 0.092 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post 0.015* 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 12,403 12,403 12,379 12,335 12,335 
R-squared 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.036 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
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Table M. 7. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2007; 
Birth Order: 1st, 2nd, 3rd) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient  
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Observations 3,302 3,302 3,292 3,288 3,288 
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.087 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 11,040 11,040 11,018 10,976 10,976 
R-squared 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.036 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
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Table M. 8. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2007; 
Birth Order: 3rd, 4th – 10th) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient  
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.021 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Observations 1,029 1,029 1,028 1,028 1,028 
R-squared 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.030 0.157 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.031 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.028 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Observations 3,302 3,302 3,299 3,291 3,291 
R-squared 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.092 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 
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Table M. 9. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2000; 
Birth Order: 1st, 2nd, 3rd) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient  
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 3,302 3,302 3,292 3,288 3,288 
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.015 0.087 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 11,040 11,040 11,018 10,976 10,976 
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.036 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
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Table M. 10. Falsification Test: Outpatient in Public Hospital (Artificial Treatment Year: 2000; 
Birth Order: 3rd, 4th – 10th) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Outpatient  
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
Outpatient   
Public  
Hospital 
      
Panel A: DID      
Treatment*Post -0.021 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Observations 1,029 1,029 1,028 1,028 1,028 
R-squared 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.030 0.157 
Panel B: DDD      
Treatment*Gov*Post -0.025* -0.027* -0.027* -0.028* -0.023 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Observations 3,302 3,302 3,299 3,291 3,291 
R-squared 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.093 
Controls NO NO YES YES YES 
Birth Order FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Age FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Religion FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Municipality FE NO NO NO NO YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Artificial Year 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
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Appendix N: Robustness Checks 
 
Table N. 1. Robustness Checks: The Effect of Compulsory and Free Tuition 
 
 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, Parent Income and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Baseline 
Regression 
Without 
Municipality 
and Year FE 
Exclude Year 
2012-2014 
Exclude 
Year 2009-
2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Matching-DID     
Work -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Illnesses -0.007*** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Standard-DID     
Work -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Illnesses -0.005** -0.004* -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Crisis/Recession** YES YES YES YES 
Controls* YES YES YES YES 
Municipality FE YES NO YES YES 
Year FE YES NO YES YES 
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Appendix O: Falsification Test 
 
Table O. 1. Falsification Test: The Effect of Compulsory and Free Tuition 
OUTCOMES 
VARIABLES 
With Parent 
Income;  
1998-1999*** 
Without Parent 
Income;  
1997-1999*** 
Without 
Parent 
Income;  
Include 1997, 
2005, 2009 
With Parent 
Income;  
Exclude 
1997, 2005, 
2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Matching-DID     
Work -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Illnesses 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
Standard-DID     
Work 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Illnesses 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
Year 1998-1999 1997-1999 1997-2014 1998-2014 
Ln(Parent Income) YES NO NO YES 
Controls* YES YES YES YES 
Age FE YES YES YES YES 
Crisis/Recession** YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Mun*Year FE YES YES YES YES 
* Controls include Gender, Marital Status, Education, HH Size, and Rural 
** Crisis and Recession include crisis/recession and interaction between crisis/recession and treatment 
*** Regression before compulsory education without controlling compulsory (2003) and compulsory education 
and free tuition (2005) intervention variables 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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